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Rumor has it that in 1896 there were only four motor vehicles in all
of the United States and two, improbably, collided, thus ushering in
the era of auto accidents on American soil-a problem that plagues us
still.' Automobiles are central to the American way of life, "per-
mit[ing] an impatient people to conquer space and time." 2 Yet, as
many of us know too well, they sometimes collide, and when they do,
the cumulative toll they take is breathtaking. Since the time of that
first auto accident, nearly 3.5 million Americans have perished, and
today, auto collisions injure 2.5 million Americans per year, constitute
the leading cause of death for those from age five to thirty-four, and
kill roughly 35,000 Americans annually.3 Their practical influence on
tort law is unparalleled, accounting for the majority of all injury claims
and three-quarters of all injury damage payouts.4 And their economic
cost is substantial, accounting for expenditures of $255 billion annu-
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1. JEFFREY O'CONNELL, THE INJURY INDUSTRY, at viii (1971). Others date the first automo-
bile death to New York in 1899. CHARLES MCCARRY, CITIZEN NADER 28 (1972).
2. JERRY L. MASHAw & DAVID L. HARFST, THE STRUGGLE FOR AuTo SAFETY, at ix (1990).
3. For the fact that auto accidents are the leading cause of death for those between age five
and thirty-four, see Motor Vehicle Safety, CDC, http://www.cdc.gov/Motorvehiclesafety/in-
dex.html (last visited Aug. 30, 2011). For automobiles' annual death toll, see ANDERS
LONGTHORNE ET AL., NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., AN ANALYSIS OF THE SIGNIFI-
CANT DECLINE IN MOTOR VEHICLE TRAFFIc FATALITIES IN 2008, at app., at 27 tbl.A1 (2010)
[hereinafter NHTSA, 2008 DECLINE].
4. JAMES M. ANDERSON ET AL., RAND, THE U.S. EXPERIENCE WITH NO-FAULT Auromo-
BILE INSURANCE: A RETROSPECTIVE 1 (2010); NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, EXAMINING THE
WORK OF STATE COURTS: AN ANALYSIS OF 2008 STATE COURT CASELOADs 28 (2010) (report-




ally5-or, to put that sum in perspective, about as much as the federal
government spent in 2010 on education and transportation, com-
bined.6 It is no wonder, then, that how to pay for auto accidents-and
lessen their effect-has long been a subject of intense debate and a
matter of profound concern.
In the second half of the last century, an innovative "no-fault" plan
by Professors Robert Keeton and Jeffrey O'Connell seemed to supply
the answer: it seemed to represent a workable solution to the age-old
question of how to deliver more equitable, more efficient, more swift,
and more certain compensation to auto accident victims in the United
States. Under the Keeton-O'Connell plan, as it came to be known,
tort law-with its individualized determination of fault and idiosyn-
cratic calculation of damages-would be jettisoned for all but the
most seriously hurt, and all auto accident victims would instead re-
ceive prompt, albeit partial, compensation from their own (meaning
first-party) insurer.
As the no-fault concept gained traction in the late 1960s and early
1970s, its proponents believed that replacing tort with no-fault legisla-
tion was not only something that should be done; it was also some-
thing that could be done. It was, as President Richard Nixon boldly
declared, "an idea whose time has come."7 During a roughly seven-
year period from 1970 to 1977, some type of no-fault legislation
seemed perennially on the verge of widespread enactment.8 In 1971,
Massachusetts's insurance commissioner predicted that "[n]o-fault
will sweep the country," a prediction Business Week said many viewed
as "a simple statement of fact."9 In 1972, Time ran an article entitled
No-Fault Catches Fire and quoted a no-fault foe conceding that fight-
5. For the $255 billion figure (which comes from 2008), see NAT'L SAFETY COUNCIL, INJURY
FACTS 90 (2010).
6. See Government Spending Details, http://www.usgovernmentspending.com/year20l0_US.
html (last visited Aug. 26, 2011).
7. President Richard Nixon went on to call no-fault "a vast improvement and a genuine re-
form." Carroll Kilpatrick, Nixon Suggests States Approve No-Fault Plans, WASH. POST, June 8,
1972, at A27. President Nixon made this statement in a telegram that he sent to Governor Arch
A. Moore, Jr. of West Virginia, who was then serving as chair of the National Governors' Con-
ference. Id. President Nixon opposed federal legislation, however, preferring a state-by-state
strategy.
8. See STEPHEN D. SUGARMAN, DOING AWAY WITH PERSONAL INJURY LAW: NEW COMPEN-
SATION MECHANISMS FOR VICTIMS, CONSUMERS, AND BUSINESS 102 (1989) (stating that "at one
time auto no-fault seemed likely to sweep the nation"); Rough Ride and New Roads Ahead for
Auto Insurers, Bus. WK., Mar. 28, 1970, at 118 ("Many industry observers feel that ... eventually
[no-fault insurance] will be enacted in all states."). For more on no-fault's "inevitability," see
infra note 21 and accompanying text.
9. No-Fault Wins Its Case, Bus. WK., July 31, 1971, at 74 (quoting C. Eugene Farnam, Massa-
chusetts Insurance Commissioner).
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ing the legislation had become a "losing cause."10 In 1973, Senator
Philip A. Hart of Michigan opened hearings on an ambitious national
no-fault bill by declaring, "As of now, there is general agreement that
we must change our present liability-based insurance system with its
inefficiencies and inadequacies and inequities, and go to a no-fault
plan."" Most remarkable of all, even Benjamin Marcus, a co-founder
of the American Trial Lawyers Association (ATLA)-the organiza-
tion that some say did more than any other to stymie no-fault's adop-
tion-at least privately noted, "We feel it is probable that when the
dust has all cleared, No Fault will be conceded by all to be substan-
tially speedier, less wasteful, and more fair than our present system." 12
Meanwhile, no-fault enjoyed the vocal and consistent support of the
nation's most respected newspaper editorial boards.' 3 It received at
least the wavering support of the American people.14 And it was the
subject of a flurry of legislative activity. At the federal level, a few
10. No-Fault Catches Fire, TIME, Mar. 6, 1972, at 64, 64 (quoting Thomas Cargill, Jr., a Boston
lawyer who waged an unsuccessful court challenge to the Massachusetts legislation).
11. National No-Fault Motor Vehicle Insurance Act: Hearings on S. 354 Before the S. Comm.
on Commerce, 93d Cong. 1 (1973) (statement of Sen. Philip A. Hart).
12. Philip A. Hart, National No-Fault Auto Insurance: The People Need It Now, 21 CATH. U.
L. REV. 259, 303 (1972) (quoting Letter from Benjamin Marcus, Muskegon, Mich. to Senator
Philip A. Hart (June 28, 1971)).
13. See, e.g., Editorial, For Auto Insurance Reform, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Apr. 7, 1971, at 37; Edi-
torial, It's Time for No-Fault, Cm. TRIB., May 19, 1975, § 2, at 2; Editorial, No-Fault Insurance
Works, Bus. WK., July 31, 1971, at 80, 80; Editorial, No Fault: The Time Has Come, WASH. PosT,
July 17, 1977, at B6; Editorial, One More Reason for No-Fault, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 1977, at 40;
Editorial, The No-Fault Auto Plan, Bos. GLOBE, Mar. 21, 1969, at 20; Editorial, A Promising
Direction, WALL ST. J., Nov. 6, 1968, at 20; Editorial, The 'No-Fault' Insurance Plan, S.F.
CHRON., Mar. 24, 1971, at 38; Editorial, The Tired Argument on No-Fault, L.A. TIMEs, May 15,
1975, pt. 2, at 6; see also Automobile Insurance Reform and Cost Savings: Hearings on S. 945 and
Others Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, 92d Cong. 1792 (1971) (statement of T. Lawrence
Jones, President, American Insurance Association (AIA)) ("The newspapers and all other news
media have been overwhelmingly favorable.").
14. See Editorial, A Reasonable Approach to No-Fault, WASH. PosT, Sept. 20, 1975, at A8
("[N]o fault has gained wide popular acceptance in the last decade."); 3 of 4 in Poll Favor No-
Fault Insurance, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 1977, at 22 (reporting on a nationwide poll commissioned
by Kemper Insurance); No-Fault Insurance Is Urged, SPARTANBURG HERALD-J., Apr. 15, 1973,
at A5 (describing polls favoring no-fault in North Carolina); Editorial, Poll Finds No-Fault In-
surance Backed when It Is Understood, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 1971, at 82 (reporting on a nation-
wide Gallup Poll finding that those who understood no-fault supported it four-to-one); John
Riley, No-Fault Insurance Plan Gains Support in Midwest Poll, Bos. GLOBE, May 11, 1969, at 58
(reporting on results of surveys in Minnesota and Illinois showing popular support for no-fault).
Not all consumer surveys found support for no-fault, however. See, e.g., Automobile Insurance
Reform and Cost Savings: Hearings on S. 945 and Others Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, 92d
Cong. 998-1006 (1971) (statement of Andr6 Maisonpierre, Vice President and Manager of the
American Mutual Insurance Alliance (AMIA)) (reporting on a survey that found staunch con-
sumer opposition); Craig Spangenberg, The Public Attitude: 'Let's Not Misrepresent It,' TRIAL,
Oct.-Nov. 1970, at 34, 34-35 (reporting on surveys finding support for the fault-based status
quo).
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muscular no-fault bills made it to the Senate floor, and one even
passed in 1974 before dying in the House of Representatives.' 5 But it
was in the states, not in Congress, that no-fault really came of age. By
1974, all states had considered no-fault legislation.16 And by 1976, lit-
tie more than a decade after the modern no-fault movement began,
more than two dozen states-encompassing the majority of Ameri-
cans-had actually enacted some type of no-fault legislation, and six-
teen states had enacted laws restricting motorists' right to sue.17
Then something remarkable happened: The no-fault movement
stopped, quite abruptly, in its tracks. No new state has enacted a no-
fault regime since 1976. A handful of states (Colorado, Connecticut,
Georgia, Nevada, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania) have, in recent
years, repealed their mandatory no-fault legislation.18 On California's
ballot in 1988 and 1996, voters twice rejected no-fault initiatives, the
first time so convincingly the vote was dubbed a "massacre."19 And
15. In 1972, a restrictive no-fault bill, which would have dramatically limited tort access while
also mandating generous first-party coverage, narrowly missed passage in the Senate by a vote of
49-46. See Spencer Rich, Carter Backs No-Fault Bill, WASH. PosT, July 15, 1977, at Al. Two
years later, another strong bill passed the Senate 53-42, but died in the House of Representa-
tives. Id. Another bill again narrowly missed Senate passage in 1976 with a vote of 49-45. Id.
These defeats were not preordained. See, e.g., Mike Feinsilber, Support Rising for 'No-Fault,'
WASH. POST, Nov. 28, 1971, at F1 ("The betting is that Congress will pass a [no-fault] law next
year .... ); No-Fault Wins Its Case, supra note 9, at 74 ("[T]he talk in Washington these days is
that the national no-fault bill backed by Senator Philip A. Hart (D-Mich.) could pass Congress in
1972.").
16. No-Fault Motor Vehicle Insurance (Part II): Hearings on H.R. 10 and Others Before the H.
Subcomm. on Commerce and Fin. of the Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 93d Cong.
1362 (1974) (statement of the AMIA) ("Every state has considered no-fault legislation.").




1973 Connecticut, Hawaii, Michigan, Nevada, New Jersey
1974 Colorado, Kansas, New York, Utah
1975 Georgia, Kentucky, Minnesota, Pennsylvania
1976 North Dakota
18. New Jersey and Pennsylvania have replaced their no-fault laws with choice systems, which
permit motorists to choose to surrender the right to claim for noneconomic damages (at least for
their less serious injuries) in return for discounted premiums. For more on auto choice, see infra
note 92. Colorado repealed its no-fault legislation in 2003. Connecticut repealed its legislation
in 1994. Washington, D.C. repealed its no-fault legislation in 1986. Georgia repealed its no-fault
legislation in 1991. Nevada repealed its legislation in 1980. DAVID S. LOUGHRAN, RAND, THE
EFFECT OF NO-FAULT AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE ON DRIVER BEHAVIOR AND AUTOMOBILE Ac-
CIDENTS IN THE UNITED STATES 7 (2001).
19. Five auto insurance reform initiatives were on California's 1988 ballot, and no-fault forces
(pro and con) spent a combined $83 million variously championing and assailing these mea-
sures-a staggering sum that exceeded the cost of the entire 1984 presidential election. Of the
$83 million, pro-no-fault forces contributed the lion's share, roughly $55 million. See ANDERSON
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appearing on Arizona's ballot in 1990, choice no-fault was trounced,
receiving a pathetic 15% of votes cast.20 In short, in the span of one
decade, automobile no-fault went from being widely viewed as "inevi-
table" to having, it is said, "breathed its last breath," become some-
thing of a "dead letter," and met its sad "demise." 2 1
Why? It is a question of significant import. Automobile no-fault
legislation is the second most ambitious alternative compensation
scheme ever enacted in the United States.22 The enactment of alter-
native compensation schemes is a topic that is both timely-as the
recent creation of the September 11th and Gulf Coast compensation
funds attest-and fundamental. Yet, until very recently, there was a
notable absence of careful investigation into no-fault's heady rise and
precipitous fall.2 3 Most who have commented upon no-fault's failure,
meanwhile, have told one of a few simple stories.24 These accounts
ET AL., supra note 4, at 51 (providing the $55 million figure). Even so, the 1988 no-fault provi-
sion, Proposition 104, received only 25% of the vote cast, while the 1996 no-fault provision,
Proposition 200, fared only marginally better. Edward L. Lascher, Jr. & Michael R. Powers, An
Introduction to Choice No-Fault, in THE ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF CHOICE NO-FAULT IN-
SURANCE 24 (Edward L. Lascher, Jr. & Michael R. Powers eds., 2001); see also THOMAS F.
BURKE, LAWYERS, LAWSUITS, AND LEGAL RIGHTS: THE BATTLE OVER LITIGATION IN AMERI-
CAN SOCIETY 118 (2002) ("Prop. 104 was massacred, receiving only 25 percent of the vote.");
BURKE, supra, at 131-32 (describing the 1996 initiative). For more on California's epic battles
over no-fault, see Stephen D. Sugarman, California's Insurance Regulation Revolution: The First
Two Years of Proposition 103, 27 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 683 (1990).
20. Final Election Results, USA TODAY, Nov. 8, 1990, at A6 (reporting on Arizona's proposi-
tion 203).
21. For "inevitability," see Automobile Insurance Reform and Cost Savings: Hearings on S.
945 Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, 92d Cong. 2305 (1971) (statement of Melvin L. Stark,
Vice President of Government Affairs, AIA) ("It now seems clear and unmistakable that no-
fault auto insurance is inevitable .... ); Editorial, The 'No Fault' Insurance Plan, S.F. CHRON.,
Mar. 24, 1971, at 38 ("'No Fault' insurance in various versions appears inevitable."); Robert N.
Gilmore, General Counsel, American Insurance Association, Letter to the Editor, 'No-Fault':
Inevitable or Improbable?, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 1971, at 36 (deeming no-fault "inevitable"). For
no-fault's fall, see KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, THE LIABILITY CENTURY: INSURANCE AND TORT
LAW FROM THE PROGRESSIVE ERA To 9/11, at 100 (2008) (stating no-fault had "breathed its last
breath"); Robert L. Rabin, The Renaissance of Accident Law Plans Revisited, 64 MD. L. REV.
699, 725 (2005) (observing that no-fault has become something of "a dead letter"); Harvey Ro-
senfield, Auto Insurance: Crisis and Reform, 29 U. MEM. L. REV. 69, 86 (1998) (documenting no-
fault's "demise").
22. It is second, of course, only to workers' compensation, discussed in some detail below.
23. See ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 4, at 3 ("The field ... lacks an overall retrospective of
the experience in the United States with no-fault insurance that can provide a historical perspec-
tive on this policy question and help explain why no-fault was adopted, flourished, and then lost
some of its political luster as a policy option.").
24. There are two main exceptions: Kenneth Abraham's The Liability Century and a recent
RAND report authored by James M. Anderson, Paul Heaton, and Stephen J. Carroll. Both
make significant contributions to the literature but are also incomplete in various respects.
Abraham's treatment raises a number of important points, but, with only four pages devoted to
no-fault's failure, necessarily leaves many questions underexplored and unanswered. ABRAHAM,
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tend to either suggest that no-fault was fairly tried and lost on its mer-
its, failed because the plaintiffs' bar's staunch resistance could not be
overcome, or some combination of both.25
And, I readily admit, there is much truth to these accounts. In some
respects, the no-fault concept itself (quite apart from any plaintiffs'
lawyers' mischievous tinkering) did trigger problems that weren't an-
ticipated. There is some evidence, for example, that no-fault is associ-
ated with increased fatality rates-a problem no-fault supporters did
not predict. It is also true that the plaintiffs' bar lobbied hard against
no-fault legislation-and sometimes won-defeating the legislation
altogether. Meanwhile, even when no-fault managed to squeak by
over plaintiffs' lawyers' vehement objections, the plaintiffs' bar often
demanded, and sometimes obtained, certain concessions that made it
harder for no-fault legislation to achieve its stated cost-cutting, court-
clearing, and fraud-fighting goals. "The trial lawyers water it down,
shoot it in the kneecap, and then protest that it doesn't work very
well," no-fault architect Jeffrey O'Connell lamented. 26
supra note 21, at 97-100 (discussing "The Demise of an 'Incontestable' Idea"). The recent
RAND report, meanwhile, is more detailed but mostly focused on the cost question. ANDERSON
ET AL., supra note 4.
25. Some take the position that no-fault failed because its costs were too high. See, e.g., AN-
DERSON ET AL., supra note 4, at 143 (concluding that "no-fault's decline in popularity is closely
related to its expense"). Others take the position that the plaintiffs' bar, with its back to the
wall, crushed the nascent reform. See, e.g., Editorial, Who Faults No-Fault?, NEw REPUBLIC,
Jan. 20, 1973, at 9, 9 ("No-fault insurance is an old idea that long ago would have become law
except for the fact that it deprives a whole class of lawyers of their income."); Virginia E. Nolan
& Edmund Ursin, Dean Leon Green and Enterprise (No-Fault) Liability: Origins, Strategies, and
Prospects, 47 WAYNE L. REV. 91, 150 (2001) (attributing no-fault's failure to plaintiffs' lawyers'
efforts); Rowland Evans & Robert Novak, America's Most Powerful Lobby, READER's DIG.,
Apr. 1994, at 131, 133 (same). And indeed, even ATLA itself seems to take credit for no-fault's
failure. See Battle Enlisting Public Support Raises Questions on No-Fault, TRIAL, Nov.-Dec.
1971, at 51, 51-52 (crediting ATLA's Washington, D.C. "information tour" with slowing down
federal no-fault legislation). For those who believe that no-fault failed because trial lawyers
watered it down, see infra note 26 and accompanying text.
26. Karl Stark, No-Fault Insurance Idea Draws Renewed Interest, PHILA. INQUIRER, Feb. 2,
2003, at El (quoting Jeffrey O'Connell). Echoing this sentiment, the AIA's T. Lawrence Jones
has testified: "[N]o-fault's opponents have taken the new no-fault model, fouled up its spark
plugs, watered down its gasoline, put on an artificially low price tag, then claimed the product
doesn't run right." Federal Standards for No-Fault Motor Vehicle Accident Benefits Act: Hear-
ings on H.R. 285 Before the H. Subcomm. on Consumer Prot. and Fin. of the Comm. on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce, 95th Cong. 450 (1977) (statement of T. Lawrence Jones, President,
AIA); see also KENNETH J. MEIER, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REGULATION: THE CASE OF
INSURANCE 119 (1988) ("Even in states that passed no-fault laws, trial attorneys were able to
gain concessions that rendered the laws ineffective."); Peter Kinzler, Auto Insurance Reform
Options: How to Change State Tort and No-Fault Laws to Reduce Premiums and Increase Con-
sumer Choice, NAT'L Ass'N oF MuT. INS. Cos. ISSUE ANALYSIS, Aug. 2006, at 12 ("In practice,
many of the laws have failed to keep premiums in check. The main reason for this lies in the
thresholds that the trial bar succeeded in weakening, as a matter of self-interest, before the laws
2012] NO-FAULT'S "DEMISE" 309
But even while the failed-on-the-merits/trial-lawyers-killed-it ac-
counts of no-fault's failure get much right, they also miss important
texture and gloss over interesting puzzles. A careful review of the
voluminous legislative record surrounding no-fault, for example, un-
derscores that even if one accepts that no-fault failed because its costs
were higher than anticipated, arguably the prime culprit for that was
not any "shot fired" by hostile trial lawyers but rather auto insurers'
primary-payer status. And that primary status, we will see, was not in
the original Keeton-O'Connell plan; nor was it championed by the
plaintiffs' lawyer lobby. That no-fault feature, which arguably did
more than any other to drive up the reform's cost, was, rather, de-
manded by those within the insurance industry, ostensibly supportive
of the plan.
Furthermore, even if it is true that no-fault failed on the merits be-
cause promised insurance premium reductions did not materialize, a
question remains: Why did sophisticated no-fault advocates sell the
legislation to the public on that basis-particularly since promising
rate reductions gave no-fault critics an objective yardstick against
which the legislation could be judged and no-fault's ability to cut pre-
miums was not clear. Indeed, throughout the early 1970s, many prom-
inent (now we see prescient) voices within the insurance industry
cautioned against pinning no-fault's success to rate reductions, repeat-
edly warning that rate reductions were speculative and, even if they
came to pass, would represent "only a fraction of what the ardent ad-
vocates seem to be promising." 27 And though insurers' warnings
might be discounted, 28 even unconflicted no-fault supporters ap-
were adopted."); What Ever Happened to No-Fault?, CONSUMER REP., Sept. 1984, at 511, 546
(blaming trial lawyers for either "blocking" no-fault or so weakening the legislation as to make it
ineffective).
27. Ross G. Hume, A Review of "No-Fault," 39 INs. CouNs. J. 346, 348 (1972); see, e.g., Auto-
mobile Insurance Reform and Cost Savings: Hearings on S. 945 and Others Before the S. Comm.
on Commerce, 92d Cong. 499 (1971) (statement of Harold Eustis, Chairman of Casualty Com-
mittee, National Association of Insurance Agents) ("There is also an apparent widespread belief
that there would be an automatic reduction in the cost of insurance were such a no-fault system
adopted. We believe this is a false, or at least speculative, assumption."); No-Fault Motor Vehi-
cle Insurance: Hearings on H.R. 285 and Others Before the H. Subcomm. on Consumer Prot. and
Fin. Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 94th Cong. 395 (1975) (statement of Andr6
Maisonpierre, Vice President, AMIA) ("I do not think that anybody can say that there is going
to be a cost reduction. I think that particular issue .. . is wide open."); No-Fault Plans "First
Aid"-"Major Surgery" Needed, TRIAL, Nov.-Dec. 1971, at 5, 5 ("It is unfortunate that no
fault's promise to lower rates has captured the headlines.... [T]here is no guarantee that ... rate
reductions will be established." (quoting Roger C. Wilkins, chairman of the board of Travelers
Insurance Companies)).
28. Not all insurers wanted no-fault, and even those who did likely wanted to insulate them-
selves from committing to rate cuts.
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peared to recognize that they were overstating this part of the case,
privately conceding, the Associated Press reported, "that the money-
saving claims were a come-on and not realistic."29 Given this obvious
risk and uncertainty, one must inquire why certain no-fault propo-
nents nevertheless made bold and insistent cost-cutting claims.30
Just as there are gaps in the conventional explanation to be filled,
there is also, I believe, a broader and more sweeping narrative to be
told. Robert L. Rabin has suggested "that the fundamental structure
of rights to reparation and responsibilities for harm is likely to be al-
tered only when tort reform rides on the coattails of [other] more
powerful ideological impulse[s]." 31 To illustrate, he highlights why
and when workers' compensation-the other, more prominent no-
fault movement of the twentieth century-took hold.
Between 1910 and 1921, with what was described at the time as a
kind of "magical rapidity," nearly all states jettisoned the tort system
for workplace accidents and replaced tort with an administrative
scheme, which (like auto no-fault) was something of a compromise.32
In place of tort's slow, uncertain, but theoretically complete recovery,
workers' compensation gave injured employees prompt, guaranteed-
but limited-relief. The history of the workers' compensation move-
ment is rich, thickly written, and in some ways contested. But it seems
clear that when workers' compensation swept the nation in the early
years of the last century, at least four powerful forces converged.
First, workers' compensation came about during the Progressive Era,
a time when there was a flood of child labor and women's rights legis-
lation, a number of health and safety reforms, a broad reassessment of
the state's police power obligations, and a pervasive confidence in ad-
ministrative competence. 33 Second, it was adopted at a time when
Americans' perception of workplace accidents subtly shifted. Ameri-
29. Louise Cook, No-Fault Insurance Has Faults, but Main Goal Succeeds, WINONA DAILY
NEWS, Oct. 31, 1977, at 8.
30. See, e.g., James S. Kemper, Jr., The Basic Protection Plan: Reform or Regression?, in CRI-
SIs IN CAR INSURANCE 99, 110-11 (Robert E. Keeton et al. eds., 1968) (recounting fantastic
promises and predictions made by Robert Keeton, Jeffrey O'Connell, and others). For addi-
tional examples, see infra note 145-47 and accompanying text.
A notable exception was Percy Foor of Pennsylvania. Foor sponsored a no-fault bill in Penn-
sylvania, even while he disclaimed any likely rate reduction and, in fact, warned that "no-fault
insurance may mean a significant increase in costs for many." Foor Offers No-Fault Bill, BED-
FORD GAZEITE, Feb. 21, 1973, at 1.
31. Robert L. Rabin, Some Reflections on the Process of Tort Reform, 25 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
13, 18 (1988).
32. JOHN FABIAN WIr, THE ACCIDENTAL REPUBLIC: CRIPPLED WORKINGMEN, DESTITUTE
wIDOWS, AND THE REMAKING OF AMERICAN LAW 127 (2004).
33. Rabin, supra note 31, at 17-18; see also Robert L. Rabin, The Politics of Tort Reform, 26
VAL. U. L. REv. 709, 710 (1992).
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cans came to believe that accidents were not just the unhappy conse-
quence of individual carelessness; accidents, instead, came to be
viewed as predictable and inevitable, making it more sensible for the
loss to be borne collectively. 34 Third, the legislation swept the nation
when workplace injuries were on the rise,35 and the human story be-
hind these otherwise dry statistics was artfully conveyed to the Ameri-
can public, who perceived a crisis in their midst.36 Fourth and finally,
these developments came together when there was relatively limited
first-party insurance37 and profound dissatisfaction with the private
law status quo, burdened as it was with the "unholy trinity" of em-
ployer defenses, which created serious and often insurmountable ob-
stacles to workers' recovery.38
So too, initially, with automobile no-fault legislation. No-fault legis-
lation burst onto the national stage as at least four factors coalesced to
open a unique policy window for its enactment. First, as Rabin points
out, no-fault-embraced by consumer groups as necessary consumer
legislation-got its hearing during the "Public Interest Era" of the late
1960s, a time when there was a surge of support for consumer and
environmental legislation and when at least twenty-five consumer, en-
vironmental, and social regulatory laws won congressional passage.39
34. ABRAHAM, supra note 21, at 52-53 (describing the evolution); Wir, supra note 32, at
63-4 (explaining that, "[b]y the turn of the century, . . . many accidents seemed increasingly
difficult to trace to any human fault" and there was an increasing sense that accidents were "the
inevitable risks of enterprise").
35. The railway injury rate, for example, doubled from 1889 through 1906. Lawrence M.
Friedman & Jack Ladinsky, Social Change and the Law of Industrial Accidents, 67 COLUM. L.
REV. 50, 60 (1967).
36. See PRICE V. FISHBACK & SHAwN EVERErr KANTOR, A PRELUDE TO THE WELFARE
STATE: THE ORIGINS OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION 99 (2000) (discussing the growing attention
paid to workplace accidents in the first decade of the twentieth century); Friedman & Ladinsky,
supra note 35, at 69 ("By 1900, industrial accidents and the shortcomings of the fellow-servant
rule were widely perceived as problems that had to be solved.").
37. ABRAHAM, supra note 21, at 44-45 (documenting workers' limited life, accident, and disa-
bility insurance around the turn of the century).
38. The "unholy trinity" of defenses were contributory negligence, the assumption of risk, and
the fellow-servant doctrine. By the time workers' compensation was enacted, some of these
common law defenses were already under assault as legislatures and courts were in the process
of adopting a series of laws weakening or overturning the "unholy trinity." FISHBACK & KAN-
TOR, supra note 36, at 23, 88.
39. Rabin, supra note 31, at 21 (observing that, just as workers' compensation must be viewed
against the backdrop of the Progressive era, "automobile no-fault requires attentiveness to the
consumer-environmental movement which began to crystallize in the late 1960s (the 'Public In-
terest Era'), and reached a crescendo of political activity at precisely the same time as the auto-
mobile no-fault movement"); see also VIRGINIA E. NOLAN & EDMUND URSIN, UNDERSTANDING
ENTERPRISE LIABILIfY: RETHINKING TORT REFORM FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 56
(1995) ("Appearing during the consumer movement .... the Keeton-O'Connell plan was the
right plan at the right time."). For the twenty-five figure, see MICHAEL PERTSCHUK, REVOLT
AGAINST REGULATION: THE RISE AND PAUSE OF THE CONSUMER MOVEMENT 5 (1982).
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Second, it was a time when enterprise liability, or the "insurance ratio-
nale," was in the vanguard, and there was a keen sense that the fault
requirement had outlived its usefulness.40 Third, the no-fault move-
ment came to the fore at the precise moment when the auto fatality
rate was peaking and the carnage caused by car crashes briefly cap-
tured the nation's attention.41 And finally, it was a time when there
was relatively little first-party insurance (at least as compared to later
decades), and there was also deep dissatisfaction with both the limits
and the excesses of traditional tort.42 These factors, I suggest, came
together to make the late 1960s and early 1970s the ideal time to enact
no-fault legislation, and situating the no-fault movement in this
broader socio-legal context sheds light on why, as each factor in its
own way eclipsed in the late 1970s, the no-fault movement stalled as
well.
Stepping back, there may also be one additional explanation for no-
fault's failure-or more accurately-its inability to regain, in later de-
cades, the momentum it had lost. I call this final point the adversarial
equilibrium, a process by which distinct but parallel legal systems shed
their excesses and patch their limits to become progressively more
alike.
I take as my point of departure John Witt's "convergence thesis."
Writing for a previous Clifford Symposium, Witt suggested that, for
certain classes of recurring torts, the on-the-ground settlement of
claims tends to "converge[] with the practice of publicly administered
systems."43 Over time, he observed, tort's procedures become pro-
gressively more routinized and less individualistic, idiosyncratic, and
adversarial. I agree, and my past work on settlement mills-which
process mostly auto claims in high volumes-lends support to Witt's
claim.44 But in carefully examining auto claims data, I take Witt's sug-
gestion a significant step further.
40. See ABRAHAM, supra note 21, at 97 ("[Sitates that adopted auto no-fault did so toward the
end of a distinct legal era.").
41. Compare Presidential Message to the American Trial Lawyers Association Meeting in
New York City, 1 PUB. PAPERS 137 (Feb. 2, 1966) ("Since 1960, 1,675 Americans have been
killed in Vietnam fighting Communist aggression. But the number of Americans killed on the
highways in 1965 alone was more than 30 times greater."), with Wirr, supra note 32, at 24 (stat-
ing that, around the turn of the last century, carnage from work accidents "seemed to many to
overshadow the casualties of modern warfare").
42. See discussion infra Part IV.D.
43. John Fabian Witt, Bureaucratic Legalism, American Style: Private Bureaucratic Legalism
and the Governance of the Tort System, 56 DEPAUL L. REv. 261, 268 (2007).
44. See generally Nora Freeman Engstrom, Run-of-the-Mill Justice, 22 GEo. J. LEGAL Emics




The data suggest that it is not just the on-the-ground practice of
processing tort claims that has become more routinized. Rather both
the tort system and the no-fault systems have changed substantially.
And not just their processes but their outputs have actually converged.
No-fault has become increasingly lawyer driven and adversarial. All
the while, the tort system in the automobile context has become less
litigious and has started to deliver broader yet shallower compensa-
tion-much like its former foe. Over time, in other words, the two
seemingly diametrically opposed systems have reached something of
an equilibrium. They have become progressively more and more
alike-raising provocative questions about no-fault's legacy and cer-
tainly, in recent decades, making the case to jettison one in favor of
the other a tougher sell.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part II traces the history of the
no-fault movement, starting with the Columbia Plan of 1932 and con-
tinuing to the modern no-fault era.4 5 Part III considers conventional
accounts of why no-fault failed.46 Specifically, drawing on a broad mix
of previously untapped primary source material-including volumi-
nous congressional testimony and thousands of contemporaneous
press and journal accounts, as well as recent data, collected by the
Insurance Research Council (IRC), the National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration (NHTSA), and RAND-Part III considers that
no-fault was associated with an arguable uptick in accidents and in-
arguably spiraling costs. Part IV then again utilizes this broad mix of
primary source material to situate the no-fault movement within
broader social and political forces of the 1960s and 1970s and, in so
doing, lends additional support to Robert Rabin's "coattails" thesis.47
No-fault fizzled, Part IV asserts, not just because its costs were too
high or its plaintiffs' lawyer opponents too fierce, but rather because
the "policy window" that was opened in the late 1960s and early 1970s
was, by the late 1970s, firmly closed.48 Part V then introduces the
concept of the adversarial equilibrium, contending that a final possible
reason no-fault faltered is that it became less necessary-and also less
distinctive-as time went by.4 9
45. See infra notes 50-120 and accompanying text.
46. See infra notes 121-99 and accompanying text.
47. See infra notes 200-309 and accompanying text.
48. For the classic account of "policy windows," see JOHN W. KINGDON, AGENDAS, ALTERNA-
TIVES, AND PUBLIC POLICIES 173-204 (1984).
49. See infra notes 310-35 and accompanying text.
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II. A SHORT HISTORY OF THE AUTO No-FAULT MOVEMENT IN
THE UNITED STATES
Academics, judges, and policymakers have been seeking a better
way to minimize, or at least better allocate, the cost of auto accidents
since the dawn of the last century. In this quest, reformers have long
toyed with the idea of eliminating the finding of fault as a prerequisite
to payment. As early as 1919, one commentator wrote:
[T]he general aim should be to eliminate entirely the question of
negligence in motor vehicle accidents; to make certain and payable
at all events a reasonable compensation . . . , spreading the cost of
such compensation over all users of motor vehicles on the public
highways; and to provide a summary method of determining the
amount of such losses.50
During the 1920s and the early 1930s, meanwhile, the no-fault
idea was actively considered. No fewer than nine state legislatures
considered bills that would have replaced tort litigation in the auto
accident arena with compensation schemes resembling workers' com-
pensation.51
A. The Columbia Plan
The most notable early effort, though, was the Committee to Study
Compensation for Automobile Accidents. 52 Formed in November
1928 under the auspices of Columbia University's Council for Re-
search in the Social Sciences, funded by the Rockefeller Foundation,
and headed by Shippen A. Lewis, a leading advocate of liability re-
form, the Committee was composed of prominent reform-minded
50. Ernest C. Carman, Is a Motor Vehicle Accident Compensation Act Advisable?, 4 MINN. L.
REv. 1, 2 (1919). Similarly, in 1924, Ohio Superior Court Judge Robert S. Marx delivered an
address to the Cincinnati Bar Association calling for the creation of a state compensation fund,
paid for by a premium levied on automobiles, to compensate those who were injured or killed
"upon the streets." Such a fund was needed, Judge Marx asserted, because the status quo was
"slow, expensive, wasteful, and impracticable" and, worst of all, it left "the vast majority of those
who are injured and killed to bear the burden of the injury, and bear it individually." Robert S.
Marx, Judge of Superior Court, Cincinnati, Ohio, The Curse of the Personal Injury Suit and a
Remedy, Address Before the Cincinnati Bar Association, in 10 A.B.A. J. 493, 497; see also Weld
A. Rollins, A Proposal to Extend the Compensation Principle to Accidents in the Streets, 4 MASS.
L.Q. 392, 392-96 (1919) (calling for no-fault reform).
51. Wirr, supra note 32, at 195.
52. Fleming James declared this project "probably the most significant contribution to the
study of torts to appear so far in the twentieth century." Fleming James, Jr., The Columbia
Study of Compensation for Automobile Accidents: An Unanswered Challenge, 59 COLUM. L.
REv. 408 (1959). For rich discussions of the Columbia Plan, see ABRAHAM, supra nOte 21, at
74-76; ROBERT E. KEETON & JEFFREY O'CONNELL, BASIc PROTECTION FOR THE TRAFFIC Vic-
TIM 125-40 (1965); Jonathan Simon, Driving Governmentality: Automobile Accidents, Insurance,




judges and lawyers of the day. Once organized, the Committee en-
gaged in a three-year, multistate empirical examination of the auto-
mobile accident status quo.5 3 What it discovered was disquieting.
Among other conclusions, the Committee found that the death toll
due to auto accidents was rapidly mounting-climbing more than
500% since 1913.54 Victims' and survivors' compensation, meanwhile,
left much to be desired. Not surprisingly, the Committee found that
injuries caused by insured motorists were far more likely to be com-
pensated than those caused by uninsured motorists.5 5 But even when
insurance was available (as it very rarely waS5 6 ), the adequacy of com-
pensation varied systematically (but paradoxically) by injury severity,
as those with minor injuries received comparatively more in relation
to economic loss, while those with serious or fatal injuries received
comparatively less.57 Furthermore, even when awards did come, they
were-particularly when injuries were grievous-delayed in delivery,
unpredictable in amount, and often significantly reduced in practice
by attorneys' fees and litigation expenses.58
Finding the situation untenable-and writing closely on the heels of
workers' compensation's successful enactment-the Committee ulti-
mately called for the abolition of fault as a prerequisite to payment.
"[N]o system based on liability for fault," the Committee concluded,
"is adequate to meet existing conditions." 59 Because automobile acci-
dents were "inevitable," it was "sound policy" for the cost of those
accidents to be shared by the motoring public. 60
53. See Young B. Smith, Compensation for Automobile Accidents: A Symposium (pt. 1, The
Problem and Its Solution), 32 COLUM. L. REv. 785, 785 & n.1 (1932). Between December 1929
and March 1931, project participants investigated 8,849 individual cases from ten localities in six
states. REPORT BY THE COMMITTEE TO STUDY COMPENSATION FOR AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENTS
TO THE COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY COUNCIL FOR RESEARCH IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 2, 4 (1932)
[hereinafter COLUMBIA REPORT].
54. COLUMBIA REPORT, supra note 53, at 17. Of course, part of the increase was attributable
to more drivers on the road. But not all was. Since 1926, there had been an increase "in the
proportion of deaths to number of cars registered." Id. at 18.
55. See id. at 55-56.
56. In 1929, only 27.3% of all private passenger and commercial vehicles registered in the
United States carried liability insurance. Id. at 45.
57. Id. at 204 ("The case studies show that the large losses resulting from these very serious
cases receive much less adequate payment than do the smaller losses . . . .").
58. Id. at 36, 152 (discussing the toll taken by contingency fees, which typically ranged from
25% to 50%); id. at 63 (discussing the "unevenness of payments"); id. at 63-64, 92-94, 151-52
(discussing delays). Precisely the same critique was leveled at compensation for those injured on
the job prior to the advent of workers' compensation. FISHBACK & KANTOR, supra note 36, at 1
(describing reformers' critique).
59. COLUMBIA REPORT, supra note 53, at 217.
60. Id. at 134-35.
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Under the Columbia Plan, as it came to be known, all vehicle own-
ers would be compelled to purchase liability insurance, and all would
be strictly liable for the injuries their vehicles caused.61 In a two-car
collision, then, each driver would be liable for the other's injuries, and
both would be jointly and severally liable for the injuries of nondriver
victims. Unlike traditional tort, the remuneration following accidents
would be reasonably certain, "would bear a fair and constant relation
to the loss sustained," would be quickly delivered, and would come at
relatively small administrative expense.62 Compensation would also,
however, be limited. As with workers' compensation, there would be
no recovery for noneconomic loss (often known as "pain and suffer-
ing"), and payment for wage loss would be partial. Such a system, the
Committee maintained, "would be workable" in practice, reasonable
in cost, and consistent with "the due process clause of the federal
constitution." 63
The Columbia Plan was seriously debated in a handful of states but
was never enacted, save partially in the province of Saskatchewan, Ca-
nada.M It was immediately opposed by the insurance industry, which
at that time vigorously opposed any form of compulsory automobile
insurance. 65 Others, meanwhile, chafed at the Columbia Plan's guid-
ing premise that there was a "close analogy" between auto accidents
and "the industrial situation." 66 To the contrary, opponents insis-
ted that the structural relationship between colliding drivers and
employers/employees was too different in hierarchy, intimacy, con-
61. Id. at 138.
62. Id. at 132.
63. Id. at 217.
64. The Columbia Plan received serious consideration in New York, Virginia, Wisconsin, and
Connecticut. Frank P. Grad, Recent Developments in Automobile Accident Compensation, 50
COLUM. L. REV. 300, 318 n.79 (1950). The Columbia Plan also provided the template for a
reform enacted in Saskatchewan, Canada in 1946. Saskatchewan's plan provided auto accident
victims scheduled compensation from a state insurance fund, without regard to fault. See id. at
320-25.
65. Insurers fought compulsory insurance tooth and nail, in part because they feared that
compulsory insurance would be accompanied by regulations to prohibit them from charging
high-risk drivers sufficiently high premiums. For more on insurers' historic and near-hysteric
resistance to compulsory insurance, see KEETON & O'CONNELL, supra note 52, at 89-102, and
Shippen Lewis, The Merits of the Automobile Compensation Plan, 3 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
583, 586 (1936) ("[Tjhe stock insurance companies have so far opposed compulsory insurance
with all their heart, with all their soul, with all their mind and with all their strength.").
66. The Committee asserted there was "a close analogy between the industrial situation ...
and the motor vehicle situation."' COLUMBIA REPORT, supra note 53, at 134-35. In both con-
texts, accidents were "inevitable" and the tort system had failed "to measure up to a fair esti-
mate of social necessity." Id. at 134-35.
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tinuity, and resource allocation to merit similar treatment.67 Com-
plaints were also leveled at the Plan's cost estimates (too optimistic),
constitutionality (they said it wasn't), and general orientation ("social-
istic," "contrary to a system of free enterprise," and "destructive" of
"individual responsibility"). 68 Moreover, the Columbia Plan was not
well timed. It was, as noted, published in 1932, just as the problem of
auto accidents dimmed-both absolutely (as the Depression and then
World War II reduced miles traveled) and comparatively (as the prob-
lem of auto accidents paled in comparison to the more urgent issues of
the day). 69
In the decades that followed, the auto accident problem never dis-
appeared and, if anything, became more acute. Indeed, in 1951, Flem-
ing James and Stewart Law conducted an empirical study of
automobile accidents in New Haven, Connecticut and glumly con-
cluded that little had changed in the intervening two decades. 70 Ten
years later, a Pennsylvania study reported much the same: "the pre-
sent system does not adequately protect many who, by dint of acci-
dent, come to need help desperately."7 1  But though academics
periodically issued calls for reform,72 and though auto injuries and fa-
67. See Donald W. Kramer, Fallacies of a Compensation Plan for Automobile Accident Litiga-
tion, 26 INS. COUNS. J. 420, 423 (1959); Austin J. Lilly, Compensation for Automobile Accidents:
A Symposium (pt. 2, Criticism of the Proposed Solution), 32 COLUM. L. REV. 803, 804-07 (1932).
68. See Grad, supra note 64, at 320 ("The Committee's estimate of the cost of the plan was
considered too optimistic . . . ."); id. at 320 (noting that some derided the plan as "'socialistic'
and contrary to a system of free enterprise"); Kramer, supra note 67, at 424 (dismissing the plan
as "destructive" of "individual responsibility"); Crandall Melvin, Compulsory Compensation Au-
tomobile Insurance, Address at Annual Meeting of the New York State Bar Association, in 6
N.Y. ST. B.A. BULL. 268, 278 (1934) (raising doubts about the Plan's constitutionality). For
further discussion of the Columbia Plan's chilly reception, see Wrrr, supra note 32, at 195; Si-
mon, supra note 52, at 578-80; Herbert Harley, Bar Association Delegates Discuss "Compensa-
tion Without Fault," 20 A.B.A. J. 710 (1934).
69. See Simon, supra note 52, 585-87.
70. See Fleming James, Jr. & Stuart C. Law, Compensation for Auto Accident Victims: A Story
of Too Little and Too Late, 26 CONN. B.J. 70, 81 (1952) ("The present study shows that the same
facts and the same problem are still with us today.").
71. Clarence Morris & James C. N. Paul, The Financial Impact of Automobile Accidents, 110
U. PA. L. REV. 913, 924 (1962). A contemporaneous Michigan study reached similar conclu-
sions. See generally ALFRED F. CONARD ET AL., AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT COSTS AND PAY-
MENTS: STUDIES IN THE ECONOMICS OF INJURY REPARATION (1964) (chronicling a system
plagued by long delays, high transaction costs, and "amazingly uneven" payments to those hurt).
72. There was one particularly notable non-academic call for reform: In his 1959 inaugural
address, then-Governor of California Edmund G. Brown suggested that auto cases ought to be
removed from the courts and turned over to a compensation commission. According to the Los
Angeles Times, after sending lawyers and the insurance industry into a "tizzy," the proposal
"died a quick death." Gene Blake, New Auto Liability Plan Stirs Legal Controversy, L.A.
TIMES, Mar. 15, 1968, at A6. Within academic circles, calls for reform most prominently in-
cluded ALBERT A. EHRENZWEIG, "FULL AID" INSURANCE FOR THE TRAFFIC VICTIM (1954),
LEON GREEN, TRAFFIC VicrIMs: TORT LAW AND INSURANCE (1958), and Grad, supra note 64.
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talities continued to mount, the notion of no-fault auto payments
more or less faded from view.73
B. The Modern No-Fault Era
This all changed in 1965, when Professors Keeton and O'Connell
published a book entitled Basic Protection for the Traffic Victim: A
Blueprint for Reforming Automobile Insurance and, in so doing,
ushered in the modern no-fault era.7 4 In Basic Protection, Keeton and
O'Connell began by describing the auto accident status quo.75 Their
findings echoed what had been said for decades: Too many of those
suffering economic loss from personal injuries sustained in automobile
accidents failed to recover compensation from any source at all, and a
solid majority of all victims (63%) got nothing whatsoever from the
tort liability system.76 Moreover, even when there was compensation,
it was-especially for those suffering from grievous injury-too small
in amount and too slow in delivery. In their words: "[O]ur system for
compensating traffic victims is inadequate-rife with undercompensa-
tion or complete lack of compensation of many victims and overcom-
pensation of others, as well as hardship, waste, and delay."77 The
present tort system for auto accidents, they believed, needed to be
abolished. In tort's place, Keeton and O'Connell proposed a compre-
hensive no-fault plan in which the burden of providing traffic victims'
basic protection would fall on motorists as a cost of driving.
Pragmatists, they included in the monograph a formal actuarial opin-
ion that their plan would save money and a draft statute, the Motor
Vehicle Basic Protection Insurance Act, which they said was complete
and ready for immediate enactment.78
Puerto Rico passed the first (government-administered) no-fault
scheme in 1968.79 Then, explicitly inspired by the Keeton-O'Connell
73. See NHTSA, 2008 DECLINE, supra note 3, at 27 (showing, inter alia, that 34,494 Americans
perished in auto accidents in 1935; 26,785 perished in 1945; 36,688 perished in 1955; and 47,089
perished in 1965).
74. See KEETON & O'CONNELL, supra note 52. Their book itself never used the term "no-
fault." But the term was bandied about in the course of adopting the Massachusetts legislation,
and it ultimately stuck. While the book was published in 1965, the authors had published a
similar law review article the previous year. See Robert E. Keeton & Jeffrey O'Connell, Basic
Protection-A Proposal for Improving Automobile Claims Systems, 78 HARv. L. REv. 329
(1964).
75. KEETON & O'CONNELL, supra note 52, at 34.
76. Id. at 43 (referring to Conard's Michigan study).
77. Id. at 67.
78. In retrospect, O'Connell views the actuarial study and model statute as critical. "[Tihose
two things," he said, "changed the whole world." Telephone Interview with Jeffrey O'Connell,
Samuel H. McCoy II Professor of Law, Univ. of Va. Sch. of Law (Apr. 27, 2011).
79. ROBERT H. JOOST, AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE AND NO-FAULT LAw 2D § 2:16 (1992).
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proposal, Massachusetts was the first state to pass a no-fault auto in-
surance law, which it did with great public fanfare (and after great
private wrangling) in 1970-five years after Basic Protection hit book-
store shelves.s0 Just one year later, Florida passed its own no-fault law
to great acclaim.81
Also in 1971, the movement got a powerful boost as the newly cre-
ated U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) issued a twenty-four
volume, 11,000-page report that comprehensively assessed the auto-
mobile accident situation in the United States. In the report, the DOT
concluded that the loss of life occasioned by the automobile was "truly
monstrous" and that, when it came to compensating those hurt, the
tort system wasn't up to the task.8 2 "[T]he existing system," the DOT
declared, "ill serves the accident victim, the insuring public and soci-
ety."8 3 Following that report, Transportation Secretary John A. Volpe
did not mince words, reporting to Congress: "We believe that the
States should begin promptly to shift to a first party, non-fault com-
pensation system for automobile accident victims." 8 4 States, at least
initially, heeded Volpe's call. By 1975, every state had considered at
least one of the more than 600 no-fault bills then in existence, and
roughly two-dozen states had followed Massachusetts down some ver-
sion of the no-fault path.85
80. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 90, §§ 34A-34R (2009). The Massachusetts bill's success was
due, in large part, to the tireless efforts of Michael Dukakis, one of Professor Keeton's former
students. Indeed, Peter Kinzler recalls, "Dukakis took the appendix from [Basic Protection] and
introduced it" without change. Telephone Interview with Peter Kinzler, former Counsel, Con-
sumer Prot. and Fin. Subcomm., House Interstate and Foreign Commerce Comm. (July 21, 2011)
[hereinafter Kinzler Interview]. The Massachusetts bill was signed into law on television before
a statewide viewing audience. Massachusetts was a natural place for the no-fault movement to
get its start because, according to the Department of Transportation, Massachusetts had the most
litigious citizenry of the nineteen states surveyed. Perhaps as a consequence, its drivers paid the
country's highest auto insurance premiums. DOT, STATE NO-FAULT AUTOMoBILE INSURANCE
EXPERIENCE, 1971-1977, at 41 (1977) [hereinafter DOT, 1971-1977] (for litigiousness); Finding
No-Fault, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 24, 1972, at 61 (for premiums). For more on the Massachusetts legis-
lation's tumultuous path to passage, see Michael S. Dukakis, Legislators Look at Proposed
Changes, in CRISIS IN CAR INSURANCE, supra note 30, at 223.
81. DOT, 1971-1977, supra note 80, at 6 (describing Florida's no-fault legislation).
82. JoHN A. VOLPE, DOT, MOTOR VEHICLE CRASH LOSSES AND THEIR COMPENSATION IN
THE UNITED STATES: A REPORT TO THE CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT 2 (1971) [hereinafter
DOT 1971 REPORT].
83. Id. at 2, 100. This study was conducted pursuant to Public Law 90-313, which directed the
DOT to conduct a comprehensive study of the automobile reparation system.
84. Automobile Insurance Reform and Cost Savings: Hearings on S. 945 and Others Before the
S. Comm. on Commerce, 92d Cong. 102-03 (1971) (statement of John A. Volpe, Secretary,
DOT).
85. By 1975, the National Association of Independent Insurers reported that over 600 no-fault
bills had received "serious consideration." National Standards No-Fault Motor Vehicle Insur-
ance Act: Hearings on S. 354 and Others Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, 94th Cong. 329
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1. Plan Specifics
As advocated by Keeton and O'Connell and as enacted in Massa-
chusetts, Florida, and elsewhere, however, "no-fault" was never really
true to its name.86 Cognizant that the complete abrogation of the
common law would be a political nonstarter, Keeton and O'Connell
advocated, and all states ultimately adopted, a hybrid system that
combined elements of no-fault with traditional tort.87 Though state
schemes varied substantially in the specifics, all obligated each vehicle
owner to purchase her own (first-party) insurance against economic
loss. Known as Personal Injury Protection (PIP), this insurance would
cover pecuniary losses (typically medical expenses and lost wages)
sustained by the car owner, passengers, and injured pedestrians
promptly, automatically, and irrespective of negligence. But the com-
pensation, while broad, would be shallow: Noneconomic loss would go
uncompensated, and most states capped PIP benefits at fairly modest
sums.88 The Keeton-O'Connell plan, for example, capped PIP bene-
fits at $10,000 (roughly equivalent to $70,000 today).8 9
In addition, all states included in their no-fault legislation a safety
valve for the most seriously hurt, giving "seriously injured" claimants
the right to seek recovery of noneconomic damages through the tradi-
tional tort system. States identified "seriously injured" claimants in
(1975) (statement of National Association of Independent Insurers) (stating that the states had
paid "serious consideration" to "well over 600 no-fault measures"). Some states considered no-
fault on multiple occasions. E.g., Larry Stammer, No New Insurance Bills in Sight: No-Fault
Clamor Now a Whimper, L.A. TIMEs, Jan. 28, 1977, pt. 1, at 3 (reporting that, between 1971 and
1976, thirty-two no-fault bills were introduced in California).
86. Pure no-fault is in effect elsewhere-in Israel, New Zealand, Sweden, Finland, and the
Canadian provinces of Quebec, Manitoba, and Saskatchewan. JOOsT, supra note 79, § 1:1. Pure
no-fault was also recommended by the powerful AIA in 1968, see Paul S. Wise & T. Lawrence
Jones, "No Fault" Auto Insurance: Two Approaches, CRISIs, Dec. 1972, at 331, 333, and by the
New York Insurance Department in 1970, see STATE OF N.Y. INs. DEP'T, AUTOMOBILE INSUR-
ANCE ... FOR WHOSE BENEFIT?: A REPORT To GOVERNOR NELSON A. ROCKEFELLER (1970).
Neither recommendation went far.
87. KEETON & O'CONNELL, supra note 52, at 164 (stating that a true no-fault plan would be
"doomed to founder as unable to muster the necessary widespread political support").
88. As noted in the text, most states capped PIP benefits, meaning, for example, that if an
accident victim accrued high medical bills, not all her bills would be covered. Michigan is an
exception; it currently provides unlimited medical benefits, though there has been a push to
enact a $1 million ceiling. JOOsT, supra note 79, § 1:3A; see also Mich. Lawmakers Must Address
Auto Rates, Industry Expert Says, ANDREws LrnlG. REP., Jan. 2010, at 7. A further note is that
the original Keeton-O'Connell plan specified that benefits for pain, suffering, and inconve-
nience could be purchased on an optional basis. KEETON & O'CONNELL, supra note 52, at
285-86.
89. See KEETON & O'CONNELL, supra note 52, at 283. Throughout this Article, I converted
sums to 2011 dollars using an inflation calculator available at BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS,
http://www.bls.gov/datalinflationcalculator.htm (last visited Nov. 19, 2011).
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one of two ways. Some, notably Michigan and, eventually, Florida
and New York, enacted a "verbal threshold" that permitted claimants
to seek compensation in tort if their injuries satisfied a descriptive
statutory definition-if they suffered "permanent serious disfigure-
ment," for example. 90 The balance of states, meanwhile, imposed less
rigid "monetary" or "dollar" thresholds. These monetary thresholds
permitted claimants to seek compensation in tort if, and only if, their
medical bills exceeded a particular sum. Monetary thresholds varied,
from Hawaii's fairly stringent monetary threshold, which was adjusted
annually to take account of inflation and was, by the mid 1980s, a
fairly substantial $4,500, to the modest and easy-to-surpass (or
"pierce") New Jersey threshold of $200.91 A third group of states took
an even more partial approach, enacting "add-on" plans, which simply
provided limited no-fault benefits without restricting access to tradi-
tional tort.92
As first enacted, the path-breaking Massachusetts plan, for exam-
ple, contained the following three main features. First, drivers were
obligated to purchase PIP coverage, which provided first-party insur-
90. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 500.3135(1) (West 2010) (providing Michigan's verbal
threshold). New York initially enacted a no-fault system with a $500 monetary threshold but
replaced the monetary threshold with a verbal threshold in 1977. DOT, COMPENSATING AUTO
ACCIDENT VIcrnIs: A FOLLOW-Up REPORT ON NO-FAULT AUTO INSURANCE EXPERIENCES 101
(May 1985) [hereinafter DOT, 1985 FOLLOW-UP]. Like New York, Florida initially enacted legis-
lation with a monetary threshold, but, concerned that the monetary threshold was tempting
claimants to consume excessive medical care, Florida's legislature abandoned the monetary
threshold in favor of a verbal threshold in 1976. Id. at 100.
91. States with dollar thresholds also tend to have verbal thresholds to allow tort access in
cases of serious injury, regardless of monetary loss. See JOOST, supra note 79, § 2:34. For more
on Hawaii's system, see DOT, 1985 FOLLOW-UP, supra note at 90. For more on New Jersey's
system, see id. at 36.
92. In states with add-on legislation, the right to recover no-fault benefits was always in addi-
tion to, rather than in lieu of, the traditional right to sue the tortfeasor. States adopting add-on
plans took one of two approaches, adopting either mandatory or optional add-on legislation.
Mandatory add-on states require drivers to purchase first-party coverage. Optional add-on
states require insurance companies to offer first-party coverage to drivers, who are then free to
reject it. During the push to enactment, no-fault proponents tended to view add-on plans as cop-
outs, or in Robert Keeton's words, "corruptions of the no-fault principle." No-Fault Motor Vehi-
cle Insurance (Part I): Hearing on H.R. 10 and Others Before the H. Subcomm. on Commerce
and Fin. of the Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 93d Cong. 408 (1974) (statement of
Robert E. Keeton, Professor of Law, Harvard Law School). In addition, three states (Kentucky,
New Jersey, and Pennsylvania) maintain "choice" systems. Choice no-fault is a relative new-
comer to the no-fault world and was enacted in a handful of states in the late 1980s and early
1990s in response to dramatically increasing insurance rates. Choice systems offer drivers a
choice between less expensive limited tort insurance (which restricts recovery for noneconomic
loss) and more expensive full tort insurance (which retains recovery for noneconomic loss). For
more on choice systems, see Stephanie Owings-Edwards, Choice Automobile Insurance: The Ex-
perience of Kentucky, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania, 23 J. INS. REG. 25 (2004).
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ance of up to $2,000 (roughly $11,650 today). 93 Following an auto ac-
cident, this PIP coverage would cover the driver, passengers, and
pedestrians for lost wages, medical expenses incurred within two
years, and the cost of replacement services (back-up childcare, for ex-
ample). Thus, if a hypothetical driver was trivially injured in a car
accident, this PIP coverage would immediately and automatically
cover his medical bills and lost wages up to the $2,000 maximum. Sec-
ond, the legislation created a limited tort safety valve. If our hypo-
thetical driver was seriously injured in a car accident by another at-
fault driver, he could receive not just his first-party PIP benefits, but
also could pursue additional damages via traditional tort. In tort, he
could seek recovery not just for his entire economic loss (above PIP's
$2,000 maximum), but also for his noneconomic loss, including his
pain and suffering, loss of enjoyment of life, inconvenience, disfigure-
ment, and so on. A "serious injury" was defined as one where an
accident victim's medical expenses exceeded $500 (roughly $2,900 to-
day) or where the victim was killed, broke a bone, lost a body mem-
ber, suffered permanent or serious disfigurement, or lost his sense of
hearing or sight.94 Third, to provide legal protection against still-
sometimes-available tort actions, all drivers were required to maintain
bodily injury liability insurance in the amount of $5,000 per person
and $10,000 per vehicle (today, $29,000 and $58,000, respectively). 95
2. No-Fault's Friends and Foes
As noted at the outset, no-fault was extremely popular with many
constituencies. It enjoyed the strong support of most academics, the
vocal support of the nation's preeminent editorial boards, and at least
the tentative support of the American public. 96 A number of power-
ful lobbies also lined up in favor, including most insurers, most con-
sumer groups (including the Consumer Federation of America,
Consumers Union, and National Consumers League), most unions,
the American Association of Retired Persons, and the National Asso-
ciation of Insurance Commissioners. 97 Yet, predictably, it also had its
93. DOT, 1971-1977, supra note 80, at 9 (summarizing the Massachusetts plan).
94. Id.
95. See id. For a more detailed description of the Massachusetts plan, see Alan I. Widiss,
Accident Victims Under No-Fault Automobile Insurance: A Massachusetts Survey, 61 IOWA L.
REV. 1 (1975).
96. See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
97. National No-Fault Motor Vehicle Insurance Act: Hearings on S. 354 Before the S. Comm.
on Commerce, 93d Cong. 185 (1973) (statement of James R. MacKay, Senior Vice President,
Fireman's Fund Insurance Company); National Standards No-Fault Motor Vehicle Insurance Act:
Hearings on S. 354 Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, 94th Cong. 529 (1975) (statement of
Gary R. Frink, Executive Director, National Committee for Effective No-Fault).
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critics: chiefly, the plaintiffs' bar, some other insurers, and the Ameri-
can Bar Association (ABA).
The plaintiffs' bar bitterly and steadfastly opposed no-fault from the
start-in part, no doubt, because the legislation would wipe out some
substantial portion of plaintiffs' lawyers' livelihoods. As a speaker at
the annual meeting of the Trial Lawyers Section of the New York
State Bar Association colorfully explained: "It is no exaggeration to
say that if the automobile litigation is lost, the American trial lawyer
will be a dead duck, and the entire profession will suffer damage from
which I don't think it will ever recover." 98 Melvin Belli, a noted San
Francisco plaintiffs' lawyer, former ATLA president, and vocal no-
fault critic, is likewise on record acknowledging that lawyers' staunch
opposition to administrative plans stemmed, in part, from the fact that
they did "not relish the prospect of losing 75 per cent of their business
in one fell swoop." 99
More often, though, the plaintiffs' bar wisely cloaked its opposition
in the public interest. The legislation, they said, discriminated against
the poor, who would have trouble accumulating enough medical bills
to overcome monetary thresholds; ran roughshod over core constitu-
tional protections; was an affront to Americans' individualized con-
ception of justice; would penalize good drivers, forcing them to pay
higher premiums to compensate for the costs imposed by others;
would upend the "ancient" concept of fault; and, perhaps worst of all,
would serve as a template for future reform.100 As Belli intoned: "As
98. Lewis C. Ryan, Where Do We Go from Here with Tort Litigation, Address Before the Trial
Lawyers Section of the New York State Bar Association (Feb. 1, 1958), in 25 INs. CoUNs. J. 500,
500 (1958).
99. JoHN FABIAN WrIT, PATRIOTS AND COSMOPOLITANS: HIDDEN HIsTORIES OF AMERICAN
LAW 264 (2007) (quoting MELVIN M. BELLI, BLOOD MONEY: READY FOR THE PLAINTIFF 122
(1956)). There was more than a little hyperbole to these dark predictions. A post-no-fault study
of Massachusetts's lawyers, for example, found that only about one-sixth of respondents re-
ported that no-fault had substantially affected their practice. See Alan I. Widiss, Massachusetts
No-Fault Automobile Insurance: Its Impact upon the Legal Profession, in No-FAULT AUroo-
BILE INSURANCE IN ACTION: THE EXPERIENCES IN MASSACHUSETrs, FLORIDA, DELAWARE AND
MICHIGAN 107 (Alan I. Widiss et al. eds., 1977).
100. See, e.g., National No-Fault Motor Vehicle Insurance Act: Hearings on S. 354 Before the S.
Comm. on Commerce, 93d Cong. 527 (1973) (statement of Leroy Jeffers, President-Elect, State
Bar Association of Texas) (raising constitutional objections); No-Fault Insurance: Hearings on S.
354 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong. 169 (1973) (statement of Leroy Jeffers,
President, State Bar of Texas) (criticizing no-fault as a "vast erosion of the adversary system of
justice"); Jacob D. Fuchsberg, Lawyers View Proposed Changes, in CRISIS IN CAR INSURANCE,
supra note 30, at 210 (arguing that, under no-fault, "the most responsible and careful people,"
who "are usually also the ones with larger earnings and families," would be penalized with
higher rates); William Morrissey, 'No-Fault Insurance' Foe Angered by Opposition Pressure,
ONEONTA STAR, Feb. 4, 1972, at 2 (quoting ATLA President Marvin E. Lewis as arguing that no-
fault plans discriminated against poor individuals).
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soon as we get no-fault . . . we'll get socialism pervading the whole
law."' 0' Other less high-minded (and less well-founded) concerns
were also occasionally voiced. For example, one 1971 ATLA press
release directed at "Housewives" ominously warned: "If no-fault auto
insurance is adopted in your state, you run a very good chance of
bringing your family to the brink of financial ruin every time you drive
the family car."102
Using a mix of high- and low-brow tactics, there is no question that
plaintiffs' lawyers worked hard to defeat no-fault legislation. Indeed,
it was the specter of federal no-fault that prompted the then-34,000-
member ATLA to raise prodigious sums, develop a potent lobbying
arm, and open a Washington, D.C. office for the first time.103 There is
also no doubt that this hard work paid handsome dividends, as trial
lawyers defeated some legislation outright, left an imprint on many
bills that were ultimately enacted, and, when laws were enacted over
their objections, waged protracted-and occasionally successful-
court challenges to have them invalidated on constitutional
grounds.104 In terms of leaving an imprint, plaintiffs' lawyers in many
101. Peter Vanderwicken, Toward the Socialization of Injury, FORTUNE, Nov. 1971, at 161, 181
(internal quotation marks omitted). Leroy Jeffers's prediction was even more dire:
In the wings is malpractice no-fault, products liability no-fault, other schemes and plans
to close the court house door, to shut off the access of free citizens to free courts for the
vindication of their rights to obtain reparation for their wrongs, and we say that is not
the road to preservation of human freedom.
National No-Fault Motor Vehicle Insurance Act: Hearings on S. 354 Before the S. Comm. on
Commerce, 93d Cong. 528-29 (1973) (statement of Leroy Jeffers, President-Elect, State Bar As-
sociation of Texas). These concerns were not without support. See infra note 116 and accompa-
nying text.
102. Al Delugach, Lawyers' Weight May Tip the Scales Against No-Fault, L.A. TIMEs, June 20,
1971, at H1.
103. In 2006, the group changed its name to the American Association for Justice. ATLA's
membership grew rapidly during the period, from 7,176 members in 1961 to 21,865 in 1967 to
34,000 in 1977-when it changed its headquarters from Boston to Washington, D.C. Federal
Standards for No-Fault Motor Vehicle Accident Benefits Act: Hearings Before the H. Subcomm.
on Consumer Prot. and Fin. of the Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 95th Cong. 405
(1977) (statement of Robert G. Begam, President, ATLA). For more on ATLA's vigorous and
varied efforts to fight no-fault legislation, see ABRAHAM, supra note 21, at 93; Linda E.
Demkovich, It's Time for Another Battle on No-Fault Insurance, NAT'L J., Oct. 8, 1977, at 1572,
1572-73; Marvin E. Lewis, The President's Report, TRIAL, Mar.-Apr. 1972, at 8, 33; Morton
Mintz, Running Over No-Fault, WASH. POST, Aug. 27, 1972, at BI; John D. Morris, Inaction by
States May Strengthen a New Drive for Federal No-Fault Insurance Law, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3,
1972, at 23; Richard B. Schmitt, Slick Tactics: Trial Lawyers Glide Past Critics with Aid of Potent
Trade Group, WALL ST. J., Feb. 17, 1994, at Al; Editorial, No-Fault Is Coming, WALL ST. J.,
Aug. 4, 1972, at 6.
104. In terms of defeat, see, for example, Tom Sherwood, Trial Lawyers' Drive Sideswipes
Proposal: Council Switches Lanes on No-Fault, WASH. POST, Jan. 31, 1982, at Al ("A majority of
the D.C. City Council members who seven months ago sponsored a proposal for mandatory no-
fault automobile insurance here have abandoned public support for the measure in the face of
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states pressed hard for add-on no-fault (which detractors dismissed as
"phony" no-fault), which left access to the tort system intact.105 And,
when that failed, they altered verbal thresholds and whittled away at
monetary thresholds making it easier for plaintiffs to access the tort
system, where noneconomic damages could be obtained.o 6 These ad-
justments undoubtedly made some no-fault bills that did come into
existence more expensive and less effective than they would have oth-
erwise been.
Insurers, meanwhile, were hardly stalwart in support. In the early
years of the no-fault campaign, insurers were badly divided, with some
passionately in favor and others vehemently opposed. 07 Illustrating
insurers' unease, the mighty American Insurance Association (AIA),
whose members wrote some 38% of all auto insurance policies, enthu-
siastically welcomed Massachusetts's adoption of no-fault insurance
and, indeed, actively lobbied for far more restrictive-and even
federal-legislation.108 But the President of the National Association
intense lobbying by trial lawyers .... ). In terms of court challenges, see, for example, Lasky v.
State Farm Insurance Co., 296 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1974) (invalidating parts of the legislation), Pinnick
v. Cleary, 271 N.E.2d 592 (Mass. 1971) (upholding the legislation), and Grace v. Howlett, 283
N.E.2d 474 (Ill. 1972) (invalidating Illinois legislation with unusual provision limiting
noneconomic damages).
105. No-Fault Insurance: Hearings on S. 354 and Others Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
93d Cong. 1114 (1973) (statement of ATLA) ("The third type of No-Fault plan is called 'Add-
On.' It is sometimes called 'Phony' no-fault by American Insurance Association spokesmen.").
For more on add-on legislation, see supra note 92.
106. For trial lawyers' efforts in New York, see Federal Standards for No-Fault Motor Vehicle
Accident Benefits Act: Hearings Before the H. Subcomm. on Consumer Prot. and Fin. of the
Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 95th Cong. 264 (1977) (statement of John M. Mur-
phy, Rep., State of New York) (stating that the trial lawyers lobbied hard for a $500 threshold in
New York, precisely because they knew such a low threshold, linked to high PIP benefits
($50,000), was "doomed to failure from the outset"). For New Jersey efforts, see Federal Stan-
dards for No-Fault Motor Vehicle Accident Benefits Act: Hearings Before the H. Subcomm. on
Consumer Prot. and Fin. of the Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 95th Cong. 353
(1977) (statement of Herb Jaffe, Editorial Department, Newark Star Ledger) (describing trial
lawyers' successful efforts to obtain an easily pierced $200 threshold in New Jersey); Joseph F.
Sullivan, No-Fault Car Insurance May Set Off a Long Debate, N.Y. TIMEs, May 21, 1972, at 109
(same). For Maryland efforts, see Richard M. Cohen, Car Surety Reform Dealt Blow in Md.,
WASH. POST, Mar. 29, 1972, at Al (describing lawyers' successful opposition to a $750 monetary
threshold in Maryland). For Illinois efforts, see Editorial, No-Fault at the Threshold, CHI. TRIB.,
June 20, 1975, § 2, at 2 (describing trial lawyers' support for add-on legislation). For Michigan
efforts, see Jeffrey O'Connell et al., No-Fault Insurance at 40: Dusting Off an Old Idea to Help
Consumers Save Money in an Age of Austerity, NAT'L Ass'N OF MUT. INS. Cos. ISSUE ANALYSIS,
Dec. 2011, at 4 (describing the weakening of Michigan's verbal threshold).
107. See National No-Fault Motor Vehicle Insurance Act: Hearings on S. 354 Before the S.
Comm. on Commerce, 93d Cong. 176 (1973) (statement of John E. Fisher, President, Nationwide
Insurance Companies) ("[T]he insurance industry has ... head[ed] in different directions on the
auto insurance reform issue.").
108. Editorial, A Promising Direction, supra note 13 (providing the 38% statistic).
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of Independent Insurers, which counted Allstate and State Farm
among its members, greeted the development by saying, "the so-called
no-fault scheme adopted in Massachusetts is so obviously inimical to
the public interest that we can envision no other state rushing to fol-
low the precedent." 109 Not one for understatement, William E. Knep-
per, former president of the International Association of Insurance
Counsel, went further, saying that the Keeton-O'Connell plan "would
certainly lead to the simultaneous destruction of the dignity of the
individual and the even-handed justice of the common law."110
Over time, however, resistance softened within the industry. And
while it is true that insurers never marched in total lockstep, and most
never supported robust federal legislation, by 1973, the vast majority
of automobile insurers had come together to back real, albeit modest,
state no-fault reform.111
109. Robert J. Cole, No Bandwagon Expected for No-Fault Insurance, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30,
1970, at 16 (quoting Vestal Lemmon, President of the National Association of Independent
Insurers).
110. William E. Knepper, "Alimony for Accident Victims?" A Review of Keeton-O'Connell's
"Basic Protection for the Traffic Victim," 15 DEF. L.J. 513, 530 (1966). What explains insurers'
early resistance? A few possibilities are (1) insurers recognized that their comparative advan-
tage was in administering compensation on the basis of fault and defending policyholders against
claims-not in administering compensation systems that more closely resembled health insur-
ance-and a change to the latter would diminish the value of accumulated actuarial data; (2) if
no-fault did result in lower premiums, insurers would have less money to invest, and if it did not,
rate increases would pressure regulators to reduce profits; (3) general status quo bias; and (4) a
fear that no-fault insurance would ultimately lead to federal insurance. See ANDERSON ET AL.,
supra note 4, at 37 (offering possibilities); O'CONNELL, supra note 1, at 140-41 (same). As
James Kemper put it, in regard to the last point: "[T]he surest road to federal regulation and
federal automobile insurance is the Basic Protection plan." James S. Kemper, Jr., The Basic
Protection Plan: Reform or Regression?, 1967 U. ILL. L. F. 459, 469.
111. See No-Fault Insurance: Hearings on S. 354 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d
Cong. 309 (1973) (testimony of T. Lawrence Jones, President, AIA) ("The organized major com-
panies are all for it."); John D. Morris, No-Fault Gaining in States, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 1973, at
32 (describing the recent "coalescence of the insurance industry in support of state laws provid-
ing limited no-fault benefits"). Some insurers' positions, then, underwent a sea change. For
example, Kemper's evolution went something like this:
Over the years our thinking went from opposition to the original Keeton-O'Connell
plan, to sponsoring additional research, to advocating experimentation in a few States,
to a few years ago strongly pushing for adoption of no-fault in all States . . . . to sup-
port[ing] congressional enactment of a no-fault auto insurance law.
Federal Standards for No-Fault Motor Vehicle Accident Benefits Act: Hearings Before the H.
Subcomm. on Consumer Prot. and Fin. of the Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 95th
Cong. 311 (1977) (statement of Steven H. Lesnik, Vice President, Communications and Public
Affairs, Kemper Insurance Company). An intriguing question, of course, is why so many insur-
ers came around on no-fault. My reading of the history suggests the change was largely strategic.
Insurers who initially opposed no-fault in all guises gradually recognized that resistance to mod-
est state-level reform would ultimately invite substantially more robust federal legislation, which,
as introduced, contained both high (and in some cases unlimited) PIP benefits and tough verbal
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Finally, when it comes to no-fault opposition, the legal mainstream,
as represented by the 150,000-member ABA, also lined up vocally
against, as the ABA's Special Committee on Automobile Insurance
Legislation concluded that no-fault proposals violated "a deep-rooted
instinct that one should not profit by his own wrong." t1 2 In lieu of no-
fault legislation, as we will see, by the late 1960s, the ABA had come
to favor achieving some of no-fault's benefits, not by enacting no-fault
per se, but by implementing sweeping changes to traditional tort.
3. Early Appraisals: "No-Fault Will Sweep the Country Like a
Prairie Fire Now"11 3
Even though no-fault plans, as enacted, were far from pristine, and
even though there were pockets of organized and determined opposi-
tion, throughout the early to mid-1970s, there were a number of
fledgling no-fault plans in operation, and those plans were generally
favorably-even ecstatically-reviewed. 114 "[N]o-fault automobile
insurance laws not only succeeded in the first states to enact them, but
also succeeded visibly, palpably, and almost immediately," Daniel
Moynihan explained in 1974.115 That same year, O'Connell declared
thresholds. Such legislation would, of course, dramatically upset the status quo, while ushering
in new and intrusive federal regulation.
If the why of insurers' change-of-tune seems fairly clear, the when is even clearer. A number
of initially resistant insurers agreed to go along with modest state level no-fault at a secret meet-
ing, attended by four of the top five insurers, in December 1972 at the Camelback Inn in Phoenix
Arizona. For more on that meeting and its aftermath, see National No-Fault Motor Vehicle
Insurance Act: Hearings on S. 354 Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, 93d Cong. 133-99 (1973);
id. at 258 (statement of Thomas C. Morrill, Vice President, State Farm Insurance Companies)
("[Wihat Camelback achieved was a relaxing of both the extreme and the moderate positions to
achieve what can only fairly be called a consensus . . . .").
112. Report of the Special Committee on Automobile Accident Reparations, 94 ANN. REP.
A.B.A. 559, 577 (1969). For more on the ABA's opposition, see Franklin J. Marryott, The Auto-
mobile Accident Reparations System and the American Bar Association, 6 FORUM 79 (1970).
113. No-Fault Wins Its Case, supra note 9 (quoting C. Eugene Farnam, Massachusetts
Insurance Commissioner).
114. See, e.g., Cook, supra note 29 ("We consider it a smashing success . . . ." (quoting Penn-
sylvania Insurance Commissioner William Sheppard)); Letter from Thomas C. Jones, Commis-
sioner of Ins., to William G. Milliken, Governor (Oct. 6, 1976), in INS. BUREAU, MICH. DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, NO-FAULT INSURANCE AFTER THREE YEARS (1976) ("1 am pleased to report to
you that no-fault has in fact fulfilled your hopes and the hopes of its many other supporters.");
Farnam Ecstatic over Early Results of Massachusetts No-Fault Program, Bus. INS., Apr. 26, 1971,
at 10, 10 (quoting Massachusetts Insurance Commissioner C. Eugene Farnam as describing his
state's early experience with no-fault as "[e]xcellent, extraordinary, incredible, unbelievable");
Editorial, The No-Fault Rate, Bos. GLOBE, Nov. 29, 1971, at 10 (finding "convincing evidence
that the new system [in Massachusetts] has worked better than even its most optimistic advo-
cates had expected").
115. Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Foreword to JEFFREY O'CONNELL, ENDING INSULT TO IN-
JURY: NO-FAULT INSURANCE FOR PRODUCTS AND SERVICES, at xi (1975).
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the no-fault experiment a "success" and, emboldened by that success
(and true to plaintiffs' lawyers' dark predictions), set his sights on
transforming other areas of tort, from products liability to medical
malpractice.116 The following year, the president of the powerful AIA
reported to the Senate "that in states where it has been adopted, no-
fault has lived up to expectations."117 In the same hearings, the Presi-
dent of the ABA (on record opposing no-fault) grudgingly concurred,
testifying "that, generally speaking, the plans are working."" 8 And in
1977, the DOT also voiced its assent. After conducting a study of the
various plans in operation, it concluded:
No-fault plans of sharply varying objectives and character are
widely seen as successes. No problem has arisen in the implementa-
tion of no-fault for which there does not appear to be a readily
available and feasible solution, given the political will to make the
necessary change. No-fault automobile insurance works.119
Yet since 1976, the year prior to the DOT's glowing report, not a
single state has adopted a new no-fault plan, and there has been, in
one academic's words, "something of a backlash" against no-fault leg-
islation.120 The next Part considers conventional accounts for why no-
fault fizzled.
III. CONVENTIONAL EXPLANATIONS FOR NO-FAULT'S FAILURE:
MORE ACCIDENTS AND DRAMATICALLY HIGHER COST
According to the conventional failed-on-the-merits/trial-lawyers-
killed-it accounts, two main factors contributed to no-fault's sudden
demise: (1) the revelation of an unanticipated (and still contested) as-
sociation between no-fault legislation and additional fatal automobile
accidents, and (2) no-fault's undeniably high cost-traceable, many
commentators assert, to plaintiffs' lawyers' mischievous tinkering.
Drawing on recent accident and insurance data, a review of thousands
of contemporaneous press and journal accounts, and no-fault's volu-
minous (more than 11,000-page) federal legislative record, this Part
116. Jeffrey O'Connell, It's Time for No Fault for All Kinds of Injuries, 60 A.B.A. J. 1070,
1070 (1974) ("With the increasing spread and success of no-fault automobile laws, we should
begin to consider the application of the no-fault principle to . . injuries now covered by products
liability, medical malpractice, and ... other accidents."). See generally O'CONNELL, supra note
115 (offering a blueprint for that expansion).
117. National Standards No-Fault Motor Vehicle Insurance Act: Hearings on S. 354 Before the
S. Comm. on Commerce, 94th Cong. 113 (1975) (statement of T. Lawrence Jones, President,
AIA).
118. Id. at 158 (statement of James D. Fellers, President, ABA).
119. DOT, 1971-1977, supra note 80, at 80.
120. Ken Oliphant, Landmarks of No-Fault in the Common Law, in SHIFrs IN COMPENSATION
BETWEEN PRIVATE AND PUBLIC SYSTEMS 52 (Willem H. Van Boom & Michael Faure eds., 2007).
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sheds light on-and in a couple of places raises doubts about-these
conventional accounts.
A. The Accident Dilemma
As Kenneth Abraham points out, the first contributor to no-fault's
downfall is the .fact that it was, at least arguably, associated with
higher fatality rates.121 At the time no-fault was adopted, many
doubted that no-fault legislation would impact the number or severity
of auto accidents, and some went so far as to predict that no-fault
would actually improve the safety of the streets. 122 In the words of
Senator Philip A. Hart: "no-fault not only saves dollars but also saves
lives."1 23 Proponents advanced four main arguments for this predic-
tion. They first pointed to past experience: Puerto Rico's public no-
fault system went into effect on January 1, 1970, and early statistics
suggested its adoption was accompanied by a significant (32%, by one
estimate) drop in highway deaths. 124 Second, proponents argued that
no-fault would improve emergency care (and thus reduce accident fa-
talities) by reassuring doctors and hospitals that any bills incurred
would be promptly paid; indeed, some attributed Puerto Rico's drop
in fatalities to just this fact. 125 Third, some analogized to the creation
of the workers' compensation system, contending that its enactment
was followed by a significant decrease in industrial accidents.126
121. ABRAHAM, supra note 21, at 99.
122. See David S. Lougbran, The Effect of No-Fault Auto Insurance on Driver Behavior and
Auto Accidents in the United States, in THE EcoNoMICS AND POLITICS OF CHOICE NO-FAULT
INSURANCE, supra note 19, at 95, 96 ("Curiously, the question whether no-fault auto insurance
encourages careless driving behavior did not play a prominent role in legislative debates over the
adoption of no-fault between 1971 and 1976."). But cf Feinsilber, supra note 15 (noting that no-
fault opponents predicted that "the system would lead to more accidents, more injuries, more
deaths").
123. National No-Fault Motor Vehicle Insurance Act: Hearings on S. 354 Before the S. Comm.
on Commerce, 93d Cong. 297 (1973) (opening statement of Sen. Philip A. Hart); see also No-
Fault Catches Fire, supra note 10, at 64 (quoting Sen. Warren Magnuson advancing this
argument).
124. National No-Fault Motor Vehicle Insurance Act: Hearings on S. 354 Before the S. Comm.
on Commerce, 93d Cong. 297 (1973) (opening statement of Sen. Philip A. Hart); No-Fault Insur-
ance: Hearings on S. 354 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong. 153 (1973) (statement
of Sen. Frank E. Moss).
125. According to Senator Hart, "Administrators of the Puerto Rico plan attribute most of
that decline to the no-fault coverage which increased the availability of emergency transporta-
tion equipment and opened up many private hospitals to the auto accident victim." National
No-Fault Motor Vehicle Insurance Act: Hearings on S. 354 Before the S. Comm. on Commerce,
93d Cong. 297 (1973) (opening statement of Sen. Philip A. Hart).
126. E.g., James, supra note 52, at 416 (dismissing the argument that compensation is "an
invitation to carelessness" by, inter alia, citing the fact that "[w]orkmen's compensation was
followed by a very material decrease in industrial accidents"). For a summary of contemporary
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Fourth, and most prominently, it was predicted that no-fault would
increase the demand for safer vehicles. The argument went like this:
Instead of computing premiums based on the expected injury to third
parties (as an insurer does in a liability regime), in a no-fault regime,
insurers would calculate premiums based on the probability and ex-
tent of injury to the policyholder and his family. So computed, owners
of safer vehicles would be given discounts, which would, in turn, in-
crease car buyers' safety-feature demand. 127
On the other hand, there are clear reasons why no-fault might result
in more accidents. Namely, economic models of liability, as devel-
oped by William Landes, Steve Shavell, Richard Posner, and others,
suggest that no-fault plans, by relieving drivers of the costs of the acci-
dents they cause, will reduce deterrence, to negative effect. Yet, just
as the above safety arguments are susceptible to critique, this argu-
ment is as well; for a host of reasons, in other words, economic models
may not accurately capture or predict the particular, real-world be-
havior of drivers. 128
For starters, civil liability is hardly the only check on careless driv-
ing. There are numerous reasons to drive safely, ranging from avoid-
ing fines and criminal penalties, to protecting one's passengers and
property, to the humanitarian impulse not to maim others, to (perhaps
most powerfully) simple self-preservation. In addition, tort's deter-
rence function is clouded by what careless driving entails. In many
instances, it's characterized not by conscious or planned behavior, but
by sheer bad luck or a split second of inattention, which is tough for
even the most conscientious to avoid. 129
research on whether workers' compensation, in fact, decreased accident rates, see ABRAHAM,
supra note 21, at 59-60.
127. Guido Calabresi was the most forceful proponent of this argument. See No-Fault Motor
Vehicle Insurance: Hearings on H.R. 285 and Others Before the H. Subcomm. on Consumer Prot.
and Fin. of the Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 94th Cong. 565-71 (1975) (state-
ment of Guido Calabresi, Professor of Law, Yale University School of Law). The argument was
also picked up by the popular press. E.g., Simon Lazarus, "No-Fault" Default, NEw REPUBLIC,
Apr. 17, 1971, at 2, 23 (suggesting that no-fault's safety incentive could trigger "a more potent
and durable system of pressures for safe vehicle design than is provided by the administrative
controls of the Transportation Department's National Traffic Safety Administration").
128. See, e.g., Wex S. Malone, Damage Suits and the Contagious Principle of Workmen's Com-
pensation, NACCA L.J., Nov. 1952, at 44 (considering and promptly dismissing the notion that
civil liability "encourage[s] drivers to be more careful").
129. See Patrick Butler & Twiss Butler, Driver Record: A Political Red Herring that Reveals
the Basic Flaw in Automobile Insurance Pricing, 8 J. INs. REG. 200, 201 (1989) ("It is well known
among insurance professionals that there are no 'safe' drivers because even 'at fault' accidents
and traffic convictions are mostly random events-the luck of conditions existing when a mis-
take is made."). But see Brent Kabler, The Case Against Auto Choice, in THE ECONOMICS AND
POLITICS OF CHOICE No-FAULT INSURANCE, supra note 19, at 67, 70-72 (suggesting that a sur-
prising number of fatal accidents result from forces other than mere momentary inattention).
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Nor is true that traditional tort actually leaves the careless driver to
shoulder all the consequences of his carelessness. Even in tort states,
most drivers have first-party health insurance, which pays for medical
care for even negligently caused injuries; the vast majority of drivers
carry first-party medical payment (MedPay) insurance, which pro-
vides some additional guaranteed (albeit limited) compensation for
medical bills and funeral expenses; and most drivers carry first-party
collision insurance, which pays for even an at-fault driver's car re-
pair.130 In addition, when a third party is harmed, liability insurance is
now compulsory in almost all states, and it (rather than the driver her-
self) typically pays the victim's expenses. And, even when liability
coverage is insufficient to fully compensate a seriously injured victim,
individual tort payments from at-fault drivers are quite rare.131 One
might reply that, even if individual driver defendants don't pay finan-
cially, they still pay in other ways-via inconvenience, stress, or uncer-
tainty. But that too seems doubtful. Alfred Conard's classic Michigan
study found that, although 55% of all defendants in auto accident
cases did miss some work for case-related reasons (an average of 2.6
days), the remainder did not report any lost time. 132 Perhaps more
striking, 33% of all driver defendants were so uninvolved in settled
auto accident cases that they could not even recall if the claim had
resulted in payment.133 Another rejoinder is that, in tort states, care-
less drivers will pay eventually via insurance premium hikes. But the
extent to which insurers reliably experience-rate premiums to account
for drivers' accident costs (as opposed to merely adjusting rates based
on crude calculations such as a drivers' "territory" or credit worthi-
ness) remains surprisingly unclear. 134
130. MedPay insurance is optional first-party insurance that pays for a driver's own medical
and funeral expenses, as well as the medical and funeral expenses his passengers incur, regard-
less of the driver's fault. The coverage, however, is fairly modest, typically topping out at $5,000
or $10,000. For more on MedPay, see infra note 281 and accompanying text.
131. See LOUGHRAN, supra note 18, at 11 (reporting that, based on data from the IRC's 1998
Survey of Auto Accident Victims, only 6.7% of total reimbursements come from at-fault drivers
in tort states). The reluctance to pursue individual payment seems to stem both from the act's
futility (many individual defendants are effectively judgment proof) and also (and less obvi-
ously) from a kind of moral code among plaintiff lawyers that frowns upon seeking "blood
money" (that is, damages in excess of liability limits, extracted from individual defendants), in
the absence of special circumstances. See generally Tom Baker, Blood Money, New Money, and
the Moral Economy of Tort Law in Action, 35 LAw & Soc'y REV. 275 (2001).
132. CONARD ET AL., supra note 71, at 299.
133. Id. at 296-97.
134. Compare WALTER J. BLUM & HARRY KALVEN, JR., PUBLIc LAw PERSPECTIVES ON A
PRIVATE LAw PROBLEM: AuTo COMPENSATION PLANs 66 (1965) ("[W]ith some important ex-
ceptions, all motorists are charged as though they represented the same risk."), and Mark M.
Hager, No-Fault Drives Again: A Contemporary Primer, 52 U. MIAMI L. REV. 793, 799 (1998)
("No strong evidence indicates that underwriters systematically link premiums to driver danger-
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The converse is also true. Just as "tort in action" shifts much of the
cost of accidents away from negligent drivers, "no-fault in action"
leaves significant accident costs thereon. Through a variety of ave-
nues, in other words, careless drivers in no-fault states still pay a price
for their carelessness. Namely, in all no-fault states save Michigan,
the tort system still governs compensation for property damage, which
can be pricey. In most states, PIP payments are limited, so some of a
seriously injured at-fault driver's medical bills might not get paid. If a
careless driver causes another to sustain a serious injury, the injury
victim may pierce the no-fault threshold (as happens roughly 29% of
the time), where tort still reigns.135 And finally, some no-fault plans
exclude coverage if the insured is engaged in malicious or intentional
conduct-meaning repercussions from the clearest breaches of duty
are not blunted at all.13 6
All this means that when no-fault was initially considered, it was
hardly clear what effect no-fault would have on highway safety or,
indeed, whether it would have any effect at all. Yet, as early as 1978,
sources contended that no-fault was resulting in higher accident rates
in adopting states.137 And, in 1982, Elisabeth Landes conducted the
first empirical study of this effect. Using state-level data from 1967 to
1975, Landes concluded that no-fault legislation increased fatalities by
ousness."), with Richard W. Grayston, Deterrence in Automobile Liability Insurance-The Em-
pirical Evidence, 40 INs. Coums. J. 117, 126-27 (1973) (noting that underwriters successfully
focus high premiums on bad drivers), and Christopher J. Bruce, The Deterrent Effects of Auto-
mobile Insurance and Tort Law: A Survey of the Empirical Literature, 6 LAw & POL'Y 67, 85
(1984) ("[V]irtually all private insurance companies have a system of premium surcharges which
are levied when drivers have been found at fault for accidents."). In California, Proposition 103,
passed in 1988, required insurers to set premiums based largely on driver safety. CAL. INS. CODE
§ 1861.02(a) (West 2005) (providing that insurers must base automobile rates on, inter alia, the
insured's driving safety record). Prior to Proposition 103's enactment, however, insurers had
substantial leeway in setting rates, and only some based premiums on driver dangerousness.
Sugarman, supra note 19, at 693-94; see also Federal Standards for No-Fault Motor Vehicle Acci-
dent Benefits Act: Hearings Before the H. Subcomm. on Consumer Prot. and Fin. of the Comm.
on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 95th Cong. 460 (1977) (statement of T. Lawrence Jones,
President, AIA) (stating that "the most important classifications" in determining premiums are
territory, miles customarily driven, and whether driving occurs at night, and suggesting that some
but not all companies reliably consult accident reports). Moreover, even if insurers do levy
surcharges on at-fault drivers, there is little evidence that these surcharges differ across liability
regimes. See LOUGHRAN, supra note 18, at xvi ("Getting into an accident in a no-fault state is
just as likely to increase insurance premiums as getting into an accident in a tort state.").
135. LOUGHRAN, supra note 18, at 9 (reporting that about 29% of PIP claims in 1997 ex-
ceeded tort thresholds).
136. MICH. COMP. LAws § 500.3105 (West 2010). Some states also exclude coverage if the
insured is injured while driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs. See, e.g., MASS GEN.
LAws ANN. ch. 90, § 34A(1) (West 2001); N.Y. INS. LAw § 5103(b)(2) (McKinney 2001).
137. E.g., ABA, AUTOMOBILE NO-FAULT INSURANCE: A STUDY BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE
ON AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE LEGISLATION 27 (1978).
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as much as 15%-a finding that did not help no-fault proponents'
cause.138 Since Landes's controversial study, the question of whether
no-fault leads to additional accidents has been repeatedly-even
exhaustively-examined, yet has remained stubbornly unresolved.
Some researchers have examined accident rates in New Zealand and
Quebec-jurisdictions with pure no-fault laws-and these research-
ers, like Landes, have found that no-fault substantially increases the
rate of fatal accidents.139 But other researchers, using state-level data
and deploying ever-greater statistical sophistication, have variously
confirmed and rejected Landes's provocative report.140 All told,
roughly half of the studies published thus far claim that no-fault cover-
age increases fatal accidents, while the other half find no effect, and
the notion that no-fault reduces fatalities has been seemingly put to
rest.141 The proposition that no-fault may be associated with greater
accidents thus lingers.
B. The Premium Problem
The second-and unambiguously important-factor that impeded
the spread of no-fault was that, despite assurances it would be, it was
138. Elisabeth M. Landes, Insurance, Liability, and Accidents: A Theoretical and Empirical
Investigation of the Effect of No-Fault Accidents, 25 J.L. & ECON. 49, 50 (1982); see also Tele-
phone Interview with Jeffrey O'Connell, supra note 78 (stating his belief that these safety allega-
tions significantly eroded support for no-fault legislation). But see Kinzler Interview, supra note
80 (disagreeing that the safety accident issue had a significant impact on the debate, at least
vis-A-vis federal legislation).
139. See generally Rose Anne Devlin, Liability Versus No-Fault Automobile Insurance Re-
gimes: An Analysis of the Experience in Quebec, in CoNTIUIoNs To INSURANCE ECONOMICS
499 (Georges Dionne ed., 1992); R. Ian McEwin, No-Fault and Road Accidents: Some Australa-
sian Evidence, 9 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 13 (1989).
140. Compare Alma Cohen & Rajeev Dehejia, The Effect of Automobile Insurance and Acci-
dent Liability Laws on Traffic Fatalities, 47 J.L. & EcON. 357 (2004) (finding no-fault is related to
a 6% increase in fatalities), and J. David Cummins et al., The Incentive Effects of No-Fault
Automobile Insurance, 44 J.L. & ECON. 427 (2001) (finding that no-fault is associated with a 13%
increase in the rate of fatal accidents), and Frank A. Sloan et al., Tort Liability Versus Other
Approaches for Deterring Careless Driving, 14 INT'L REV. L. & EcoN. 53 (1994) (showing a 5%
increase for adults), with LOUGHRAN, supra note 18 (finding no effect), and Paul Zador &
Adrian Lund, Re-analyses of the Effects of No-Fault Auto Insurance on Fatal Crashes, 53 J. RISK
& INS. 226 (1986) (same), and Paul S. Kochanowski & Madelyn V. Young, Deterrent Aspects of
No-Fault Automobile Insurance: Some Empirical Findings, 52 J. RISK & INS. 269 (1985) (same),
and DOT, 1985 FOLLOW-UP, supra note 90, app. B (same). A recent study extending beyond
fatal accidents and considering a broad range of accident types similarly finds no effect. See
generally PAUL HEATON & ERIc HELLAND, RAND, NO-FAULT INSURANCE AND AUTOMOBILE
ACCIDENTS (2010).
141. See ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 4, at 80-82 (summarizing the voluminous empirical
literature).
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not a demonstrable cost saver. 14 2 In the heady days of enactment, no-
fault legislation was packaged and sold as a cure to any number of ills.
As previously discussed, it was sometimes touted as safety legislation.
And, as we will see, it was also sometimes touted as necessary to close
gaps in the social safety net, as a way to alleviate the congestion of the
courts, as a way to increase the predictability of damage payouts, and
as a way to combat fraud, among other virtues. Yet, it was primarily
packaged and sold to the consumer as a way to control the cost of
insurance. By (1) lowering transaction costs (particularly by reducing
attorneys' fees, post-accident investigations, and court costs) and (2)
eliminating payment for noneconomic loss, no-fault was, at long last,
supposed to reduce billowing insurance premiums.143
This promise of rate reductions was the most politically potent argu-
ment in no-fault proponents' arsenal. And it was a promise that was
"relentlessly paraded before the public."14 4 Professor O'Connell got
in the act, maintaining: "The savings under Basic Protection would be
striking"-with automobile insurance costs dropping from 15% to
142. See id. at xvi ("We conclude that the decline in no-fault's popularity is a result of (1) its
unexpectedly high claim costs and (2) the political debate shifting from an overall assessment of
the optimal insurance system to the impact of those high costs on consumers."). Likewise, Ken-
neth Abraham's recent appraisal also identifies no-fault's unexpectedly high cost as one of four
explanations for no-fault's demise. ABRAHAM, supra note 21, at 98; see also JERRY J. PHILLIPS &
STEPHEN CHIPPENDALE, WHO PAYS FOR CAR ACCIDENTS? THE FAULT VERSUS NO-FAULT IN-
SURANCE DEBATE 62 (2002) ("In sum, the principal failing of no-fault plans is their failure to
reduce premiums.").
143. For a description of how no-fault would be financed, see National No-Fault Motor Vehi-
cle Insurance Act: Hearings on S. 354 Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, 93d Cong. 110 (1973)
(statement of Lindsey Cowen, Dean, Case Western Reserve Law School and Ohio Commis-
sioner on Uniform State Laws).
144. PAUL GILLESPIE & MIRIAM KLIPPER, NO-FAULT: WHAT YOU SAVE, GAIN, AND LOSE
WITH THE NEw AUTO INSURANCE 155 (1972) ("As the drive to institute no-fault reform contin-
ues across the country, the prospect of immediate consumer savings has been relentlessly
paraded before the public."); see also Walter J. Blum & Harry Kalven, Jr., Ceilings, Costs, and
Compulsion in Auto Compensation Legislation, 1973 UTAH L. REV. 341, 359 ("The dominant
political rhetoric was to promise virtually all motorists an actual reduction in premiums."); Ran-
dall R. Bovbjerg, Massachusetts No-Fault: A Note on Some Changes in the Law and in Rate
Levels, in No-FAULT AUTOMoBILE INSURANCE IN ACTION: THE EXPERIENCES IN MASSACHU-
SEris, FLORIDA, DELAWARE AND MICHIGAN, supra note 99, at 248 ("Pocketbook issues were the
mainspring of reformist sentiment [in Massachusetts]; concern for prompt claims payment, re-
duced tort litigation, and other hoped-for no-fault benefits was distinctly secondary."); Joseph
W. Little, A Critique of No-Fault Reparation for Traffic Crash Victims, 51 IND. L.J. 635, 641
(1976) ("[I]t was the cost factor that caught the interest of the public and enabled the reformists
to overcome institutional resistance to change."); John G. Ryan, Massachusetts Tries No-Fault,
57 A.B.A. J. 431, 431 (1971) ("For the most part legislative support depended on a single fac-
tor-the hope . . . that the plan could cut automobile insurance costs. Other motivations com-
monly advanced to support the no-fault idea were relatively unimportant.").
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25%, which, he hastened to add, was "a conservative estimate." 145
The New York Times Editorial Board breathlessly reported that if a
restrictive New York no-fault bill were enacted, "[e]limination of
overhead would cut premiums to policyholders by as much as 50 per
cent." 146 And, not to be outdone, the General Counsel of the AIA
publicly declared that "all cost studies" found that no-fault auto plans
will save money for the policyholder. 14 7 To bring the promise of rate
reduction home, a number of states, including Massachusetts and
Florida, legislatively mandated that insurers reduce premiums 15% in
the plan's first year. And, early in its operation, Massachusetts far
surpassed that 15% benchmark. There, rates dropped a whopping
42.5%, while early results from New York also showed significant
reductions. 148
Yet, lasting savings proved elusive. By January 1976, the Chicago
Tribune reported that insurance executives were already privately
conceding "that the rate-reduction potential of no-fault insurance was
probably overstated." 1 4 9 And by 1977, the initial verdict was in: "No-
fault auto insurance," the American Mutual Insurance Alliance's
(AMIA's) Vice President declared, "does not lead to automobile in-
surance cost reduction."150 As the years followed, that conclusion
145. Jeffrey O'Connell, Is It Really Immoral to Pay Regardless of Fault?, TRIAL, Oct.-Nov.
1967, at 18, 19. Of course, it is possible that the Keeton-O'Connell plan would have reduced
premiums if it had been enacted as written. We will never know.
146. Editorial, No-Fault Auto Insurance, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 1970, at 46.
147. Gilmore, supra note 21; see also Utah Senator Urges No-Fault Insurance Before Californi-
ans, HERALD, Oct. 28, 1973, at 36 (quoting Sen. Frank E. Moss as stating that, even a "medium
benefit" no-fault law would save Californians 35% on auto insurance); Car Insurance Change
Pushed, BRIDGEPORT PosT, Oct. 18, 1968, at 11 (quoting Connecticut Insurance Commissioner
William R. Cotter as stating that a no-fault plan "could save motorists 'up to 50 per cent"').
148. For information on rate cuts in Massachusetts, see Editorial, No-Fault Is Coming, supra
note 103 (calling no-fault "an innovation that reduced the cost of insurance by 42.5% in Massa-
chusetts"); No-Fault Insurance: Hearings on S. 354 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d
Cong. 460 (1974) (statement of Michael Dukakis, former State Rep. from Massachusetts) ("[W]e
have been able to save hundreds of millions of dollars in premiums for the motorists of Massa-
chusetts."). For information from New York, see Faultless Victory, NEWSWEEK, May 13, 1974, at
119, 120 (reporting that, after no-fault's New York enactment, the premium for a typical policy
offered by Allstate dropped precipitously, from $134 to $85).
149. Editorial, No-Fault Auto Insurance: Did We Get a Lemon?, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 26, 1976, § 1,
at 4. A few months before, the Los Angeles Times had published an article declaring "no-fault
has worked no miracles on price." Alexander Auerbach, No-Fault Car Insurance-Still Faulty,
L.A. TIMES, Nov. 15, 1975, at 1.
150. Federal Standards for No-Fault Motor Vehicle Accident Benefits Act: Hearings Before the
H. Subcomm. on Consumer Prot. and Fin. of the Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce,
95th Cong. 277 (1977) (statement of Andr6 Maisonpierre, Vice President, AMIA); see also id. at
462 (statement of Paul C. Blume, Vice President-General Counsel, National Association of Inde-
pendent Insurers) ("[T]he various no-fault States have not achieved reductions in insurance
losses and premiums, but have in fact experienced substantial increases.").
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grew only more insistent and irrefutable. In 1983, two academics pub-
lished a study concluding that no-fault had "failed spectacularly" in
meetings its cost-cutting goal.151 In 1985, a DOT study, generally
favorable to no-fault, observed that no-fault states had higher overall
insurance premiums.15 2 In 1990, O'Connell conceded that "costs were
reduced less than anticipated." 1 53  And, a comprehensive RAND
study recently concluded: "Per-policy costs are highest in no-fault
states, and these states have also experienced more-dramatic cost
growth over time." 154
Evidence of what happened in states that repealed no-fault is also
instructive. Georgia repealed its no-fault legislation in 1991. Shortly
thereafter, insurance liability premiums declined 20%, a level at which
they have basically stayed.155 Colorado repealed its legislation in July
2003. Between 2002 and 2004, the overall injury loss costs (the
amount of loss paid per insured vehicle) decreased 27%, while auto
insurance liability premiums declined 16%.156 And in 1994, when
Connecticut repealed its no-fault system, premiums also declined. 57
The graph below, using data compiled by RAND, illustrates the
point graphically, showing the cost of the average written liability pre-
mium between 1987 and 2004 in tort and no-fault states. No-fault
costs more, and the gap between no-fault and tort is growing.
151. BERNARD L. WEBB & CLAUDE C. LILLY, No-FAULT-THE RECORD: PROMISE V. PER-
FORMANCE, MYTH v. REALITY 30 (1983).
152. DOT, 1985 FOLLOW-UP, supra note 90, at 4.
153. Jeffrey O'Connell, A Model Bill Allowing Choice Between Auto Insurance Payable with
and Without Regard to Fault, 51 OmIo ST. L.J. 947, 948 (1990).
154. ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 4, at 135. Anderson and his co-authors reach this conclu-
sion after adjusting for property-damage costs (to account for variation in general inflation) and
accident prevalence across states. Id. at 76.
155. Id. at 74.
156. IRC, COLORADO AUTO INSURANCE-TRANSITION FROM No-FAULT TO TORT 10-11
(2008).
157. For more on Connecticut's repeal, which yielded rate reductions of approximately 10%,
see Richard D. Hailey, Traveling Same Old Road, USA TODAY, Oct. 3, 1997, at 12A. For more
on repeals generally, see ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 4, at 74-75. Anderson and co-authors
point out that all three states experienced rapid cost increases in the years immediately prior to
repeal, and so some of the observed reduction could reflect mean reversion. Id. at 74. However,
they largely reject the notion that "these states would have experienced such large and abrupt
cost reductions. absent the change in insurance regime." Id.
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Source: ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 4, at 66 fig.4.1 (using data derived from IRC,
TRENDS IN INJURY CLAIMS (2008), and IRC, AUTO INJURY INSURANCE CLAIMS:
COUNTRYWIDE PATTERNS IN TREATMENT, COST, AND COMPENSATION (2008)), re-
printed with permission.
Below we consider the five prime explanations for why no-fault was
less of a cost saver than anticipated.
1. More Compensated
First, by its very design, no-fault expands the delivery of compensa-
tion: paying two parties following an accident is inherently more costly
than paying only one. 15  So too, a nontrivial proportion of serious
accidents (and a solid majority of fatal accidents) are one-car colli-
sions, which, prior to no-fault, did not merit compensation and after
no-fault did.159 Finally, because the enacted no-fault plans all had tort
safety valves, they all required that each driver retain (or in some
cases, for the first time obtain) bodily injury coverage (because cata-
158. See Federal Standards for No-Fault Motor Vehicle Accident Benefits Act: Hearings Before
the H. Subcomm. on Consumer Prot. and Fin. of the Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce,
95th Cong. 277 (1977) (statement of Andrd Maisonpierre, Vice President, AMIA) (attributing
no-fault's failure to reduce premiums to two facts, one of which is that "[m]ore automobile acci-
dent victims are being paid benefits").
159. According to NHTSA, 59% of fatal crashes and 33% of all injury crashes involved only
one vehicle. National Statistics, NHTSA, http://www-fars.nhtsa.dot.gov/Main/index.aspx (last
visited July 5, 2011).
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strophic accidents could still result in tort liability) and simply pile on
a new layer of mandatory coverage: PIP.
2. The Exclusion of Property Damage Claims
Second, no-fault, as initially proposed by Keeton and O'Connell,
and as ultimately enacted in most states (save in Michigan and tempo-
rarily in Massachusetts and Florida), did not affect property damage
claims. 160 Because property damage coverage accounts for more of
each premium dollar than bodily injury coverage does, and it was left
undisturbed, the huge premium reductions certain advocates touted
were never in the cards.161
3. Primary Payer
Third, as originally conceived, Keeton and O'Connell called for PIP
coverage to be secondary to the victim's health or disability insurance,
meaning accident victims would first seek compensation from their
health and disability insurers; only secondarily, and residually, would
victims seek recovery from PIP.162 Making auto insurance secondary,
Jeffrey O'Connell asserted, was "absolutely essential . . . to help con-
160. See KEETON & O'CONNELL, supra note 52, at 280-81 (excluding property damage). The
property provision was repealed in Massachusetts after it had been in existence (and experienc-
ing trouble) for five years. It was struck down by court action in Florida in 1973. For further
information on these provisions and their respective abrogation and repeal, see Roger C. Hen-
derson, No-Fault Insurance for Automobile Accidents: Status and Effect in the United States, 56
OR. L. REV. 287, 298 & n.75 (1977); see also Kluger v. White, 281 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1973) (invalidat-
ing Florida's property damage provision).
161. There are three types of property damage coverage: collision coverage (which pays for
your post-collision vehicle repair, regardless of fault), comprehensive coverage (which pays for
damage to your vehicle or its contents from perils such as fire or theft), and property liability
coverage (which pays for the other driver's vehicle and property if you are legally at fault).
Property damage coverage typically accounts for the lion's share of the premium dollar. See
Automobile Insurance Reform and Cost Savings: Hearings on S. 945 and Others Before the S.
Comm. on Commerce, 92d Cong. 1033, exhibit 1 (1971) (statement of Andr6 Maisonpierre, Vice
President and Manager, AMIA) (chart showing that, in various jurisdictions, roughly two-thirds
of auto premiums go to vehicle damage coverage); INS. INro. INsT., THE INSURANCE FACT BOOK
2010, at 63 (2010) (showing that $.42 of every premium dollar goes to property damage, while
only $30 goes to payments to injured persons).
162. See KEETON & O'CONNELL, supra note 52, at 278. For more on the choice and its conse-
quences, see ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 4, at 38; STEPHEN J. CARROLL ET AL., RAND, No-
FAULT APPROACHES TO COMPENSATING PEOPLE INJURED IN AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENTS 38
(1991) ("Making private health insurance primary ... would have a major effect on total injury
coverage costs."); Gary T. Schwartz, Auto No-Fault and First-Party Insurance: Advantages and
Problems, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 611, 627 n.67 (2000) ("[Rlendering health insurance primary to no-
fault could reduce the aggregate of no-fault injury coverage costs by as much as 40%.").
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trol skyrocketing insurance costs, and to discourage corrupting over-
utilization of insured services." 163
This, however, was something even ostensibly supportive auto in-
surers could not abide. As a State Farm representative put it: "One of
the few conditions on which we have adopted an absolutely non-
negotiable position is that the automobile insurance policy must be
the primary source of recovery for the costs involved in automobile
accidents." 164
To support their position, and defeat secondary status, insurers trot-
ted out a number of arguments. Some were practical: it would be too
difficult, auto insurers warned, to keep track of lapses or gaps in (op-
tional) health insurance coverage, and making health insurers pay first
would substantially delay auto payments. Some went to motivations:
health insurers would have inadequate financial incentives to provide
the injured with the very best in medical care since they, unlike auto
insurers, would bear no responsibility for lost wages. Some appealed
to basic fairness: it would be wrong to require nondrivers, participat-
ing in group health plans, to subsidize the driving public, and it would
also be wrong for wealthy drivers, with generous health insurance pol-
icies, to pay less for auto insurance than impecunious (and less-
comprehensively-insured) individuals. And, some appealed to legisla-
tors' own self-interest: because the majority of health insurers, unlike
auto insurers, are nonprofits, adding auto health costs to health insur-
ers would result in the loss of tax revenue.165 ATLA, meanwhile,
163. O'CONNELL, supra note 1, at 98. Health insurers, too, advanced this position. E.g., No-
Fault Motor Vehicle Insurance (Part II): Hearings on H.R. 10 and Others Before the H. Sub-
comm. on Commerce and Fin. of the Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 93d Cong.
1571 (1974) (statement of Walter J. McNerney, President, Blue Cross Association) ("We feel
that health care program benefits should be primary.").
164. Hume, supra note 27, at 347; accord No-Fault Motor Vehicle Insurance (Part IV): Hear-
ing on H.R. 4994 Before the H. Subcomm. on Commerce and Fin. of the Comm. on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce, 92d Cong. 1334 (1971) (statement of National Affairs Committee, Indepen-
dent Mutual Insurance Agents Association of New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut) ("On
one point we are adamant and will not compromise: Automobile insurance absolutely must oc-
cupy the primary coverage position in the settlement of any and all claims arising from automo-
bile accidents."); T. Lawrence Jones, The Case for Making Auto Insurance Payments Primary,
WASH. INS. NEWSLETTER, Oct. 10, 1972, at 1 (stating that "within the property casualty insurance
industry . . . there is nearly unanimous agreement on one facet of the issue: basic compensation
for auto accident injuries should be paid by auto insurance and not by health care payment
system").
165. See, e.g., No-Fault Motor Vehicle Insurance: Hearings on H.R. 285 and Others Before the
H. Subcomm. on Consumer Prot. and Fin. Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 94th
Cong. 580 (1975) (exhibit to the statement of John G. Cook, President, National Association of
Mutual Insurance Agents) ("We are convinced that if health insurance were to be primary, the
public would suffer confusion, administrative chaos, and premium increases from the duplication
of effort."); National Standards No-Fault Motor Vehicle Insurance Act: Hearings on S. 354 Before
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highlighted another, more cynical reason for insurers' resolve: "A plan
which saves the consumer billions of dollars will take away from the
private insurance industry billions of dollars in cash flow and reserves,
and will correspondingly diminish investment income and agents'
commissions."1 6 6 And ATLA's suspicion had support. A 1970 Busi-
ness Week article reported that AIA was "adamant that auto insur-
ance should be the 'primary' coverage ... because some members feel
a de-emphasis would cut into their premium income."167
However motivated, though, insurers' arguments carried the day in
most states: Except to workers' compensation benefits (received when
a driver is injured on the job) and governmental benefits (like social
security), auto benefits were almost uniformly deemed primary.s68
The repercussions of that political compromise were profound. For
one, it meant that some policyholders who had health insurance would
have duplicate coverage, meaning that, following a car accident, they
could possibly receive a windfall and be paid twice.169 Furthermore,
even when coverage did not duplicate, having auto coverage primary
meant not only that relevant medical bills would be paid mostly by
auto insurers, rather than health insurers, but that more medicals bills
would be paid, and they would often be paid at substantially higher
the S. Comm. on Commerce, 94th Cong. 126-27 (1975) (statement of William G. Russell, former
President, National Association of Casualty and Surety Agents) (listing eleven separate reasons
why "auto insurance should be made the primary source of payment to accident victims").
166. National Standards No-Fault Motor Vehicle Insurance Act: Hearings on S. 354 and Others
Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, 94th Cong. 456 (1975) (statement of Leonard Ring and
Craig Spangenburg, ATLA).
167. Rough Ride and New Roads Ahead for Auto Insurers, supra note 8.
168. For the fact that, with a few limited exceptions, PIP payments were made primary, see
DOT, 1985 FOLLOW-UP, supra note 90, at 25-41, which summarizes state plans. In 1974, the
Michigan no-fault statute was amended to require insurers to offer insureds discounts if motor-
ists substituted their health insurance for a portion of their no-fault coverage. When policyhold-
ers elected this option, they received approximately $8 (which translates into roughly $32 today)
off their premiums. Relatively few policyholders made this election, however. See 2 JAMES K.
HAMMrTT, RAND, AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT COMPENSATION: PAYMENTS BY AUTO INSURERS 23
(1985) (analyzing Michigan's closed-claims data and suggesting "that the option of designating
one's private health insurance primary to PIP is not widely chosen"). In 1977, New York also
amended its no-fault law to provide for a similar type of coordination, but as of 1995, Michigan
and New York stood alone. JoosT, supra note 79, §§ 3:11, 3:14.
169. It appears that duplicative recoveries are rare today, as medical providers charge auto
insurers (rather than health insurers) directly for the charges patients incur. See Email from
Ellen Melchionni, President, N.Y. Ins. Ass'n, Inc. (Jan. 26, 2012) (on file with author) (explain-
ing that duplicative recoveries are "not customary"). It does not appear it was always thus. INS.
BUREAU, MICH. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, NO-FAULT INSURANCE IN MICHIGAN: CONSUMER Arri-
TUDES AND PERFORMANCE 80 (1978) (concluding "duplicate recoveries add substantially to the
total insurance bill"); State No-Fault Automobile Insurance Experiences: Hearings Before the H.
Subcomm. on Consumer Prot. and Fin. of the Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 95th
Cong. 511 (1977) (statement of Lawrence P. Kuvin, Co-chairman, Florida Bar Association No-
Fault Committee) ("A lot of people collect two, three, four different times.").
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rates. Medical insurers, that is, reduce costs via discounts and fee
schedules, and they limit patient treatment using any number of mech-
anisms, including deductibles, co-payments, utilization controls, and
medical protocols. Auto insurers, by contrast, tend to pay almost any
bills that a victim incurs-and, in most states, at full freight-dramati-
cally increasing (indeed, by one account, more than doubling) the cost
of care. 170
In sum, one of the main reasons that no-fault cost significantly more
than expected was that it was ultimately deemed the primary payer.
And this no-fault feature was not part of the original Kee-
ton-O'Connell plan. Nor was it the result of plaintiffs' lawyers' lobby-
ing. Enacted no-fault legislation was made far more expensive and
thus weakened (perhaps fatally) by those in the ostensibly supportive
insurance industry itself.
4. More Medical Care
A fourth reason why no-fault cost more than anticipated was that,
in practice, accident victims in no-fault states consumed dramatically
more medical care of almost all kinds.171 For this, there are three
prime explanations, one salutary, one mostly innocent, and one less
benign.
First, it should be no surprise that accident victims in no-fault states
consumed more medical care, as an important goal of no-fault, from
its inception, was to make medical care more widely available. With-
out no-fault, some accident victims might forego necessary but costly
170. In 2005, State Farm reported that in Florida, "Charges to insurers for services under the
PIP coverage are generally more than double the fees charged by providers under the workers'
compensation fee schedule." Questions for PIP/No-Fault Meeting: Hearings Before H. Ins.
Comm. (Fla. 2005) (State Farm Insurance Response to House Insurance Committee Questions,
Nov. 2, 2005), available at http://www.myfloridahouse.gov/sections/Documents/loaddoc.aspx?
PublicationType=Committees&Committeeld=2246&Session=2006&DocumentType=Meeting%
20Packets&FileName=insurance_11_08-05.pdf; see also Kinzler, supra note 26, at 20 (observing
that "the PIP system remains the last health insurance system in the United States that remains
largely free of [cost] constraints"); Herb Jaffe, Some Doctors, Hospitals Victimize New Jersey
Reform System-Fraudulent No-Fault Claims Fuel Premium Spiral, NEWARK STAR LEDGER,
Feb. 14, 1977, at 1, 5 (noting that an absence of "fee schedules" or "controls over medical
charges" are increasing costs and quoting a Kemper insurance manager as stating that doctors
who normally charge "$35 to $50 for a first visit are charging $75 and $100 after they hear it's a
no-fault case"). New York has, for decades, had a fee reimbursement schedule, limiting PIP
charges to those contained in the workers' compensation fee schedule. See N.Y. INs. LAW § 5108
(McKinney 2009). Florida very recently enacted fee schedules, capping most PIP fees at 200%
of the amount payable under Medicare. See FLA. STAT. § 627.736(5) (2010). In a number of
other states, however, auto insurers are explicitly barred by statute or regulation from entering
into managed-care arrangements with medical providers. ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 4, at
119 n.44.
171. See ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 4, at xv, 120-31.
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care; with no-fault, that care is available. The second reason for this
increased consumption is somewhat similar: In no-fault states, as
noted directly above, victims' medical care is assured, free of any net-
tlesome deductible or co-payment, and sometimes even pleasurable
(massages, for example, can be covered), creating a potent mix for
moral hazard, particularly because healthcare professionals (afforded
the rare opportunity to be paid without discount) are apt to be enthu-
siastic providers. Now, we are at the third explanation, and it is less
benign. As also noted above, most no-fault states controlled access to
the tort system using fixed monetary thresholds: claimants could re-
cover in tort if, and only if, their medical bills exceeded a particular
sum. The problem is that these medical thresholds, it now seems
clear, did not provide a real barrier but instead became-in the
DOT's words-unintended "targets" for accident victims and their
lawyers to "shoot at" and surpass.172 Put bluntly, the temptation be-
came, as one lawyer put it, "Keep taking X-rays till you jump the
threshold or you glow in the dark."173
When assessing the unexpectedly high cost of no-fault, then, the
problem of fraud looms large. Its prominence is also somewhat sur-
172. DOT, 1971-1977, supra note 80, at 80; see also No-Fault Motor Vehicle Insurance: Hear-
ings on H.R. 285 and Others Before the H. Subcomm. on Consumer Prot. and Fin. Comm. on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 94th Cong. 316 (1975) (statement of William Cohen, Professor
of Law, Stanford Law School) (describing the "tendency to inflate medical bills to get the full
ticket in the negligence lottery").
173. Patrick Bedard, Auto Insurance Pays Off Big for Crooks and Trial Lawyers, CAR &
DRIVER, Jan. 1998, at 20 (quoting an unidentified lawyer). Graphically illustrating the interac-
tion, congressional hearings turned up the following letter sent by a New York law firm to physi-
cians prior to New York's adoption of a verbal threshold:
Dear Doctor: ...
We have taken the case of the above patient(s) on a contingent basis, pending deter-
mination as to whether or not the cost of reasonable medical care of the patient will
exceed the $500 minimum threshold limit.
Since the patient(s) would not be able to recover for pain and suffering beyond the
actual out-of-pocket expenses of his medical care, unless the medical care exceeds $500,
may we strongly ask you to constantly consider and remain aware of the fact that the
medical care given will be promptly paid by the insurance carrier upon the presentation
of your bills. Would you also send the patient(s) for X-rays, hospital care, diagnostic
tests for treatment, orthopedic, neurological, or other specialist consultations to aid in
treating the patient(s). ...
You will be aiding the patient(s) in not only giving them the best and complete avail-
able medical care the insurance policy can buy but will also be aiding the patients in
assuring them that they will have their day in court when they can sue for pain and
suffering resulting from medical injuries.
State No-Fault Automobile Insurance Experiences: Hearings Before the H. Subcomm. on Con-
sumer Prot. and Fin. of the Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 95th Cong. 624 (1977)
(statement of John M. Murphy, Rep., State of New York).
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prising. The tort system has long been thought to reward plaintiffs
who seek extra, unnecessary medical treatment because, in the rough-
and-tumble world of claims adjustment and settlement, a plaintiff's
medical bills are often roughly multiplied by an arbitrary coefficient in
order to calculate her total recovery.174 Given this multiplication, as
one lawyer told me: "If a person goes to a chiropractor and gets some
treatment, gets some medical specials, all of a sudden instead of hav-
ing a case that's worth $1,500, you have a case that's worth $3,500."'15
It is magical math. And it is tremendously costly. This perverse in-
centive to build one's claim by seeking unnecessary treatment has
been called "one of the central weaknesses of the current tort system"
and is estimated to cost insurers and their policyholders billions of
dollars per year.'76
As originally conceived, by eliminating most noneconomic dam-
ages, no-fault was supposed to reduce the incentive to build, feign, or
exaggerate one's claim.'77 Soon after the Massachusetts plan went
into effect, meanwhile, there was a striking 39% decline in the number
of personal injuries reported to authorities, which some attributed to
the fact that, under the tort system, many claims had been "phony"
and these bogus claims had been deterred by the new rules in ef-
fect. 178 As the bill's sponsor, Michael Dukakis, put it at the time:
"Apparently, motorists are beginning to realize that a fabricated acci-
dent or exaggerated claim of personal injury no longer pays the divi-
174. As H. Laurence Ross reports from his classic study of insurance claims adjusting: "The
hospital and physicians' bills are totaled, and are multiplied by an arbitrary coefficient-typically
from two to five, depending on the practice of the area-to yield an agreeable figure for the
intangibles of the case, the pain and suffering and inconvenience." H. LAURENCE Ross, SET-
TLED OUT OF COURT: THE SOCIAL PROCESS OF INSURANCE CLAIMS ADJUSTMENT 108 (1980).
But see HAMMrrr, supra note 168, at 33 (recognizing the "folklore" that general damages are a
multiple of special damages but concluding, on the basis of 1977 closed-claims data, that "actual
payments cannot be predicted accurately using medical or economic loss alone").
175. Telephone Interview with L.J. (Apr. 17, 2008).
176. STAFF OF JOINT ECON. COMM., 104TH CONG., IMPROVING THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYS-
TEM: THE ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF TORT REFORM 17 (Comm. Print 1996); see also IRC, FRAUD
AND BUILDUP IN AUTO INJURY CLAIMS: PUSHING THE LIMITS OF THE AUTO INSURANCE SYSTEM
2 (1996) (concluding that approximately 36% of all paid bodily injury claims appear to involve
fraud or buildup and estimating that excess injury payments total $5.2 to $6.3 billion per year).
177. GILLESPIE & KLIPPER, supra note 144, at 13 ("[N]o-fault plans seek . . . an end to the
need to exaggerate injuries [and] the elimination of fraud."); see also KEETON & O'CONNELL,
supra note 52, at 6 (describing their plan as one that would "minimize inducements to
dishonesty").
178. No-Fault Catches Fire, supra note 10, at 64 ("In fact, there was a striking 39% decline in
the number of personal injuries even reported to authorities, which suggests that many claims
under the old system were phony.").
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dends it used to."17 9 Yet, with the benefit of hindsight, it seems that
particularly monetary threshold no-fault plans did little to alleviate,
and may have even exacerbated, the fraud concern, as providing
noneconomic damages only to those who pierce thresholds tempts
some to seek treatment until the threshold is pierced. Illustrating this
response, in 1989, when Massachusetts's monetary threshold was
raised from $500 to $2,000, the number of visits to chiropractors and
physical therapists more than doubled.180
At the same time, while the no-fault system created powerful incen-
tives to build claims, it also tied insurers' hands in various ways. For
one, it is particularly difficult to crack down on fraudulent PIP claims
because these claims involve policyholders rather than third parties.
Appearing "tough" in handling one's policyholder is bound to be bad
customer relations.' 8' It is also both difficult and risky. It is difficult
because all no-fault states require the prompt payment of PIP bene-
fits, typically within thirty days of a claim's receipt, which leaves little
time for careful investigation.18 2 It is risky because if a claimant suc-
cessfully sues for overdue PIP benefits, an insurer must pay an interest
penalty and reasonable attorney's fees, or worse, might be subject to a
bad faith failure-to-pay claim-where punitive damages could be
assessed.183
5. Thresholds Were Less Effective than Anticipated
The fifth and final reason why no-fault was less of a cost saver than
anticipated was that thresholds were simply less effective than antici-
pated: No-fault has kept far fewer cases out of the court system than
179. Michael S. Dukakis & Stephen Kinzer, Auto Accidents: Blame Is Not the Principal Issue,
L.A. TIMES, Apr. 9, 1972, at Cl.
180. Sarah S. Marter & Herbert I. Weisberg, Medical Expenses and the Massachusetts Auto-
mobile Tort Reform Law: A First Review of 1989 Bodily Injury Liability Claims, 10 J. INs. REG.
462, 463, 487 (1992). In Hawaii, meanwhile, where the threshold was $7,000 in 1990, claimants
who visited chiropractors did so a median of fifty-eight times. IRC, AUTOMOBILE INJURY
CLAIMS IN HAWAII 26 (1991); Hager, supra note 134, at 810.
181. MARJORIE M. BERTE, HIr ME-I NEED THE MONEY! THE POLITICS OF AUTO INSUR-
ANCE REFORM 32 (1991) (making this public relations point).
182. No-Fault Auto Insurance Fraud Re: To Examine Ways to Reduce the Incidents of No-
Fault Auto Insurance Fraud in New York: Hearing Before the N.Y. State S. Standing Comm. on
Ins., 112-13 (N.Y. Apr. 26, 2011) (testimony of Kristina Baldwin, Assistant Vice President, Prop-
erty Casualty Insurers Association of America), available at http://www.nysenate.gov/files/04-26-
11%20Public%2OHearing%2OTranscript.pdf ("[W]e have to pay or deny within 30 days. And if
we miss that for some reason .... we have to pay the claim no matter how ridiculous it is.....
This hasn't actually happened, but we would have to pay for a third prosthetic leg if we were
billed for it and we missed the 30-day time frame.").
183. ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 4, at 132 ("[Slome auto insurers have cited the growth in
bad-faith lawsuits as restricting their ability to investigate questionable claims under no-fault.").
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reformers boldly predicted, and reductions have eroded over time.184
Analyzing data collected in 1977, RAND researchers concluded: "Tort
thresholds, even those of moderate stringency, seem effective in re-
ducing the number of [bodily injury] claims paid."185 Since that time,
however, tort thresholds have become substantially more porous.
One study, for example, found that, nationally, the percentage of in-
jured parties that pierce thresholds has increased from 17% in 1977 to
29% in 1997.186 In some states, the increases have been even more
dramatic. In Connecticut, for example, 63% of PIP claimants were
judged eligible for a tort claim in 1992, compared to 41% in 1987 and
just 19% in 1977.187 In Hawaii, likewise, a meager 3% of PIP claim-
ants were judged eligible for noneconomic damage payouts in 1977,
compared to 21% in 1997.188
Though verbal thresholds are seemingly less susceptible to erosion,
two of the three verbal threshold states have nevertheless seen in-
creases in the proportion of threshold-piercing claims. Of the three,
New York has appeared to hold the line on the proportion of PIP
claimants eligible for noneconomic damages, even touting a decrease
from 27% in 1977 to 22% in 1997.189 By contrast, within the same
period, Michigan witnessed more than a doubling of those who had
pierced its tough threshold, from 6% to 15%.190 In Florida, mean-
while, from 1990 to 2005, the proportion of threshold-piercing PIP
claimants also increased substantially. 191 Also surprising, all three
verbal threshold states have seen a rapid increase in their bodily injury
(that is, tort) claims as a proportion of those in auto accidents. Flor-
184. For example, after the Massachusetts law went into effect, it was predicted that "80 per-
cent of claims for personal injury will be closed completely on a no-fault basis." Automobile
Insurance Reform and Cost Savings: Hearings on S. 945 and Others Before the S. Comm. on
Commerce, 92d Cong. 420 (1971) (statement of John Jackson, Washington Rep., Commonwealth
of Massachusetts). In fact, by 1997, 52% of PIP claimants exceeded the state's monetary thresh-
old. LOUGHRAN, supra note 18, at 10.
185. HAMMTYT, supra note 168, at 75.
186. LOUGHRAN, supra note 18, at 9 (reproducing information compiled by State Farm and
the IRC).
187. Id. at 10. Connecticut abandoned no-fault in 1994. For speculation as to why monetary
thresholds have deteriorated, see infra note 312 and accompanying text.
188. LOUGHRAN, supra note 18, at 10.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Memorandum from William H. Stander, Regional Manager, Prop. Cas. Insurers Ass'n of
Am. to Rep. Dennis Ross, Chairman, House Ins. Comm. (Nov. 4, 2005), available at http://www.
myfloridahouse.gov/sections/Documents/loaddoc.aspx?PublicationType=committees&Commit
teeld=2246&Session=2006&DocumentType=Meeting%20Packets&FileName=insurance11 08
05.pdf (reporting a 35% increase from 1990 to 2005). Between 1977 and 1997, statistics suggest
that the percent of PIP claimants eligible for noneconomic damages increased marginally in
Florida, from 31% to 34%. LOUGHRAN, supra note 18, at 10.
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ida, for example, witnessed more than a doubling in bodily injury
claims per 100 property damage claims (from 9.5 to 19.1) between
1980 and 1993.192
Once thresholds are pierced, meanwhile, litigation in no-fault states
appears, if anything, more protracted-and thus more expensive-
than litigation pursued via traditional tort. The reason is this: PIP
payments, by tiding victims over, strengthen accident victim's hand
vis-a-vis insurers. Much like workers' compensation benefits are
thought to subsidize products liability claims and nonrecourse litiga-
tion loans are thought to subsidize and prolong accident litigation gen-
erally, PIP payments give accident victims the economic wherewithal
to litigate claims to the hilt.193 As one witness told a House Commit-
tee, once no-fault is in place, "[t]here is no more incentive to settle at
a bargain price a substantial liability claim because the man's medical
expenses are paid, his work loss is paid, and he will insist upon full
value for his claims."1 94
These costs add up. In 1980, Nevada repealed its no-fault legisla-
tion because, some lamented, it merely provided "a vehicle to finance
lawsuits."195 Six years later, an analysis of published appellate deci-
sions printed in the Insurance Counsel Journal, a publication for insur-
ance defense attorneys, shared the sad news: "[W]hatever the
advantages of no-fault, a reduction in court cases and court costs
would not appear to be one of them."196 Or, perhaps most telling of
192. In New York, the number of bodily injury claims per 100 property damage claims in-
creased from 11.5 in 1980 to 16.3 in 1993; in Michigan it increased from 5.8 in 1980 to 8.2 in 1993.
IRC, TRENDS IN AUTro INJURY CLAIMS, PART ONE: ANALYSIS OF CLAIM FREQUENCY 14 (2d ed.
1995).
193. Cf ABRAHAM, supra note 21, at 67 (discussing workers' compensation's role in giving
"employees access to capital, thereby providing them with staying power they would not other-
wise have in tort suits against third parties").
194. No-Fault Motor Vehicle Insurance: Hearings on H.R. 285 and Others Before the H. Sub-
comm. on Consumer Prot. and Fin. Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 94th Cong. 501
(1975) (statement of Patrick Chidness, Vice Chairman, Florida Bar No-Fault Insurance Commit-
tee); id. ("[T]he insurance companies, under the standard tort scene, were able to get settlements
of many cases merely through economic pressure, that the injured person was out of work, that
he had a lot of doctor bills and while his claim may have been worth $25,000 he had to settle for
$5,000 or $6,000 just to pay his creditors and continue to exist."). Some predicted and even
intended this result. For example, in 1977 Professor Roger Henderson wrote: "Serious injury
cases are often settled more because of the victim's economic necessity than because of the
merits of the claim." He continued: "Thus, one of the hopes of no-fault is that the seriously
injured will receive support from no-fault benefits while pursuing third-party tort claims, thereby
avoiding improvident settlements caused by dire financial need . Henderson, supra note
160, at 305-06.
195. Patrick F. Maroney, No-Fault Automobile Insurance: A Success or Failure After Eleven
Years?, 51 INs. COUNS. J. 75, 75 (1984).
196. Norman K. Risjord, Does No-Fault Reduce Litigation?, 53 INs. CouNs. J. 389, 392 (1986).
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all: When Florida recently considered abandoning no-fault-in a re-
markable turnabout-it was many within the insurance industry, com-
plaining of rampant fraud and spiraling premiums, who supported
repeal, and it was the Florida trial lawyers, "united in the belief that
the current system is working," who championed the status quo.'9 7
Andr6 Maisonpierre from the AMIA observed back in 1975: "[T]he
polls have indicated time and time again when asked, 'Why do you
like no-fault,' they say 'Because it is going to reduce costs.' If the
promise does not follow through, there will be a backlash."198
Whether because of new payments to previously ineligible victims, the
exclusion of property damage coverage, auto insurer's ultimate status
as the primary payer, the innocent or strategic increased utilization of
medical care, or the erosion of thresholds, costs were not reduced.
And backlash there was. In the handful of states where no-fault has
been abolished, rising premiums were the prime reason typically cited
for repeal.199
IV. THE OPENING AND QUICKLY CLOSING POLICY WINDOW FOR
No-FAULT INSURANCE
The above explanations supply the conventional accounts for why
no-fault failed: no-fault was associated with arguably more accidents
and inarguably higher cost. And though I believe there is undeniable
truth and power to these accounts, I also believe there is more to this
story. In order to understand no-fault's heady rise and precipitous
fall, one must not simply assess no-fault on the merits. One must also,
as Robert Rabin instructs, situate the no-fault movement within a
broader social and political milieu.
John Kingdon, in his classic book on public policy, highlights that
enactments take place during "policy windows." 200 Here, it is clear
197. Tom Zucco, Repeal No-Fault Law, Say Insurers, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Mar. 4, 2006, at
1D (quoting Glenn Klausman, Vice Chairman of the Florida Trial Lawyers Auto Insurance
Subcommittee).
198. No-Fault Motor Vehicle Insurance: Hearings on H.R. 285 and Others Before the H. Sub-
comm. on Consumer Prot. and Fin. Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 94th Cong. 395
(1975) (statement of Andrd Maisonpierre, Vice President, AMIA).
199. See, e.g., Rita Jameson, Nevada Nixes No-Fault, TRIAL, Aug. 1979, at 10 (stating that the
Nevada legislature voted to repeal no-fault law because it "was concerned that the no-fault sys-
tem had not proven to be the cost saver it was originally intended to be"); Mark Pazniokas,
House Votes to Repeal No-Fault Law, HARTFORD COURAr, June 3, 1993, at Al (describing no-
fault's repeal "as a way to save constituents money"); Otis White, Georgia Dumping No-Fault
Insurance System, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Mar. 12, 1991, at 1A (quoting Tim Ryles, Georgia
Insurance Commissioner, as saying that Georgia repealed no-fault because it "did not fulfill its
promises of lowering insurance rates").
200. See KINGDON, supra note 48, at 173-204.
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that the no-fault era dawned during a roughly seven-year period when
four factors converged to open a policy window for its enactment.
First, as Rabin has observed, the no-fault era coincided almost per-
fectly with the Public Interest Era-an era when consumer groups en-
joyed unprecedented success in passing consumer legislation.201
Second, the no-fault era dawned just as enterprise liability or the in-
surance rationale was at its zenith. Third, no-fault arrived at the pre-
cise moment when auto accidents were taking an unprecedented toll
and there was, for the first time, genuine, sustained, and widespread
focus on the auto accident problem. And finally, no-fault was intro-
duced just as there was a rising tide of frustration with various per-
ceived excesses and limits in traditional tort. Each of these factors
coalesced to make the late 1960s and early 1970s the perfect time to
enact no-fault legislation. Yet, Kingdon cautions: "Once the window
opens, it does not stay open long. An idea's time comes, but it also
passes." 202 A policy window can close, Kingdon says, because of ac-
tion or inaction, or because "the events that prompted the window to
open may pass from the scene." 203 That, I contend, is precisely what
happened here.
A. Public Interest Era
First, as initially enacted, no-fault was typically viewed as consumer
legislation. Indeed, one House witness representing the AFL-CIO
dubbed no-fault legislation "one of the most significant consumer pro-
grams in history."204 So viewed, it fit within the broader consumer
movement of the late 1960s and early 1970s, or as Rabin has dubbed
it, the Public Interest Era.205 This era marked a period when, spurred
by a restive but financially strapped Congress and President, con-
sumer causes, which offered great bang for the federal buck, moved to
the top of the domestic legislative agenda. And it was a time when
Congress's attention to consumer issues yielded great dividends, as
201. Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1189
(1986).
202. KINGDON, supra note 48, at 177.
203. Id.
204. No-Fault Motor Vehicle Insurance (Part II): Hearings on H.R. 10 and Others Before the
H. Subcomm. on Commerce and Fin. of the Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 93d
Cong. 1283 (1974) (statement of Kenneth Meiklejohn, Legislative Rep., AFL-CIO); accord No-
Fault Insurance: Hearings on S. 354 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong. 143 (1973)
(statement of Sen. Warren G. Magnuson) (deeming auto insurance one of the "two biggest con-
sumer issues in the United States").
205. Interestingly, some contemporaneous observers also attributed no-fault's early success to
its association with the consumer movement. See, e.g., Blum & Kalven, supra note 144, at 342.
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Congress passed landmark legislation dealing with a .host of issues,
from occupational health and safety to hazardous waste.206
It is first noteworthy-and a bit surprising-that no-fault was
viewed as consumer legislation, as it does not fit neatly within the con-
sumer frame: For all its advantages, after all, the legislation closed the
courthouse door to injured Americans. Furthermore, it was staunchly
opposed by none other than Ralph Nader (the movement's progenitor
and main proponent) and of course the plaintiffs' bar, which usually
could be counted on to be in the consumer camp.207 The coupling
makes sense, however, once one recalls that no-fault was most promi-
nently, frequently, and fatefully packaged as a way to bring down in-
surance rates, and it came along at a time when the cost of insurance
was viewed as a critical consumer problem, touching the lives of most
Americans.208 From 1955 to 1970, automobile insurance liability pre-
206. For more on the Public Interest Era, see Rabin, supra note 201. For a broad discussion of
the consumer movement, see MARK V. NADEL, THE POLITICS OF CONSUMER PROTECTION
(1971).
207. As U.S. Rep. Robert Krueger explained on the pages of Trial magazine: "Although no-
fault is advocated on behalf of consumers, it seems to be an odd program that assists consumers
by depriving them of cherished rights." Robert Krueger, The Faults of No-Fault Insurance,
TRIAL, Jan. 1978, at 22, 25; see also ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 4, at 44 ("No-fault ... was the
rare, consumer-oriented tort reform that narrowed the consumer's ability to sue."). For the fact
that trial lawyers generally supported consumer legislation, see No-Fault Motor Vehicle Insur-
ance (Part II): Hearings on H.R. 10 and Others Before the H. Subcomm. on Commerce and Fin.
of the Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 93d Cong. 1584 (1974) (statement of Sen.
Frank E. Moss) ("[O]f the work that we have done in the field of consumerism with this single
exception I have found myself in agreement also with the position of the trial lawyers. . .. "). For
Ralph Nader's unparalleled prominence, see NADEL, supra note 206, at 42 ("Ralph Nader
quickly became a personal symbol of the drive for consumer protection policy."). For Nader's
opposition to no-fault legislation, see Thomas Whiteside, Profiles: A Countervailing Force-II,
NEW YORKER, Oct. 15, 1973, at 46, 96. At least initially, Nader attributed his opposition to the
fact "that [no-fault] went nowhere near far enough in attempting to reform insurance-industry
practices." Id. Instead of no-fault, Nader favored "either a system of social insurance" or "en-
terprise liability, where the companies who produce the cars also have an insurance policy at-
tached to the cars." Id. Much later, Nader pivoted some, attributing his opposition to the fact
that "any system that eliminated pain-and-suffering damages was 'dehumanizing."' BURKE,
supra note 19, at 62 (citing Interview with Ralph Nader, Washington, D.C. (May 2, 1994)); see
also Auto Insurance Reform: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci., and Transp.,
106th Cong. 31 (1999) (statement of Ralph Nader, Consumer Advocate, Center for Responsive
Law, and Harvey Rosenfield, President, Foundation for Taxpayer and Consumer Rights) ("By
taking away the right of injured motorists to seek compensation for their human pain and suffer-
ing, no-fault depersonalizes the human being, treating injured people as the equivalent of damaged
property.").
208. Investigation of Auto Insurance: Hearings on S.J. Res. 129 and Others Before the S. Con-
sumer Subcomm. of the Comm. on Commerce, 90th Cong. 22 (1968) (statement of Andrew J.
Biemiller, Director, Department of Legislation, AFL-CIO) ("The mounting grievances over the
unsatisfactory performance of the automobile insurance system have now reached a full head of
steam. Few so-called consumer issues touch the lives of such a large proportion of American
families.").
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miums soared from $2.4 billion to $8.9 billion and the cost-per-driver
far outstripped inflation, leading to, as the Consumers Union put it,
"runaway rates."209 So packaged and so timed, no-fault won the af-
fection and enthusiastic backing of organized labor and various con-
sumer groups, and its chief congressional champions were Warren G.
Magnuson, Philip A. Hart, and Frank E. Moss in the Senate and John
E. Moss in the House of Representatives-four legislators who were
widely credited for leading the consumer charge. 210
No-fault's association with the consumer movement, then, helps to
explain a couple of critical points. First, no-fault supporters' impulse
to fit the legislation (however uneasily) within the powerful consumer
movement provides a clue, I suggest, to solve the puzzle raised at the
outset-namely, why no-fault supporters seemingly painted them-
selves into a corner by promising lower rates, even when those rate
reductions could not be assured. It was only by packaging no-fault as
a rate reducer that proponents were able to ride the consumer wave.
But doing so was, of course, dangerous because, by selling no-fault on
the promise of lower premiums, no-fault proponents were easily (and
perhaps fatally) attacked when those reductions failed to materialize.
At the same time, situating the drive for no-fault within the con-
sumer movement helps to explain no-fault's sudden loss of momen-
tum. 2 11 From the mid-1960s through the mid-1970s, when the
consumer movement was at its most muscular, the stars were seem-
ingly aligned for no-fault's enactment. But then, in the late 1970s, the
nation's political winds started to shift, away from concern for social
welfare and environmental and consumer protection, toward individu-
alism, deregulation, and free market ideas.212 In short, by around
209. For the national premium figures, see ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 4, at 28. For the fact
premiums had outpaced inflation, see Paul G. Edwards, Allow Reform, Lawyers Urged, WASH.
PosT, Aug. 8, 1968, at C9; Can 'No Fault' Auto Insurance Offer Motorists a Better Break?, CHI.
TRIB., Oct. 11, 1970, at C13. For "runaway rates," see The 'No-Fault' Auto Insurance Contro-
versy, CONG. DIG., June 1, 1971, at 162, 184 (statement of Colston E. Warne, President, Consum-
ers Union of United States).
210. For more on these leaders, see MICHAEL R. LEMOV, PEOPLE'S WARRIOR: JOHN MOSS
AND THE FIGHT FOR FREEDOM OF INFORMATION AND CONSUMER RIGHTS (2011); PERTSCHUK,
supra note 39, at 25; NADEL, supra note 206, at 108-11.
211. See Rabin, supra note 21, at 703 (attributing no-fault's fall to the end of the Public Inter-
est Era).
212. As P.S. Atiyah wrote in 1980:
In the United States, everyone is conscious ... of a renewed faith in individualism. This
belief in individual responsibility couples well, of course, with the traditional common
law action for negligence. Individualism requires that those who are at fault for injur-
ing their neighbors should make good the consequences; it also requires that individu-
als be treated as responsible for deciding against what risks, and to what extent, they
should insure themselves. ...
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1978, experts agree that the consumer movement-to which no-fault
had long been tethered-had itself "lapsed into a state of political in-
solvency," naturally dimming no-fault's prospects for passage.2 13
Importantly, though, when talking about the fall of no-fault, we can
point to something more tangible than a subtle shift in national senti-
ment. There were personnel problems too. Namely, no-fault's four
most faithful congressional champions had, by 1979, all departed their
positions of power. First, Senator Frank Moss, who had long spon-
sored no-fault legislation, was defeated in 1976.214 Later that year, on
December 26, 1976, Senator Hart, who had worked tirelessly on be-
half of the no-fault cause, passed away.2 15 Two years later, Represen-
tative John Moss retired home to California, while Senator Magnuson
stepped down as Chair of the powerful Commerce Committee and
was replaced by Senator Howard Cannon who was "less than enthusi-
astic" about no-fault's enactment.216 After these departures no-fault
was left on Capitol Hill without those most knowledgeable about, and
invested in, the no-fault cause.
Given that the legislation was only ever enacted in the states, it is
easy to underestimate the importance of these federal develop-
ments-until, that is, one understands the particular political economy
of the no-fault debate. Throughout the early to mid-1970s, the federal
government, quite explicitly, used the specter (some said threat) of a
robust federal no-fault bill to spur the states to act. As Senator How-
ard Baker warned: "if the States should fail to take meaningful action
to rectify the glaring deficiencies of the present system, we should not
fail to do so." 217 Far from falling on deaf ears, this threat resonated
This is, therefore, a bad moment to be arguing for the virtues of no-fault
compensation.
P.S. Atiyah, No-Fault Compensation: A Question that Will Not Go Away, 1980 INs. L.J. 625,
627-28 (1980).
213. LEMOv, supra note 210, at 163 ("The end of the consumer decade can be traced to
1978."); PERTSCHUK, supra note 39, at 11 (suggesting that, by 1980, "the public-interest entrepre-
neurs appear to have lapsed into a state of political insolvency"); see also MEIER, supra note 26,
at 122 (identifying 1978 as the "end of the contemporary consumer movement"); Ralph Nader,
The Trial Bar and the Public Interest, TRIAL LAw. Q., Fall 1988, at 7, 8 ("Legislation advancing
the safety and health rights of Americans came to a halt in Congress by the late '70s.").
214. Deaths Elsewhere, BALT. SUN, Jan. 31, 2003, at 7B (providing Sen. Moss's obituary).
215. Linda E. Demkovich, The Cautious Approach of Cannon's Commerce Committee, NAT'L
J., May 27, 1978, at 846, 846 (discussing Sen. Hart's December 1976 death).
216. Chairman Cannon Looks at His Committee's Role, NAT'L J., May 27, 1978, at 848, 848;
see also Demkovich, supra note 215, at 846 (describing personnel changes in the Senate Com-
merce Committee).
217. National No-Fault Motor Vehicle Insurance Act: Hearings on S. 354 Before the S. Comm.
on Commerce, 93d Cong. 57 (1973) (opening statement of Sen. Howard H. Baker); see also
Automobile Insurance Reform and Cost Savings: Hearings on S. 945 and Others Before the S.
Comm. on Commerce, 92d Cong. 113 (1971) (statement of John A. Volpe, Secretary, DOT)
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and was often repeated. The Washington Post reported, for example,
that "an often-cited reason for passage of a bill in [Virginia's] General
Assembly has been that if the state doesn't act, the federal govern-
ment will."218 The California Bar President, generally opposed to no-
fault, nevertheless called for passage of a no-fault plan in the Golden
State, explaining: "We are very much concerned that unless a large
state, such as California, adopts a modified no-fault plan, the federal
legislation will pass." 219 So too, a Utah newspaper editorial urged:
"[U]nless the industry and the legal profession move soon Big Brother
will surely be called in to do the job."220 When the threat posed by
"Big Brother" disappeared, a potent argument in state reformers' ar-
senal likewise vanished.
B. No-Fault and Enterprise Liability
Second, as Kenneth Abraham has observed, the period when no-
fault received its warmest reception was also a time when scholarly
commentary, popular sentiment, legislative activity, and formal tort
doctrine all evidenced something of a turning away from the fault
principle. Inspired by the work of Leon Green, Fleming James, and
other Legal Realists, the 1960s and early 1970s comprised the golden
age of "enterprise liability"-the notion that business enterprises
ought to be strictly liable for harm they cause221-and what Mark
Rahdert calls the broader "insurance rationale"-the notion that
some losses ought to be passed to defendants, not because of fault, but
(agreeing that the federal government's position was to convey to the states that, if they refused
to pass no-fault legislation, "[f]ederal action may follow").
218. Helen Dewar, Legislature Spins Wheels, WASH. PosT, Mar. 11, 1973, at D1; see also Na-
tional Standards No-Fault Motor Vehicle Insurance Act: Hearings on S. 354 Before the S. Comm.
on Commerce, 94th Cong. 596 (1975) (additional submission) (statement of Philip M. Sadler,
President-Elect, Virginia State Bar, and N. Samuel Clifton, Executive Director, Virginia State
Bar) ("[Diuring the last session of the [Virginia] General Assembly one of the most pervasive
reasons for the passage of a no-fault bill was, 'if we don't do it now, Congress is going to do it for
us.'").
219. David K. Robinson, President's Message: No-Fault and the State Bar, 47 CAL. ST. B.J.,
286, 291 (1972).
220. Editorial, Needed: A New Concept in Auto Insurance, SALT LAKE TRIB., Nov. 13, 1967, at
14; see also Editorial, The Coming of No-Fault Insurance, MIAMI HERALD, June 25, 1971, at 6A
("To forestall Sen. Hart's national legislation, the insurance companies will have to stop dragging
their feet and get with it in the other 48 states.").
221. See NOLAN & URSIN, supra note 39, at 116 ("Beginning in the 1960s, the enterprise liabil-
ity theory triumphed . . . ."); George L. Priest, The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical
History of the Intellectual Foundations of Modern Tort Law, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 461, 463 (1985)
("By the mid-1950s, the theory of enterprise liability commanded almost complete support
within the academic community . . . .").
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simply because of their superior ability to bear and spread the loss. 2 2 2
During this era, there was broad agreement within academic circles
that the principal goal of tort law was not to define rules, express
moral values, correct injustices, or deter carelessness but, rather, to
compensate the injured.223 So defined, tort law's function was to shift
and spread losses with as little friction as possible, and the fault re-
quirement was little more than an antiquated and inconvenient im-
pediment in tort law's path. The time was, in other words, ideally
suited for no-fault to flourish. 224
Commentary of the era, too, reflects a broad (although certainly not
unanimous) sense that the fault principle had outlived its usefulness.
In 1965, the President of Royal Globe Insurance Companies declared:
"We live in a time when the idea is widely accepted that the injured
party deserves redress or compensation, regardless of fault." 225 The
following year, Professor Alfred F. Conard, a pioneer in auto accident
scholarship, proclaimed: "We are heading toward a socialization of
compensation for injuries." 226 And Franklin J. Marryott, Vice Presi-
dent and General Counsel of Liberty Mutual Insurance Company,
222.. See generally MARK C. RAHDERT, COVERING ACCIDENT COSTS: INSURANCE, LIABILITY,
AND TORT REFORM (1995). Rahdert explains that the term "insurance rationale" has a some-
what broader meaning than "enterprise liability" in that it refers, not only to profit-oriented
business activities, but to
any entity that enjoys advantages in obtaining insurance against the risks of injury asso-
ciated with its activities. Thus, the rationale extends to nonprofit charitable organiza-
tions, municipalities, drivers of motor vehicles, and even homeowners, all of whom ...
should be subject to liability in circumstances where they enjoy material advantages in
their ability to insure against the risk of injury.
Id at 199 n.37. See generally Jeffrey O'Connell & John Linehan, Neo No-Fault Early Offers: A
Workable Compromise Between First and Third-Party Insurance, 41 GoNz. L. REv. 103, 106-11
(2005) (discussing the rise and fall of the insurance rationale). This story is not accepted every-
where. See Gary T. Schwartz, The Beginning and the Possible End of the Rise of Modern Ameri-
can Tort Law, 26 GA. L. REV. 601, 608 (1992) (contending that post-1960 doctrine was a
consequence of judges taking negligence seriously and creating "[a] full regime of negligence
liability").
223. See, e.g., BLUM & KALVEN, supra note 134, at 15 (writing in 1965: "The question fre-
quently now heard is: 'By what arrangement can we most expeditiously maximize the shifting of
losses?"'); Guido Calabresi, The Decision for Accidents: An Approach to Nonfault Allocation of
Costs, 78 HARV. L. REV. 713, 715 (1965) ("Many recent writers have tended to focus on compen-
sation as the main purpose of accident law."); Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J.
LEGAL STUD. 29, 30 (1972) ("[Tlhe orthodox view is that the dominant purpose of civil liability
for accidents is to compensate the victim for the medical expenses, loss of earnings, suffering,
and other costs of the accident.").
224. See NOLAN & URsIN, supra note 39, at 155 ("[N]o-fault alternatives to tort law are an
implementation ... of the enterprise liability theory.").
225. Special Report on the Industry's No. 1 Problem-Auto Claims, INs. MGMT. REV., July 3,
1965, at 24 (quoting H. Clay Johnson, President of the Royal-Globe Insurance Companies).
226. Vanderwicken,supra note 101, at 161 (quoting Professor Alfred F. Conard, University of
Michigan Law School).
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published a piece in the ABA Journal documenting, in numerous con-
texts, fault's "losing battle with the quest for security." 227 A few years
later, these ideas were taken to the public via Fortune magazine:
Americans are more and more coming to feel that anyone who is
accidentally injured-whether in an automobile crash, through use
of a defective product, or by a harassed doctor-should be compen-
sated for his injury without having to go to court to prove who was
at fault. There is a growing consensus that the risks of life should
not be borne by the individual but should be spread through the
society. 228
Formal tort doctrine both spurred and reflected this shift. This
turning away from the fault principle is best exemplified by the 1963
case, Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., in which a unanimous
California Supreme Court, led by Chief Justice Traynor, announced a
standard of strict liability for personal injury caused by products.229
The following year, the American Law Institute promulgated Restate-
ment § 402A, basically enshrining the Greenman ruling, which, in
something of a tidal wave, was soon accepted by forty-one states.230
Legislation of the era also exhibited an acute sensitivity to human
welfare and endeavored to spread the cost of injury. Broadly, this was
the era when Medicare and Medicaid came into being, in 1965. And
more specifically, it was an era when a number of no-fault plans were
created: In 1957, Congress passed the Price-Anderson Act-a no-fault
compensation scheme for nuclear accident victims. 2 3 1 In 1969, Con-
gress passed the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act so "dis-
abled miners and their families will not be deserted by our society in
227. Franklin J. Marryott, The Tort System and Automobile Claims: Evaluating the Keeton-
O'Connell Proposal, 52 A.B.A. J. 639, 643 (1966).
228. Vanderwicken, supra note 101, at 161; see also Edward W. Kuhn, In Defense of the Tort
System, 56 ILL. B.J. 106, 108 (1967) (documenting "the national trend to compensate or take care
of misfortune of every kind and the victims thereof"); Knepper, supra note 110, at 514 ("There is
an attitude in our society today that all victims of accident or misfortune should be compen-
sated-regardless of fault."); Ursula Vils, Tort System Evolves to a Point of Reform, L.A. TIMES,
Feb. 24, 1977, at F1 (quoting Edward K. Hamilton of Stanford University, who noted "since the
middle '60s" the "increasing sense among the population that serious injury ought to be compen-
sated"). See generally LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, TOTAL JUSTICE (1985) (detailing, in various
contexts, American's "general expectation of recompense for injuries and loss").
229. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963).
230. William Prosser famously observed that the strict liability cases represented "the most
rapid and altogether spectacular overturn of an established rule in the entire history of the law of
torts." WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 654 (4th ed. 1971).
231. Price-Anderson Act, Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 814 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2210).
Under the Act, claimants must establish causation and proof of loss but need not establish fault.
Robert L. Rabin, Some Thoughts on the Efficacy of a Mass Toxics Administrative Compensation
Scheme, 52 MD. L. REV. 951, 955-56 (1993) (describing the scheme).
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their hour of critical and justified personal need."232 And in 1965,
California became the first state to enact a crime victims' compensa-
tion program, soon followed by New York, Maryland, and
Massachusetts. 233
The ascendance of automobile no-fault, then, tracks quite neatly a
discrete era when the compensatory goal of tort was king and, in a
drive to offer that compensation, it looked as if the negligence system
might be dismantled entirely, with a regime of strict or enterprise lia-
bility erected in its stead. But then, almost as quickly as the era
dawned, it went into, as Rabin has observed, a state of "eclipse." 234 In
the mid-1970s, a perceived crisis in insurance rates triggered a back-
lash against expanding liability, and in 1975, California started the
country on a long, tumultuous, and apparently unfinished path of tort
"reform" by enacting the Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act,
which raised various barriers to victim recovery. 235 At the same time,
within academia, the law-and-economics movement gained ground,
and Chicago School theorists drew attention to the deterrence goal of
tort, which was quite incompatible with the no-fault idea.236 By the
late 1970s, within academe, the goal of accident prevention, rather
than compensation, prevailed. 237 Around that time, corrective justice
scholars also came to the fore, and these scholars-focused on right-
ing wrongs and achieving moral redress-shared law-and-economics
232. Presidential Statement on Signing the Black Lung Benefits Act of 1972, PUB. PAPERS
608, 609 (May 20, 1972); see also Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, Pub. L. No.
91-173, 83 Stat. 742 (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 901).
233. William E. Hoelzel, A Survey of 27 Victim Compensation Programs, 63 JUDICATURE 485,
485 (1979); see also Glenn E. Floyd, Victim Compensation Plans, 55 A.B.A. J. 159, 159 (1969).
By 1980, a total of twenty-eight states had enacted legislation to compensate the victims of
crime. See Hoelzel, supra, at 485. To be sure, not all no-fault legislation was enacted in the
identified two-decade time span. Some post-date it, considerably.
234. Robert L. Rabin, Some Thoughts on the Ideology of Enterprise Liability, 55 MD. L. REV.
1190, 1208 (1996) ("For the present, [enterprise liability] is perhaps in a state of eclipse."); see
also NOLAN & URSIN, supra note 39, at 125 ("During the 1970s and 1980s, leading torts scholars
turned away from both the common law and legislative versions of the enterprise liability the-
ory."); Gregory C. Keating, The Theory of Enterprise Liability and Common Law Strict Liability,
54 VAND. L. REV. 1285, 1291 (2001) ("[E]nterprise liability has come under sustained attack
during the past twenty years . . . .").
235. CAL. CIV. CODE § 333.2 (West 2007).
236. E.g., Posner, supra note 223, at 33 ("[T]he dominant function of the fault system is to
generate rules of liability that if followed will bring about, at least approximately, the efficient-
the cost-justified-level of accidents and safety."); see also Schwartz, supra note 222, at 694
("Within legal education, the law-and-economics movement began in earnest in the early 1970s,
and by the mid-1970s had become an important force in American legal scholarship.").
237. NOLAN & URSIN, supra note 39, at 147 ("When the no-fault movement came to a stand-
still in the late 1970s, economic analysis, focused 'on liability' incentives for the prevention of




scholars' dim view of the compensation principle. 238 Soon thereafter,
formal doctrine joined in the retreat, as the drafters of the Third Re-
statement of Torts "restated" the test to be used in product warning
and design cases in a way that returned those cases to what is essen-
tially negligence. 239 No-fault lost momentum, then, in the late
1970s-just as strict liability, enterprise liability, and the insurance ra-
tionale lost their luster, and just as scholars and courts, perhaps unex-
pectedly, reasserted and trumpeted the primacy of fault.240
C. Sharply Rising and then Falling Auto Accident Fatalities
Third, the mid-1960s coincided with a sharp uptick in the number of
auto accident injuries and fatalities and also marked a period when a
particularly gifted policy entrepreneur (in the form of Ralph Nader)
and a particularly receptive president (in the form of Lyndon John-
son) thrust the auto accident problem into the national spotlight.
From the Second World War until 1960, traffic deaths per miles trav-
eled had consistently declined. But beginning in 1960, the fatality rate
started to climb-and it did not soon stop, rising four of the next five
years, which constituted the worst surge on record. Then starting in
1965, that surge-and the auto accident problem generally-slowly
started to attract attention.241 In February 1965, Senator Abraham
Ribicoff, Chair of the Senate Governmental Operations Committee's
Subcommittee on Executive Reorganization, announced that he
would hold hearings on the "fantastic carnage" caused by automo-
biles;2 4 2 in April of that year, a group of physicians picketed the New
York Automobile Show, protesting "safety defects in current auto de-
238. See id. at 147, 148. See generally Richard A. Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J.
LEGAL STUD. 151 (1973); George P. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L.
REV. 537 (1972); Ernest J. Weinrib, Understanding Tort Law, 23 VAL. U. L. REV. 485 (1989).
239. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmt. d (1998) ("Assessment of a
product design in most instances requires a comparison between an alternative design and the
product design that caused the injury, undertaken from the viewpoint of a reasonable person.
That approach is also used in administering the traditional reasonableness standard in
negligence.").
240. See RAHDERT, supra note 222, at 61 (stating that the "prominence" of the insurance
rationale "has proven to be remarkably short-lived"); G. EDWARD WHITE, TORT LAW IN
AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 280 (Expanded ed. 2003) ("[A] negligence model of tort
liability has proved unexpectedly robust ... in the late twentieth century.").
241. See Jack L. Walker, Setting the Agenda in the U.S. Senate: A Theory of Problem Selection,
7 BRIT. J. POL. Sci. 423, 432-33 (1977) (stating that "the upward turn had attracted attention"
providing "stark, unavoidable evidence that a major social problem existed").
242. See Patrick Anderson, Ralph Nader, Crusader; Or, the Rise ofa Self-Appointed Lobbyist,




signs";243 and in November, Ralph Nader's Unsafe at Any Speed, a
scathing critique of the automobile industry, hit bookstore shelves.2 44
Then, what was a trickle of concern in 1965, in 1966, became a tor-
rent.2 4 5 In January 1966, President Lyndon Johnson made a one-
sentence mention of highway safety in his State of the Union address,
and it received, according to the New York Times, "almost as much
publicity as anything else in the speech." 246 The next month, Presi-
dent Johnson went further-improbably declaring that, among the
vexing problems confronting the nation, automobile accidents ranked
second, behind only Vietnam. 247 "There is cause for sacrifice in Viet-
nam," President Johnson intoned, but "no excuse for suicide at
home." 248 In the spring of that year (after General Motors made the
unwise decision to investigate the young Nader and thus turned his
story into a scandal), Nader's monograph started to sell-spending
fifteen weeks on the New York Times bestseller list.249 And most
astonishing of all, in September 1966, Congress deemed the problem
of auto accidents so dire that, under Senator Warren Magnuson's
stewardship, it passed the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety
Act-for the first time regulating what was then the largest and most
powerful industry in the United States-and it did so unanimously.250
Auto accidents and auto insurance, meanwhile, were both logically
and rhetorically linked. In part, the rise of serious auto accidents ac-
tually made the auto-compensation problem worse: the more serious
auto accidents there were, the more accident victims there were. To
the extent victims remained uncompensated, the social problem grew
243. Joseph C. Ingraham, Physicians Picket Automobile Show, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 1965, at 34.
244. RALPH NADER, UNSAFE AT ANY SPEED: THE DESIGNED-IN DANGERS OF THE AMERI-
CAN AUTOMOBILE (1965).
245. See Walker, supra note 241, at 434 (showing that 1966 witnessed a "massive upsurge" in
news coverage of the auto accident problem).
246. Anderson, supra note 242, at 112.
247. Presidential Message, supra note 41, at 137. The message declared: "You and I know that
the gravest problem before this nation-next to war in Vietnam-is the death and destruction,
the shocking and senseless carnage, that strikes daily on our highways and that takes a higher
and more terrible toll each year." President Johnson further estimated that, within the next
decade, the annual death rate might exceed 70,000. Id.
248. Id.
249. When originally published, Unsafe at Any Speed sold a mere 25,000 copies. Sales took
off after the GM investigation broke, and the book graced the New York Times bestseller list
from April 24 through July 17, 1966. See N. Y. Times Bestseller List, http://nytbestsellerlist.com/
list/decade/1960; see also NADEL, supra note 206, at 141 (describing GM's investigation and its
aftermath).
250. See The National Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 97-449, 96 Stat. 2418
(codified at 49 U.S.C. § 301); see also MASHAW & HARFST, supra note 2, at 7. At the time, the
automobile industry reportedly employed, either directly or indirectly, one in six Americans.
Traffic Safety Act of 1966, S. REP. No. 89-1301, at 2 (1966).
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more dire. Conversely, to the extent more accident victims were com-
pensated, premiums rose and the court congestion problem became
more critical.251 And in part, the rise of serious accidents rhetorically
assisted reformers' cause: Both problems, some claimed, were simulta-
neously spiraling out of control and demanding attention. As Daniel
Patrick Moynihan wrote in the New York Times Magazine in 1967:
The problem [with automobile insurance] is precisely parallel to
that of automobile safety. The system is not working well as such,
and its secondary effects are wasteful and expensive. On either
ground change is in order, and given both, change is as near to ur-
gent as a world of competing sorrows will permit.252
Or as Senator Magnuson, fresh off steering the Auto Safety bill to-
ward its unanimous passage, declared in 1967: "Just as we developed
reasonable and responsible programs to combat the growing death toll
on our nation's highways, we must also devise programs . . . guaran-
teeing full and fair insurance coverage to every American
motorist." 253
Yet, as the following graph shows, auto accident fatalities peaked in
1966-the very year legislators were spurred to action. And then fa-
talities plummeted. The reasons for the decline are numerous and
overlapping. They include dramatically improved automobile and
highway design;254 enactment of state laws cracking down on drunk
driving and requiring seatbelts and child restraints;255 and increased
urbanization, which reduces vehicle speed and thus accident sever-
ity.2 5 6 But whatever the reason or reasons, since the mid-1960s, as the
251. See Daniel P. Moynihan, Next: A New Auto Insurance Policy, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Aug. 27,
1967, at 26, 76 ("The number of accidents goes up and up, and so does the number of claims and
counterclaims.").
252. Id.
253. Warren G. Magnuson, Probe of Abuses, TRIAL, Oct.-Nov. 1967, at 14, 15.
254. See Michael Cooper, Happy Motoring: Traffic Deaths at 61-Year Low, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
1, 2011, at A15 (describing advances in automobile and road design). According to one NHTSA
report, changes to vehicle design-including the introduction of collapsible steering wheels, lam-
inated windshields, padded dashboards, energy-absorbing fronts, over-the-shoulder seatbelts,
adjustable head rests, and front and side airbags-saved an estimated 328,551 lives from 1960
through 2002. CHARLES J. KAHANE, NHTSA, LIVES SAVED BY THE FEDERAL MOTOR VEHICLE
SAFETY STANDARDS AND OTHER VEHICLE SAFETY TECHNOLOGIES, 1960-2002 (2004), available
at http://www.nhtsa.gov/cars/rules/regrev/evaluate/pdfl809833Partl.pdf.
255. New York enacted the first seat belt use law in 1984; all states (save New Hampshire)
enacted laws by 1995. NHTSA, 2008 DECLINE, supra note 3, at 14. Tennessee enacted the first
child safety law in 1978; by 1985, all states had followed suit. Id.
256. See Auto Insurance Reform: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci., and
Transp., 106th Cong. 36-37 (1999) (statement of Ralph Nader, Consumer Advocate, Center for
Responsive Law, and Harvey Rosenfield, President, Foundation for Taxpayer and Consumer




graph shows below, auto accident fatalities have dropped precip-
itously, both as an absolute matter and particularly when adjusted for
miles traveled.257
MOTOR VEHICLE TRAFFIC FATALITIES 1960 To 2010
(PROVIDED BY TOTAL FATALITIES AND RATE PER
100 MILLION MILES TRAVELED)
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Sources: NHTSA, 2008 DECLINE, supra note 3, at 27; NHTSA, EARLY ESTIMATE OF
MOTOR VEHICLE TRAFFIC FATALITIES IN 2010, at 1 (2011).
In other words, in both absolute and relative terms, the problem of
auto accidents had simply become less dire. And just as mounting
fatalities created momentum for no-fault legislation, plummeting fa-
talities likely took some of the wind out of reformers' sails.
D. Gaps Closed, Alleged Excesses Curbed
Finally, no-fault gained momentum at a time when there was in-
creasing impatience with both the limits and excesses of traditional
tort. In terms of limits, no-fault's ascendance marked a time when
there was increasing frustration with the fact many needy accident
claimants went wholly uncompensated. And in terms of tort's ex-
cesses, no-fault's ascendance marked a time when there was signifi-
cant frustration with court congestion (reportedly traceable to too
much automobile litigation) and mounting, allegedly exorbitant, pay-
ments for noneconomic loss. Since the mid-1960s, however, these
concerns have also diminished.
257. NHTSA, 2008 DECLINE, supra note 3, at 27; NHTSA, EARLY ESTIMATE OF MOTOR VE-
HICLE TRAFFIC FATALITIES IN 2010, at 1 (2011).
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1. Fewer Uncompensated
First, the need for no-fault had long been premised on the fact auto
accidents took a tremendous, and too-often uncompensated, toll. No-
fault thus promised to narrow the "gaps in the fabric of compensation
for auto-related accidents." 258 But between 1965 and the late 1970s
when no-fault lost momentum, for reasons explained below, gaps in
compensation had considerably narrowed, draining momentum from
the no-fault movement.259
a. Broader Compensation Through Tort: Compulsory Liability
Insurance and Liberalization of Doctrine
In 1971, the DOT study, which became the factual template on
which no-fault reformers ultimately drew, found that less than half
(only about 45%) of those seriously injured or killed in auto accidents
received any benefit from the tort liability system.260 Thereafter, this
fact was seized on quickly and repeatedly endlessly, as tort's incom-
plete compensation of the injured became a resonant rallying cry for
no-fault supporters. 261 Yet, since the time of this critique, two changes
have made it easier for drivers to recover.
First, when no-fault was initially debated, only three states-New
York, North Carolina, and Massachusetts-required drivers to
purchase liability insurance.262 A number of states added compulsory
258. ABRAHAM, supra note 21, at 99.
259. See id. at 99-100 (discussing broader compensation's fact and effect); Gary T. Schwartz,
Foreword, Tort Scholarship, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 548, 550 (1985) ("By the mid-1970s ... a non-
trivial floor had been established that deprived compensation proposals much of their ur-
gency."); see, e.g., National Standards No-Fault Motor Vehicle Insurance Act: Hearings on S. 354
Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, 94th Cong. 144 (1975) (statement of Burton Johnson, Chair-
man, No-Fault Committee of the Oklahoma Bar Association) (suggesting that no-fault was los-
ing momentum because other sources of payment, such as MedPay, Medicare, and Social
Security, were increasingly available to reduce economic hardship following automobile acci-
dents); Thomas F. Lambert, Jr., Seeing the '70s-Anticipations in Automobile Law in the '70s,
1970 A.B.A. SEC. INS. NEGL. & COMP. L. PROC. 478, 510 ("I believe that with the liability and
solvency gaps progressively closing, the sharp break with the traditional tort system represented
by the various auto compensation plans is unnecessary and should be earnestly resisted.").
260. DOT 1971 REPORT, supra note 82, at 35. Injured persons were classified as "seriously
injured" if they self-reported that they had (1) been hospitalized for two weeks or more; (2)
incurred $500 or more in non-hospital medical costs; or (3) missed three weeks of work or, if not
working, six weeks or more of normal activities. Id. at 2. Of all claimants, about 47.7% received
some tort recovery. Id. at 47.
261. See ABA, supra note 137, at 13 ("It is difficult to find any advocacy of changes in auto-
mobile insurance . . . that does not mention the DOT's finding[] that: Only 45% of all those
killed or seriously injured in auto accidents benefited in any way under the tort liability
system.").
262. The remaining states had financial responsibility laws, which, as Robert Joost has ex-
plained, "are a little like the dog-bite laws; you may get the 'first bite' free, but after that you
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insurance in the early 1970s, however, and today, liability insurance is
almost uniformly compulsory. And though compulsory insurance has
not rid the roads of uninsured motorists as effectively as many had
hoped, now marginally more at-fault drivers are insured (and thus
equipped to pay damages) for the injuries they cause-which logically
increases compensation.263
Second, formal tort doctrine has itself liberalized considerably:
Starting in earnest in the late 1960s, whether by legislative action or
judicial fiat, a number of liability-limiting common law doctrines met
their demise. Most notably, from 1969 through the early 1980s, thirty-
seven states replaced contributory negligence (wherein, at least for-
mally, any fault on the plaintiff's part barred her recovery) with the
more lenient comparative negligence, 264 which, a RAND study found,
at least modestly expands the pool of compensated claimants.265
Other liability-limiting doctrines were also abolished. In 1969, Ver-
mont initiated the modern move to jettison guest statutes-which had
previously barred passengers from suing drivers for mere negligence.
By 1985, the move to repeal was almost complete, as guest statutes
were retained in only five jurisdictions. 266 During the same period,
have to have liability insurance." Automobile Insurance Reform and Cost Savings: Hearings on
S. 945 and Others Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, 92d Cong. 907 (1971) (statement of Rob-
ert H. Joost). For more on financial responsibility laws, see KEETON & O'CONNELL, supra note
52, at 102-09.
263. At the time no-fault was debated, it was believed that compulsory insurance would "go a
long way towards filling some of the [coverage] gaps." H. Laurence Ross, A Review Article on
Basic Protection for the Traffic Victim, 34 J. RISK & INS. 647, 651 (1967) (book review). When it
comes to filling gaps, however, compulsory insurance has been something of a disappointment.
The proportion of motorists without insurance has, it appears, declined-but only marginally.
Compare DOT 1971 REPORT, supra note 82, at 28 (estimating that 15%-20% of drivers were
uninsured in 1967), with INs. INFo. INsT., THE INSURANCE FACT BOOK 2010, at 68 (2011) (esti-
mating that 13.8% of drivers were uninsured in 2007).
264. Carol A. Mutter, Moving to Comparative Negligence in an Era of Tort Reform: Decisions
for Tennessee, 57 TENN. L. REV. 199, 228 (1990).
265. Prior to the formal shift, it was widely believed that juries, in administering contributory
negligence rules, in fact, employed something resembling an under-the-table comparative negli-
gence regime. See, e.g., Li v. Yellow Cab Co. of Cal., 532 P.2d 1226, 1230-32 (Cal. 1975) (recog-
nizing this belief); Malone, supra note 128, at 20, 27 ("Every practicing lawyer in a common law
state knows that if the jury gets the issue of contributory negligence, it will probably ignore the
plaintiffs fault, except as a factor to be considered in reducing the amount of the verdict.").
And, it was said that insurers did much the same. See COLUMBIA REPORT, supra note 53, at 203.
Yet, a RAND study nevertheless suggests that adopting comparative negligence did modestly
increase the proportion of compensated plaintiffs. 1 JOHN E. ROLPH ET AL., RAND, Aurromo-
BILE ACCIDENT COMPENSATION: WHO PAYS How MUCH How SOON? 18 (1985).
266. Guest statutes, which existed at one time or another in most states, were initially enacted
between 1927 and 1939, with backing by the insurance industry. Their stated aim was to deter
collusive actions and to protect drivers from lawsuits by ungrateful guests and (given the
Depression-era lineage) particularly to keep hitchhikers from profiting from drivers' largesse.
Guest statutes fell out of favor in the second half of the twentieth century. The modem, legisla-
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intrafamily, spousal, governmental, and charitable immunities were
also widely discarded. 267
And, indeed, it is here-in examining why the above changes came
about in the late 1960s and early 1970s-that an as-yet underap-
preciated irony in the rise and fall of no-fault is laid bare. In advocat-
ing no-fault, as already noted, proponents highlighted tort's
incomplete compensation of the injured as a ground for jettisoning the
tort system in the automobile context.268 No-fault's opponents, mean-
while, seized on this critique and ran with it. They wholeheartedly
agreed with proponents' diagnosis (compensation through tort was
too spotty) but disagreed with proponents' proposed cure. No-fault's
opponents, that is, insisted that compulsory liability insurance and the
liberalization of tort doctrine-rather than its brute elimination-was
the appropriate response. 269 The debate over no-fault thus helped to
kindle a wide-ranging debate about the need for compulsory liability
insurance as well as the need to dismantle various liability-limiting
doctrines.
And though it might be too much to say that no-fault caused the
adoption of compulsory liability insurance and the toppling of tradi-
tional tort doctrines-especially because all these developments took
place against the backdrop of the enterprise liability era, with its own
focus on compensation and momentum for change-it would certainly
be wrong to view these developments in a vacuum. Indeed, some no-
fault legislation simultaneously-in the same act-eliminated the
tive move to repeal began in Vermont in 1969. The Florida legislature followed suit in 1972, and
the next year California's Supreme Court declared its statute unconstitutional. By 1985, the
drive to repeal was nearly complete; guest statutes were retained in only five jurisdictions. Stan-
ley W. Widger, Jr., Note, The Present Status of Automobile Guest Statutes, 59 CORNELL L. REV.
659 (1974). Guest statutes were particularly incompatible with no-fault, as they affected only
auto claims and, after no-fault, passengers could recover automatically, irrespective of the
driver's negligence.
267. J.L.W., Commentary, Alabama's Automobile Guest Statute: The Edsel Lives!, 33 ALA. L.
REV. 143, 154-57 (1981) (cataloging the "recent trends" to abrogate traditional tort immunities);
cf KEETON & O'CONNELL, supra note 52, at 26 (stating that, even by 1965, these immunities
were "on the wane-especially that of charities").
268. See supra notes 260-61 and accompanying text.
269. E.g., ABA, supra note 137, at 18-19, 71 (suggesting that, if there is a desire to broaden
coverage, states should abolish "the remaining tort immunities," enact compulsory insurance,
and adopt comparative negligence); Automobile Insurance Reform and Cost Savings: Hearings
on S. 945 and Others Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, 92d Cong. 1639,1641 (1971) (statement
of Joe W. Henry, President, Tennessee Bar Association) (suggesting that "gaps in compensation"
should be plugged by abolishing the doctrine of contributory negligence and certain immunities
without toppling the "House of Tort"); Jacob D. Fuchsberg, Economic Burden and Social Injus-
tice Seen in W.C. System for Auto Claims, TRIAL, Oct.-Nov. 1965, at 28, 30 (stating that, instead
of jettisoning fault entirely, "comparative negligence, the rule now in only a handful of our
states, should be made universal").
[Vol. 61:303362
2012] NO-FAULT'S "DEMISE" 363
common law doctrines referenced above. 270 Other states that did not
enact no-fault, meanwhile, reported that they had, instead, addressed
the problem no-fault reformers identified by repealing guest statutes
and switching to comparative negligence, thereby removing impedi-
ments to tort recovery.271 It was while enacting no-fault that eleven
states, for the first time, passed legislation making automobile liability
insurance compulsory.272  It was a discussion of no-fault that
prompted some insurers-who had long fiercely defended contribu-
270. Connecticut simultaneously enacted no-fault, while repealing contributory negligence,
1972 Conn. Acts 438 (Reg. Sess.), amended by 1973 Conn. Acts 1458 (Reg. Sess.), and South
Carolina's add-on no-fault statute also eradicated contributory negligence for auto claims, as
well as intrafamily tort immunity. See 1974 S.C. Acts 2718. There were also near misses. For
example, Ohio's House passed a no-fault bill (which did not become law), which simultaneously
repealed the state's guest statute and enacted comparative negligence. No-Fault Insurance:
Hearings on S. 354 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong. 262 (1973) (statement of
Walter C. Beall, Executive Committee Member, Ohio State Bar Association). California's As-
sembly also passed a no-fault bill, which simultaneously abolished contributory negligence, but it
too failed to win Senate passage. Dian Dickson Ogilvie, Comment, Judicial Activism in Tort
Reform: The Guest Statute Exemplar and a Proposal for Comparative Negligence, 21 UCLA L.
REV. 1566, 1610 n.201 (1974). The timing of other no-fault enactments suggests a close connec-
tion. For example, the Oregon Governor signed a bill enacting no-fault on June 28, 1971, and a
bill enacting comparative negligence on the 30th. See OR. REV. STAT. § 742.520 (2009) (no-
fault); OR. REV. STAT. § 31.600 (2009) (comparative negligence). And, in one busy month, be-
tween February 18, 1974 and March 14, 1974, the Kansas legislature adopted no-fault, repealed
its host-guest statute, and enacted comparative negligence. See Linda L. Pfalzgraf, Note, No-
Fault Automobile Insurance: An Analysis of the Kansas Automobile Injury Reparation Act, 20
WASHBURN L.J. 375, 405 (1980-1981) ("In Kansas ... the repeal of the guest statute and the
enactment of comparative negligence coincided with the adoption of no-fault." (footnote
omitted)).
271. The Texas State Bar, for example, successfully sponsored legislation in 1973 to abolish
contributory negligence and repeal the state's host-guest statute and thereby "bring[] swifter
and more complete remedies to persons sustaining automobile accident injuries in the State."
According to the State Bar's former president: "Instead of closing the courthouse door to recov-
ery of compensation for injuries in automobile accident cases ... the Texas statute broadens the
right of recovery in a civilized and humane way...." No-Fault Motor Vehicle Insurance (Part I):
Hearings on H.R. 10 and Others Before the H. Subcomm. on Commerce and Fin. of the H.
Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 93d Cong. 476 (1974) (statement of Leroy Jeffers,
former President, State Bar of Texas); No-Fault Motor Vehicle Insurance (Part II): Hearings on
H.R. 4994 and Others Before the H. Subcomm. on Commerce and Fin. of the H. Comm. on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 92d Cong. 570 (1971) (statement of W. James Kronzer, Jr.,
Texas Trial Lawyers Association) ("[W]e in Texas keenly appreciate the efforts of the Congress
and the Department of Transportation, for without these herculean efforts to clean up the
'Augean Stables' we would still be confronted with an archaic pure contributory negligence sys-
tem."). Texas was not alone in seeing passage of pure comparative negligence as a way to deflect
calls for no-fault. See Vincent v. Pabst Brewing Co., 177 N.W.2d 513, 521 (Wis. 1970) (Hallows,
C.J., dissenting) ("What I do fear is that if the doctrine of pure comparative negligence is not
adopted, the whole fault system in torts will be repudiated and a no-fault system akin to work-
men's compensation adopted.").
272. The states making automobile liability insurance compulsory were Colorado, Connecti-
cut, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Kansas, Kentucky, Minnesota, New Jersey, North Dakota, and
Pennsylvania. DOT, 1985 FOLLOW-UP, supra note 90, at 17.
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tory negligence-to change their tune. 27 3 And perhaps most impor-
tant of all, it was while opposing no-fault that the ABA went on
record supporting comparative negligence for the first time.2 74
Contemporaneous observers, meanwhile, were not shy about draw-
ing the causal arrow. Writing in 1978, U.S. Representative Robert
Krueger asserted: "State no-fault proposals, by all accounts, inspired
the impetus of reform legislation (such as the elimination of guest stat-
utes) in the last decade." 275 In 1970, the president of ATLA called the
new consensus in favor of jettisoning contributory negligence, "one
good thing" that had come out of the no-fault furor.276 And even
more assertively, two commentators declared in 1973: "The recent leg-
islative reforms of modified comparative negligence ... and modifica-
tion of the 'guest statute' are a direct outgrowth of the earlier 'no-fault
insurance' proposals." 277 A provocative possibility, then, is that the
most enduring legacy of the no-fault movement in the United States
was not the adoption of no-fault per se but the liberalization of tradi-
tional tort that the debate over no-fault helped to inspire.
But the irony cuts deeper still. The debate surrounding no-fault
shone a harsh spotlight on tort's selectivity, and in the glare, many
liability-limiting doctrines met their demise. Compensation was ulti-
mately expanded. Though precise statistics tracking doctrinal changes
alongside compensation rates are not available, it is revealing that
273. See Automobile Insurance Reform and Cost Savings: Hearings on S. 945 and Others
Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, 92d Cong. 475 (1971) (statement of Robert V. McGowan,
President, National Association of Mutual Insurance Agents) ("We strongly urge the adoption
of the Wisconsin comparative negligence rule wherever practical."); No-Fault Motor Vehicle In-
surance (Part II): Hearings on H.R. 4994 and Others Before the H. Subcomm. on Commerce and
Fin. of the H. Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 92d Cong. 613 (1971) (statement of
Andr6 Maisonpierre, Vice President, AMIA) (advocating comparative negligence as part of a
sweeping proposal). For insurers' historic resistance, see Gary T. Schwartz, Contributory and
Comparative Negligence: A Reappraisal, 87 YALE L.J. 697, 697 n.5 (1978) ("Auto liability insur-
ers had traditionally resisted comparative negligence proposals. But by 1970, with auto no-fault
plans looming, many insurers threw their support behind comparative negligence in an effort to
expand the existing liability system so as to make it less vulnerable to the no-fault challenge.").
274. See Marryott, supra note 112, at 82-83.
275. Krueger, supra note 207, at 25.
276. Leon L. Wolfstone, Foreword to COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE: THE ATL MONOGRAPH
SERIES (William Schwartz ed., 1970).
277. Frank T. Abraham & Don R. Riddle, Comparative Negligence-A New Horizon, 25
BAYLOR L. REV. 411, 411 (1973); see also John G. Fleming, Foreword, Comparative Negligence
at Last-by Judicial Choice, 64 CALIF. L. REv. 239, 239-40 (1976) (drawing a causal link be-
tween no-fault and the adoption of comparative negligence); John W. Wade, Comparative Negli-
gence-Its Development in the United States and Its Present Status in Louisiana, 40 LA. L. REV.
299, 303-04 (1980) (same); Henry Woods, The New Kansas Comparative Negligence Act-An
Idea Whose Time Has Come, 14 WASHBURN L.J. 1, 3 (1975) ("[B]etween 1969 and 1974 twenty
states adopted some form of comparative negligence. Much of the impetus undoubtedly arose
from the threat of so-called 'no-fault' automobile accident statutes.").
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52% of all accident victims (not just those seriously injured), received
no recovery under the tort liability system according to the DOT's
1971 study.278 Twenty years later (and when counting payments under
uninsured motorist coverage), RAND reported that the number had
dropped almost in half, to less than 30%-with the single largest cate-
gory of uncompensated victims injured in single car accidents. 279
b. Broader First-Party Coverage: Expansion of First-Party
Insurance
As Kenneth Abraham and Gary Schwartz have observed, the 1970s
witnessed not just an expansion of third-party coverage and compen-
sation (through the tort system). It also witnessed a broad expansion
of first-party coverage and compensation from both private and public
sources, also reducing the force of the undercompensation critique. 280
For starters, during the late 1960s and 1970s three distinct types of
first-party auto insurance-MedPay, uninsured, and underinsured-
appear to have expanded. First, MedPay coverage, which, as noted
earlier, is a first-party coverage that provides limited (typically less
than $10,000) in guaranteed compensation for medical bills or funeral
expenses, was, by 1975, widely available and frequently purchased, ex-
cluded from less than 15% of policies. 281
278. See DOT 1971 REPORT, supra note 82, at 36.
279. CARROLL ET AL., supra note 162, at 200 (reporting that, in the traditional system, 72.8%
recovered something through third-party compensation); see also id. at 24 (noting, in a model
comparing a no-fault plan (with a strong verbal threshold) with traditional tort, "the proportion
of injured who suffered some economic loss but received no compensation is about the same");
Kinzler, supra note 26, at 15 (offering this comparison between RAND and DOT data); cf
BLUM & KALVEN, supra note 134, at 4 ("[I1f we add to the common law both compulsory liabil-
ity insurance and comparative negligence ... we end up with a negligence system under which
the vast majority of victims recover something, albeit not promptly.").
280. See ABRAHAM, supra note 21, at 99 ("By the time no-fault was being most hotly debated
in the mid-1970s, . . . other important and substantial sources of insurance were increasingly
available to compensate the victims of auto accidents for their medical expenses and lost
wages."); Schwartz, supra note 259, at 550 ("By the mid-1970s ... a nontrivial floor had been
established that deprived compensation proposals of much of their urgency.").
281. MedPay coverage was apparently invented in the late 1930s because of "a felt need that
victims of automobile accidents should be compensated . . . regardless of legal fault and more
quickly." Medical Payments Coverage in the Standard Automobile Accident Liability Policy,
1952 INs. L.J. 514, 514. For the proportion of insureds with MedPay coverage, see, for example,
No-Fault Motor Vehicle Insurance: Hearings on H.R. 285 and Others Before the H. Subcomm. on
Consumer Prot. and Fin. of the H. Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 94th Cong. 432
(1975) (letter from Lionel Van Deerlin, Chairman, Subcommittee on Consumer Protection and
Finance to Donald P. McHugh, Vice President and General Counsel, State Farm Mutual Auto-
mobile Insurance Company) (reporting that roughly 90% of policyholders carry MedPay
coverage).
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Second, insurers voluntarily developed uninsured motorist coverage
in 1955 to compensate policyholders for losses (both economic and
noneconomic) in the event a policyholder's claim against an at-fault
driver could not be satisfied.282 Within two decades of its invention,
uninsured motorist coverage became an integral part of the auto in-
surance package, with forty-nine states requiring it to be at least of-
fered and a substantial minority going further and making it
compulsory. 283 Whether by choice or by law, by 1972, a State Farm
representative reported that over 92% of its policyholders carried
such coverage-meaning that, for almost all policyholders, the nag-
ging problem of the insolvent tortfeasor had been mostly
eliminated. 284
Finally, invented in the late 1960s, underinsured motorist coverage
also spread-often providing benefits equal to the difference between
the tortfeasor's liability insurance limits and (within certain limits) the
victim's loss. 2 8 5 In the early 1970s, according to one knowledgeable
observer, underinsured-motorist insurance "barely existed" and
"wasn't even part of our discussion." 2 8 6 Not so in later years. By
1980, twenty-one states had enacted legislation requiring that insurers
at least offer underinsured motorist protection,287 and by 1990, the
vast majority of jurisdictions had done so.288
282. See 1 ALAN I. WIDISS, UNINSURED AND UNDERINSURED MOTORIST INSURANCE
§H 1.10-1.11 (2d ed. 1999) (recounting the invention of uninsured motorist coverage).
283. Gary T. Schwartz, A Proposal for Tort Reform: Reformulating Uninsured Motorist Plans,
48 OHIo ST. L.J. 419, 422 (1987). Indeed, when enacting no-fault, four states (Maryland, Minne-
sota, New Jersey, and Kentucky) simultaneously made uninsured motorist insurance compul-
sory, required that underinsured coverage be at least offered, or both. DOT, 1985 FOLLOW-UP,
supra note 90, at 18.
284. Hume, supra note 27, at 347; see also Jeffrey O'Connell & Robert H. Joost, Giving Mo-
torists a Choice Between Fault and No-Fault Insurance, in THE ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF
CHOICE No-FAULT INSURANCE, supra note 19, at 191, 207-08 & n.52 (showing that, by 1984,
nearly all motorists were covered by uninsured motorist protection).
285. See JOOST, supra note 79, § 1:12; see also Better Car Insurance Coming, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP., July 8, 1968, at 60, 62 (stating that underinsured motorist coverage is a "new type
of protection" that "is being tried out"). Contemporary observers recognized that the invention
of underinsured motorist protection might reduce the need for no-fault insurance by making
"available to everyone even more protection than the no-fault advocates desire." E.g., Henry A.
Hentemann, Underinsured Motorist Coverage; A New Coverage with New Problems, 50 INS.
COUNS. J. 365, 365 (1983) (stating that a new Ohio law (effective in June 1980), "which mandated
the offering of underinsured motorist coverage . . . . could well be the death-knell for no-fault
insurance in the state").
286. Kinzler Interview, supra note 80.
287. Michael S. Miller, Comment, Redefining Underinsured Motorist Coverage in Ohio, 44
OHIO. ST. L.J. 771, 773 (1983).
288. Martin J. Huelsmann & William G. Knoebel, Underinsured Motorists: An Evolving In-
surance Concern, 17 N. Ky. L. REv. 417, 421 & n.19 (1990).
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Non-automobile first-party insurance has also grown considerably.
Congress enacted Medicare and Medicaid in 1965-the very year Ba-
sic Protection went to press. By 1970, the programs were doling out
roughly $7 billion each year and paying most of the medical bills for
the elderly, the poor, and many of the disabled.289 Further expanding
the social safety net, between the mid-1960s and mid-1970s, private
health insurance also became much more widely available. This fact
was not lost on no-fault's opponents, and indeed, by the mid-1970s,
they had taken to reeling off health insurance statistics to argue "that
the hysteria for change which prompted the DOT study is greatly di-
minished."290 To make the case, opponents most effectively show-
cased a 1977 article in U.S. News & World Report, which showed that
between 1966 and 1976, the proportion of the American populace cov-
ered by private health insurance increased substantially (from 70% to
90%), while "[b]enefits paid by this insurance . . . more than
tripled." 291
2. Identified "Excesses" Alleviated
Just as the gaps in compensation that so troubled no-fault propo-
nents had, by the late 1970s, somewhat narrowed, identified excesses
in the tort system-specifically, the clogging of courts and the alleg-
edly excessive award of noneconomic damages-had also been
curbed.
a. Reduced Court Congestion
Between 1955 and 1970, the number of auto lawsuits increased by
50%.292 And, in some jurisdictions by the mid-1970s, auto accident
cases had proliferated to the point where they reportedly accounted
for half-or, according to some, more than half-of state court civil
289. ABRAHAM, supra note 21, at 86.
290. National Standards No-Fault Motor Vehicle Insurance Act: Hearings on S. Before the S.
Comm. on Commerce, 94th Cong. 161 (1975) (statement of James D. Fellers, President, ABA);
see also No-Fault Insurance: Hearings on S. 354 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong.
1115 (1974) (statement of Leonard Ring, ATLA) (documenting the "steady annual increase in
the number and percentage of persons covered [by health insurance policies] every year for the
past decade").
291. State No-Fault Automobile Insurance Experiences: Hearings Before the H. Subcomm. on
Consumer Prot. and Fin. of the H. Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 95th Cong. 542
(1977) (statement of William F. Blews, President, Academy of Florida Trial Lawyers) (citing
Nearly 9 out of 10 Americans Are Covered by Private Health Insurance Now, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP., Mar. 28, 1977, at 45).
292. 1 SELWYN ENZER, SOME IMPACTS OF NO-FAULT AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE-A TECH-
NOLOGY ASSESSMENT 88 (1974).
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dockets.293 This growth fed the often-articulated belief that the auto
accident situation had grown untenable. The Massachusetts Supreme
Court, for example, referred to motor vehicle claims as "a cancer." 294
And the "choking" 295 of court calendars, and the concomitant freeing
of courts "from their bondage to the automobile" 296 via no-fault legis-
lation, thus became yet another no-fault reformer rallying cry.2 9 7
Yet, here too, we see that, though the data are admittedly sparse,
there is some reason to believe that the problem no-fault proponents
identified was alleviated about the time the no-fault movement
stalled. Data suggest that, during the 1970s, auto accident litigation
was on the decline. Between 1970 and 1974, for example, 48% of civil
trials in San Francisco involved auto accidents. Between 1975 and
1979, that number dropped to 43%. And between 1980 and 1984, the
number dropped further still, to 35%.298 Cook County, Illinois trial
data also show a drop from 76% in 1970-1974 to 59% in 1980-1984.299
Likewise, between 1975 and 1985, auto cases comprised a declining
fraction of California tort filings, comprising 65% of tort filings in
1975-1976 and only 43% in 1984-1985.300
More recent data suggest the decline continued. For example, a
1987 RAND study concluded: "Auto accident cases are a steady or
declining percentage of court action."301 The study reviewed court fil-
ings in five state courts between 1980 and 1985, and reported: Auto
293. See, e.g., Pinnick v. Cleary, 271 N.E.2d 592, 603 (Mass. 1971) (reporting that, in 1967 in
Massachusetts, of 34,730 civil cases pending in Superior Courts, the vast majority (23,279) in-
volved motor vehicles); Robert E. Keeton, The Plan Presented: Elimination of Fault Principle
and Collateral Benefits Keys to Basic Protection, TRIAL, Oct.-Nov. 1967, at 15, 16 ("Typically
automobile accident cases are two-thirds or more of a court's civil jury docket."); John A. Hamil-
ton, How to Pay for 15,000,000 Auto Accidents a Year, N.Y. TIMES MAG., May 10, 1970, at 32, 34
(quoting Richard E. Stewart, New York State Superintendent of Insurance, as stating that the
"110,000 automobile liability cases now pending" in New York courts comprised "about half of
the total civil docket"); Moynihan, supra note 251, at 80 ("[A]ccident litigation accounts for an
estimated 65 to 80 per cent of the total civil court cases tried in the United States.").
294. Pinnick v. Cleary, 271 N.E.2d 592, 604 (Mass. 1971).
295. KEETON & O'CONNELL, supra note 52, at 15.
296. STATE OF N.Y. INs. DEP'T, supra note 86, at 123.
297. See, e.g., Moynihan, supra note 251, at 26 (blaming "the system of accident insurance and
claims litigation" for "steadily paralyzing the American legal system"); Editorial, No Fault: The
Time Has Come, supra note 13 (supporting strong federal no-fault legislation, in part, because
no-fault promised to "free[] the courts of a case load that has become almost intolerable");
Vanderwicken, supra note 101, at 174 ("Perhaps the weightiest criticism of the present repara-
tions system is that it is a major factor in clogging the courts.").
298. DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL., RAND, TRENDS IN TORT LITIGATION: THE STORY BE-
HIND THE STATISTIcs 9 (1987).
299. Id.
300. Id. at 8 tbl.2.1.
301. Id. at 11.
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cases comprised 61% of tort filings in 1980 and only 55% in 1985.302
The Bureau of Justice Statistics reported that the number of automo-
bile accident trials concluded in the nation's seventy-five most popu-
lous counties decreased by 29% from 1996 to 2005.303 A study by the
National Center for State Courts similarly found that automobile state
court filings declined between 1992 and 2001, a nontrivial 14%.304
And a recent RAND study tracked per capita auto lawsuit filings in
North Carolina, California, and Arizona between 1985 and 2003 and
reported the following dramatic decline:
NEW AUTO FILINGS PER 10,000 RESIDENTS












1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Source: ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 4, at 95 fig.5.2, amended to reveal only tort
states (using data from the National Center for State Court Processing Statistics
Data), reprinted with permission.305
302. Id. at 8. The five states studied were California, Hawaii, Maryland, Michigan, and Texas.
303. THOMAS H. COHEN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, TORT BENCH AND JURY TRIALS IN
STATE COURTS, 2005, at 12 (2009).
304. The study considered seventeen states, representing 53% of the U.S. population. See
NAT'L CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF STATE COURTS, EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE COURTS:
TORT AND CONTRACT, 2002, at 26 (2003), available at http://www.ncsconline.org/DResearch/
csp/2002 Files/2002_TortContract.pdf. But cf ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 4, at 93 (showing
that the percentage of civil cases disposed by trial involving automobiles increased between 1992
and 2001 in tort states).
305. Anderson and co-authors report the following about their selection of California, Ari-
zona, and North Carolina:
This set of states does not represent any selection on our part, but rather includes all
of the no-fault and tort states that consistently reported auto case data to the National
Center for State Courts. Examining the states individually reveals that, among the tort
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In sum, though the data are admittedly time-limited, partial, and
fragmentary, it seems likely that the "clogging the courts" claim was
less true by the late 1970s than it had been previously-and that the
share of court business devoted to auto cases has, since the early
1970s, markedly diminished.
b. Less in Noneconomic Damages
During the early 1960s, while court filings were on the rise, damages
in auto cases were also rising, leading the Insurance Management Re-
view to issue a "special report" on "the Industry's No. 1 Problem-
Auto Claims."306 An overcompensation critique was thus coined, and
it quickly centered on the allegedly excessive payment for
noneconomic loss, particularly for relatively minor injuries.307 Yet,
this too is an area where the purported excesses of the tort system
have been substantially alleviated.308 As the table below indicates,
noneconomic damages are shrinking, with the average bodily injury
payment per dollar of economic loss dropping from $2.29 in 1977 (the
first year the IRC collected such data) to $1.65 in 1997, a reduction of
nearly 28%. Or, as Jeffrey O'Connell noted in 1999, "the tort system
as the years go by is paying less and less for noneconomic loss and
more and more for only economic loss," 309 which is, of course, a
change that no-fault reformers had long advocated and desired.
states, California and Arizona exhibited declining trends, while North Carolina exhib-
ited a stable trend.
ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 4, at 94 n.16. Interestingly, Arizona and California have both
taken steps to reduce accident litigation. For a discussion of Arizona's efforts to reduce litiga-
tion, including mandatory court-annexed arbitration, see The Auto Choice Reform Act, Hearing
on S.625 Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci., and Transp., 105th Cong. 35-41 (1998) (state-
ment of Michael R. Perry, Esq., Carnahan & Perry, PLC, Phoenix, Arizona). In 1996, Califor-
nia's voters adopted a referendum to disqualify uninsured motorists from collecting
noneconomic damages-which would, it appears, also have the effect of reducing those individu-
als' incentive to sue. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.4(a) (West 1997).
306. Special Report on the Industry's No. I Problem-Auto Claims, supra note 225, at 23, 25
(quoting Jury Verdict Research report); id. at 27 (reporting that verdicts in cervical strain cases
rose 57% between 1960 and 1964).
307. See No-Fault Motor Vehicle Insurance (pt. I): Hearings on H.R. 10 and Others Before the
H. Subcomm. on Commerce and Fin. of the H. Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 93d
Cong. 90 (statement of John A. Volpe, Secretary, DOT) ("We believe that recovery for general
or intangible damages should be drastically limited and carefully circumscribed.").
308. When adjusted for inflation, the median jury trial award for an automobile accident case
fell a full 56.8%, from $37,000 in 1992 to $16,000 in 2001. THOMAS H. COHEN & STEVEN K.
SMITH, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CIVIL TRIAL CASES AND VERDICTS IN LARGE COUN-
TIES, 2001, at 9 (2004).
309. Auto Insurance Reform: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci., and Transp.,
106th Cong. 82 (1999) (statement of Jeffrey O'Connell, Professor of Law, University of Virginia
Law School).
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AVERAGE BODILY INJURY PAYMENT PER DOLLAR OF ECONOMIC
Loss BY YEAR
1977 1987 1992 1997
$2.29 $2.11 $1.87 $1.65
Source: IRC, INJURIES IN AUro ACCIDENTS: AN ANALYSIS OF AuTo INSURANCE
CLAIMS 7 fig.1.4 (1999).
And here, the point is conveyed graphically, with data from 1985
through 2007: In tort states, noneconomic damages have declined
sharply as a share of total payments.







1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Source: ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 4, at 116 fig.5.12 (amended to reveal only tort
data) (using data from the IRC), reprinted with permission.
V. ADVERSARIAL EQUILIBRIUM
To this point, I have mined a variety of primary sources to attempt
to enrich conventional accounts for why no-fault fizzled and also situ-
ate the no-fault experiment within a larger socio-legal framework. In
this Part, I step back to view the no-fault experience not in isolation
but as an exemplar of what may be a larger story about the evolution,
and ultimate convergence, of legal regimes over time. In particular, I
suggest a tentative but intriguing possibility: When operating in paral-
lel, even systems with very different formal rules may shed their ex-
cesses and patch their limits to gradually meet at a point I call the
adversarial equilibrium. That shedding and patching may be precisely
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what happened here. And, that shedding and patching might provide
a clue to a final puzzle: not why the no-fault movement initially stalled
in the late 1970s, as much of the convergence did not become evident
until much later, but instead, why more recent attempts to revitalize
the no-fault idea (including in California, Arizona, Rhode Island, and
also at the federal level) have all failed.310
We take as a starting point the observation that automobile no-fault
plans have become, by virtually any measure, gradually less effective
over time.311 In nearly every state, the costs of no-fault have progres-
sively risen, and, more important for our present purposes, no-fault's
benefits (whether in deterring fraud, limiting third-party claims, re-
ducing court congestion, or curbing lawyer retention) have progres-
sively diminished. Why did no-fault's benefits erode over time? In
large part the answer is simple. Most states limited access to the tort
system via monetary thresholds, and, except in Hawaii, these thresh-
olds were not indexed for inflation. As time went by, they became
easier to pierce. As more thresholds were pierced, more claims were
routed to the tort system, with the costs, delays, and inefficiencies that
that entails.312 Fair enough, but this explanation is also incomplete.
The reason why some states with verbal thresholds, which are not sus-
ceptible to monetary inflation, have seen thresholds erode, bodily in-
jury claims rise, and fraud mount for example, remains something of a
mystery.313
Likewise, it is also true that, over the past three decades, the tort
system in the automobile context has become gradually less selective
in its compensation, less generous in its awards, and less adversarial in
310. No-fault was on California's ballot in 1988 and 1996. A choice no-fault measure was on
Arizona's ballot in 1990. Choice no-fault legislation was considered (and rejected) on multiple
occasions in the Rhode Island legislature in the early 1990s. And there was finally a serious,
bipartisan campaign to enact federal choice no-fault legislation in the late 1990s. Those attempts
all failed. To be sure, no-fault's opponents did not focus their critique on the points that follow;
they were largely focused on no-fault's unexpectedly high cost, explored in Part III. But, while
opposing federal no-fault, some congressional witnesses did note that (1) tort had itself changed
in the intervening decades and (2) the test of time had revealed that no-fault was susceptible to
some of the same abuses as the tort system. See infra notes 327 and 330. Moreover, congres-
sional testimony from the 1990s is at times revealing for what it does not include. Early no-fault
advocates focused heavily on the need to alleviate court congestion and remedy tort's incom-
plete compensation of the injured. By the late 1990s, these claims were scarce.
311. Recall that, when first enacted, most no-fault plans were seen as great successes. See
supra notes 114-19 and accompanying text. It was only later that thresholds became easier to
pierce, the cost of no-fault soared, the retention of lawyers nearly doubled, fraud increased, and
bodily injury lawsuits rose.
312. See LOUGHRAN, supra note 18, at 10 (highlighting the erosion between 1977 and 1997).
313. In New York, the number of bodily injury claims per 100 property damage claims in-
creased from 11.5 in 1980 to 16.3 in 1993; in Michigan it increased from 5.8 in 1980 to 8.2 in 1993;
in Florida it increased from 9.5 in 1980 to 19.1 in 1993. IRC, supra note 192, at 14.
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its operation. Again, two of these three trends are susceptible to any
number of micro explanations. In Part IV.D., I suggested that
broader compensation is traceable (at least in part) to the widespread
adoption of compulsory liability insurance and the demise of host-
guest statutes, common law immunities, and contributory negligence.
So too, declining noneconomic damages can be traced to a swirl of
factors, including bodily injury liability limits lagging behind inflation,
the enactment of formal tort reform measures (particularly caps on
noneconomic damages), and various groups' aggressive and insistent
tort reform-related publicity campaigns. 314 But still, there are puzzles.
A convincing explanation for the overall drop in automobile lawsuits,
for example, remains elusive.
The adversarial equilibrium idea provides a possible explanation for
the above anomalies. It takes as its point of departure Professor John
Witt's "convergence thesis." Specifically, Witt has observed that, for
"mature torts"-torts in which the law is relatively settled and in
which injuries recur in clustered fact patterns (so, automobile cases fit
nicely)-"tort practice converges with the practice of publicly admin-
istered systems such as workers' compensation."3 15  Drawing princi-
pally on his work with Samuel Issacharoff and also on H. Laurence
Ross's classic study of insurance claim adjustment, Witt writes: "Both
[tort practice and publicly administered systems] are organized
around bureaucratic administration. Both adopt rules rather than
314. As noted in the text, when considering why noneconomic damages have dropped as a
share of total payments, possibilities abound. One partial explanation is that bodily injury liabil-
ity limits, which, in practical terms typically define the scope of recovery, see supra note 122,
have not kept pace with inflation. IRC data show that 52% of all policyholders carry $50,000 or
less of liability insurance (with most of such policyholders carrying $25,000 or less). Given rising
medical costs, such limits leave little for noneconomic loss. IRC, INJURIES IN AUTro ACCIDENTS:
AN ANALYSIS OF AUTro INSURANCE CLAIMs 104 (1999). Other explanations are that, by the late
1970s, the tort reform movement had started to assert itself and a slew of formal tort reform
measures-alongside tort-reform-related publicity campaigns-influenced the ability and the
willingness of juries to award large judgments. See Kenneth S. Abraham, Stable Divisions of
Authority, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 963, 965 (2009) (discussing various trends); Nora Freeman
Engstrom, Run-of-the-Mill Justice, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1485, 1528 & n.28
2 (2009) (same).
Most notably a number of states have capped noneconomic damages, which, according to two
researchers, corresponds to a substantial decrease in claim size. Mark J. Browne & Robert
Puelz, Statutory Rules, Attorney Involvement, and Automobile Liability Claims, 63 J. RISK & INS.
77, 79-80 (1996) (analyzing bodily injury liability claims from twenty-one states and finding that
caps on noneconomic damages correspond to a decrease in claim size by 62% and limits on
punitive damages decrease claim size by 40%).
315. Witt, supra note 43, at 268. As noted in the text, to support his convergence thesis, Witt
principally draws on Ross, supra note 174, and Samuel Issacharoff & John Fabian Witt, The
Inevitability of Aggregate Settlement: An Institutional Account of American Tort Law, 57 VAND.
L. REV. 1571, 1571 (2004).
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standards to facilitate the claims processing; both construct grids to
measure the damages that arise out of routine injuries."316
Witt's thesis is provocative, but I submit that, at least in the automo-
bile context, it does not go far enough. While Witt suggests that the
on-the-ground process of settling automobile claims in fault and no-
fault regimes is destined to converge, I suggest that the bird's-eye-
view product of claims adjustment in fault and no-fault states has con-
verged over time. In recent decades, the claiming practices in tort
states have become less adversarial (as we see a rising tide of claims
but paradoxically fewer filed lawsuits),317 and compensation has be-
come simultaneously broader and yet shallower, meaning that more
accident victims recover but, when it comes to noneconomic damages,
victims tend to recover less.3 18 There has been a shift, in other words,
toward something that more closely resembles a no-fault scheme. All
the while, no-fault states have exhibited much the opposite. Over the
years, no-fault states have exhibited a decisive trend toward adversari-
alism: more pierced thresholds, more bodily injury claims, more law-
suits, and more lawyers. When judged by the proportion of claimants
who recover, the amount they recover, who they recover from, the
legitimacy of the claims they are recovering for, and the processes
claimants use to obtain that recovery, the two systems that have such
different formal rules have, in operation, reached some kind of adver-
sarial equilibrium. Tugged toward that adversarial equilibrium, no-
fault's vaunted benefits-and also, I hasten to add, tort's limits and
excesses-have faded over time.
Consider first the breadth of compensation. A significant reason for
no-fault, its supporters long claimed, was that the tort system was too
selective in its compensation, providing nothing to the majority of
those hurt. 319 No more. By 1985, the Department of Transportation
reported to Congress that "[m]odifications have been made [to the
tort system] that have had the effect of reducing the role of fault in the
system and thus permitting more and more auto accident victims to
obtain compensation." 320 "In most states today," the report contin-
316. Witt, supra note 43, at 268-69.
317. See Mark J. Browne & Joan T. Schmit, Patterns in Personal Automobile Third-Party
Bodily Injury Litigation: 1977-1997, at 16 (Sept. 2, 2004) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract588481.
318. See IRC, supra note 176, at 25 (noting a "steady increase in bodily injury liability claim
frequency from 1980 to 1993"); STEPHEN CARROLL ET AL., RAND, THE COSTS OF EXCESS MED-
ICAL CLAIMS FOR AUTOMOBILE PERSONAL INJURIES 2 (1995) (comparing data from 1980 and
1991 and finding that "[d]rivers who have accidents are more prone to submit claims").
319. See supra notes 260-61 and accompanying text.
320. DOT, 1985 FOLLOW-UP, supra note 90, at 8.
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ued, "injury victims represented by attorneys have a good chance of
recovering at least some compensation in all but single-car acci-
dents." 321 Indeed, IRC consumer-survey data reveal that, between
1998 and 2002, those in tort states recovered 79.7% of their economic
loss following car wrecks, while those in no-fault states recovered
85.7%.322 Those in no-fault states received, in other words, a little bit
more-but the gap between the two systems had closed considerably.
The composition of compensation (meaning the allocation between
economic and noneconomic damages) in fault and no-fault regimes
has also become more similar. Recall that a goal of no-fault was to
eliminate noneconomic damages for the vast majority of claims.323
But now, the two systems pay almost the same in noneconomic dam-
ages, as a share of total payments.







1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
- - - No-Fault - Tort
Source: ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 4, at 116 fig.5.12 (amended to reveal only tort
and no-fault data) (using data from the IRC), reprinted with permission.
Autombile lawsuit filing rates reveal much the same. Recall that an
important goal of no-fault, from its inception, was to alleviate court
congestion,324 and note too that it is widely believed that verbal
thresholds-more robust than dollar thresholds-do this best. More-
over, by all accounts, when Florida, Michigan, and New York first im-
321. Id. at 12.
322. See ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 4, at 87.
323. See supra note 307 and accompanying text.
324. See supra notes 292-97 and accompanying text.
/.
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plemented verbal thresholds, a precipitous drop in automobile lawsuit
filings soon followed. 325 For example, according to a 1984 report by
the New York State Insurance Department, New York's verbal thresh-
old (enacted in 1977) "resulted in a reduction in tort actions over the
1974 level of almost 80%."326
Yet the next graph compares automobile lawsuit filing rates in three
states with the strongest verbal thresholds (Florida, Michigan, and
New York) with the filing rates in the three tort states (California,
Arizona, and North Carolina) we considered earlier. And it reveals
something surprising. Around 1993, the auto filing rates in the two
systems not only converged, but they actually crossed. Florida, Michi-
gan, and New York have strong verbal thresholds limiting access to
the tort system yet more per capita auto filings than three states where
auto claims sound in traditional tort. 3 2 7
325. DOT, 1985 FOLLOW-UP, supra note 90, at 113-15 (discussing steep drops in automobile
lawsuit filings in Florida, Michigan, and New York soon after verbal thresholds were enacted).
Other states also saw significant drops in case filings following no-fault's enactment. See, e.g.,
DOT, 1971-1977, supra note 80, at 46-50 (providing Massachusetts court data from 1964
through 1975 and concluding that "the magnitude of the decline in motor vehicle tort cases [was]
surprisingly large").
326. See DOT, 1985 FOLLOW-UP, supra note 90, at 115 (quoting Letter from N.Y. Dep't of Ins.
to the DOT (Jan. 20, 1984)).
327. See ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 4, at xv ("[W]hile no-fault states had lower levels of
litigation activity . . . in the 1980s than did tort states, by 2007, the two systems had largely
converged on these characteristics."); id. at 96 (concluding that "no-fault's advantage at minimiz-
ing litigation has eroded over time"). And indeed, opponents highlighted no-fault's unproven
ability to "reduc[e] ... court cases and court costs" while testifying against choice no-fault in the
late 1990s. Auto Insurance Reform: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci., and
Transp., 106th Cong. 32 (1999) (statement of Ralph Nader, Consumer Advocate, Center for
Responsive Law, and Harvey Rosenfield, President, Foundation for Taxpayer and Consumer
Rights).
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1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004
-- - No-Fault (FL, MI, NY) - Tort (CA, AZ, NC)
Source: ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 4, at 95 fig.5.2 (amended to reveal only tort and
no-fault data), reprinted with permission. For information about the underlying data,
see id. at 95.
Attorney retention data are similar. At the time no-fault was en-
acted, it was assumed that no-fault processes would be so simple that
relatively few claimants would retain lawyers. But data reproduced
below reveal that, between 1977 and 1997, the percentage of PIP
claimants represented by attorneys nearly doubled, from 17% to 31%,
while the percentage of bodily injury claimants retaining counsel has
stayed roughly the same, meaning-once again-that the distance be-
tween the two systems has shrunk considerably.328
328. Most PIP claimants who hired attorneys reported that they did so in order to help with a
PIP claim while also pursuing an associated tort claim. Only 10% of PIP claimants reported that
help with a first-party claim was the sole reason for an attorney's involvement (although for an
additional 23% of claimants, the purpose of attorney hiring was unknown). IRC, AUro INJURY
INSURANCE CLAIMS: COUNTRYWIDE PATTERNS IN TREATMENT, COST, AND COMPENSATION 61
(2008); see also ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 4, at 94 (stating that "there was a statistically
significant increase in the use of lawyers in no-fault ... states during the 1990s" although attor-
ney involvement in tort states "was stable").
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PERCENT OF CLAIMANTS REPRESENTED BY
ATrORNEYS BY COVERAGE
Year 1977 1987 1992 1997 2002 2007
Bodily Injury 47 55 57 52 47 49
PIP 17 31 31 30 28 31 I
Sources: IRC, INJURIES IN AUTO ACCIDENTS: AN ANALYSIS OF AUTO INSURANCE
CLAIMS, 58 fig.6.2 (1999); IRC, AUTO INJURY INSURANCE CLAIMS: COUNTRYWIDE
PATTERNS IN TREATMENT, COST, AND COMPENSATION 51 (2008).
Finally, the incidence of fraud continues this now-familiar pattern.
Recall that when no-fault was first enacted, it was touted as a way to
"minimize inducements to dishonesty." 329 No-fault proponents sug-
gested both that eliminating noneconomic damages would reduce the
incentive to build one's claim and that the ongoing, first-party rela-
tionship between the insurer and policyholder would give both parties
"good reason to conduct themselves honestly and fairly."3 30  Recall
too that soon after no-fault was adopted, there were promising indica-
tions that the reform had worked; fraud, observers believed, was on
the wane.331
But now, when we consider a hallmark of fraudulent claiming-
seeking compensation for hard-to-verify soft-tissue injuries-the two
systems, fault and no-fault, again converge. 332 Though claims seeking
compensation for soft-tissue injuries were, in 1987, much less preva-
lent in no-fault states than they were in tort states, between 1987 and
2007, the gap between the two systems closed dramatically.333
329. KEETON & O'CONNELL, supra note 52, at 6.
330. Alfred F. Conard, Insurance Rates and Regulations, U. MICH. L. QUADRANGLE NOTES,
Fall 1970, at 14, 16 (suggesting that, because they have an ongoing relationship, a benefit of no-
fault insurance "will be a diminution in the shameless efforts of claimants to claim too much and
of insurers to pay too little"); see also id. at 17 ("People who will exaggerate a claim against
somebody else's insurer will be a lot more careful against their own, knowing that their losses
simply escalate their own insurance premiums (instead of somebody else's premiums.)").
331. See supra note 177-79 and accompanying text.
332. Fraud is, of course, impossible to measure in any direct fashion. To get at it, researchers
identify and measure "fraud indicators." One important fraud indicator, explored below, consid-
ers the incidence of claims for soft-tissue injuries (mostly sprains and strains), which are exceed-
ingly difficult to verify. Other fraud indicators are the incidence of claimed losses just above tort
thresholds and use of certain medical providers (such as chiropractors). For more on research-
ers' attempts to measure the incidence of fraud, see ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 4, at 98-99.
333. Indeed, by 2008, the IRC published a study with the following conclusion: "The incidence
of apparent fraud in tort states was much lower than the incidence in no-fault states." IRC,
FRAUD AND BUILDUP IN AUro INJURY INSURANCE CLAIMs 22 (2008). No-fault's susceptibility
to fraud was becoming evident even by the late 1990s. Indeed, in the 1997 Senate hearings, one
witness from Georgia warned the Senators:
There's a lesson here: no matter what proponents tell you about insurance fraud, no-
fault will not do anything to control it. On the contrary, no-fault is to insurance fraud
what octane level is to gasoline: the more no-fault you have, the greater the fraud. It
378
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PERCENTAGE OF CLAIMS WITH HARD-TO-VERIFY INJURIES:










1987 1992 1997 2002 2007
- - - Verbal No-Fault ***** Dollar No-Fault - Tort
Source: ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 4, at 107 fig.5.7 (using data from the IRC),
amended to reveal only fault and no-fault data; reprinted with permission.334
In sum, whatever the precise manner or mechanism, no-fault and
tort-the two systems that look so different on paper and that engen-
dered such bitter controversy at enactment-have become progres-
sively more and more alike.335 This convergence raises provocative
questions about no-fault's legacy and tort's durability-and, as de-
cades passed, may have chilled efforts to embark on bold reform.
VI. CONCLUSION
Writing in 1975, Jeffrey O'Connell declared: "No-fault automobile
insurance seems finally to have come of age. No army of trial attor-
neys or timid insurance executives will likely stop it now."3 36 Within
came as little surprise to me that when Georgia repealed no-fault, some medical prov-
iders who had participated in gaming Georgia's system moved to Florida, which has a
generous no-fault system.
The Auto Choice Reform Act of 1997, Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Sci. and
Transp., 105th Cong. 83 (1997) (statement of Tim Ryles, former Insurance Commissioner, State
of Georgia).
334. Anderson and his co-authors explain: "Our regression analysis controls for the time, lo-
cation (urban/rural), vehicle count, impact severity, and reported injury severity of the accident,
as well as age, gender, marital status, seat-belt use, and seat position of the victim." ANDERSON
ET AL., supra note 4, at 106.
335. In a future paper I intend to explore the adversarial equilibrium idea in more detail to
speculate on what mechanisms may be causing the observed trends and also probe whether the
idea is generalizable.
336. O'CONNELL, supra note 115, at 70.
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two years, though, the auto no-fault movement had stalled, if not for
forever, for at least half a century-a fact that has profound implica-
tions for insurance markets and auto accident litigation, of course, but
also for tort law generally, because if auto no-fault had been a roaring
success, it is surely possible that additional alternative compensation
schemes would have followed. Why, then, did no-fault stumble?
For one, "[1]ike hangover cures, campaign pledges and the rotary
engine, no-fault automobile insurance may have promised more than
it possibly could deliver." 337 Easily lost in no-fault post-mortems is
that the legislation was by no means an unmitigated failure. It did
achieve a number of its stated goals. By all accounts, PIP payments
help to level the playing field between claimants and insurers, tiding
claimants over so they can obtain adequate awards. Under no-fault,
"[t]here is no more incentive to settle at a bargain price a substantial
liability claim because the man's medical expenses are paid, his work
loss is paid, and he will insist upon full value for his claims."33 8 Re-
lieving claimants from coerced settlements is-one could certainly ar-
gue-a proud accomplishment. No-fault also speeds compensation-
by an average of two months according to a RAND estimate.339 An-
other RAND study found that "[n]o-fault approaches to compensa-
tion always reduce transaction costs, regardless of plan provisions." 340
And a 2010 RAND study reports that claimant satisfaction in no-fault
states is a little bit higher.341 If such advances had been proponents'
primary aims, the no-fault landscape might look much less bleak. But
that path was not taken. In part, I suggest, to shoehorn no-fault legis-
lation within the vigorous consumer movement, many no-fault advo-
cates promised rate reductions. And because of any number of
factors outlined above, including insurers' fateful insistence on being
primary payers, rates went up-which surely did not help reformers'
cause.
337. Tom Goldstein, No-Fault Insurance Promised More than It Has Delivered, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 3, 1977, at 6.
338. No-Fault Motor Vehicle Insurance: Hearings on H.R. 285 and Others Before the H. Sub-
comm. on Consumer Prot. and Fin. of the H. Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 94th
Cong. 501 (1975) (statement of Patrick Chidness, Vice Chairman, Florida Bar No-Fault Insur-
ance Committee).
339. STEPHEN J. CARROLL & JAMEs S. KAKALIK, RAND, NO-FAULT AUTOMOBILE INSUR-
ANCE: A POLICY PERSPECTIVE 9 (1991) ("Injured people begin receiving payments on average
about two months sooner under no-fault than under the traditional system."); see also DOT,
1985 FOLLOW-UP, supra note 90, at 4 ("Compensation payments under no-fault insurance are
made far more swiftly than under traditional auto insurance.").
340. CARROLL ET AL., supra note 162, at 43; see also DOT, 1985 FOLLOW-UP, supra note 90, at
4 ("No-fault insurance systems pay a greater percentage of premium income to injured claimants
than do traditional liability systems.").
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But to lay the blame for no-fault's demise only at the feet of soaring
premiums, plaintiffs' lawyers' staunch resistance, or proponents' over-
the-top promises misses an important part of the story. In order to
understand why no-fault suddenly gained and then lost momentum we
must not only assess no-fault on the merits. We must, as Robert Ra-
bin has suggested, situate the no-fault movement within a broader
socio-legal framework. So situated, it becomes clear that the no-fault
era represents a time when Professors Keeton and O'Connell, two
gifted and indefatigable policy entrepreneurs, thrust the idea of no-
fault onto the national stage just as four factors coalesced to open a
unique policy window for its enactment. It was the dawn of the public
interest era; within tort doctrine, enterprise liability reigned; it was a
time of rapidly rising auto accident fatalities; and there was deep dis-
satisfaction with the limits and apparent excesses of traditional tort.
As each factor, for its own reasons, ebbed, no-fault's fade was argua-
bly inevitable.
Finally, the no-fault movement, I suggest, was stung by what I call
the adversarial equilibrium. Throughout the late 1970s and early
1980s, and partly because no-fault proponents' harsh critique of the
status quo generated momentum for change, the tort system's gaps
were patched and its excesses were curbed. The tort system was no
longer as selective in its compensation, profligate in its payouts, or
adversarial in its operation as early no-fault proponents had sug-
gested. At the same time, as years went by, it became increasingly
clear that no-fault did not represent as profound a departure from the
tort system as it had initially appeared to be. Over time, in other
words, the two systems that looked so different in theory became pro-
gressively more alike in operation-making the case to jettison one in
favor of the other decidedly more difficult.
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